THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS
AS VIEWED BY THE AMERICAN PERIODICAL PRESS
1920-1937

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INTRODUCTION

The development of the Chinese Communist Party and the rise of that party from a small group of intellectuals to a major organization within China, at first a threat to and then the destroyer of the established government of the country, is an intriguing story for many historians. More and more knowledge is daily being added to the store of printed information about the party's early years and activities, about its organization and power struggles. With each addition comes a tendency to wonder how much of this was known at the time-- to the rulers of China, to foreign officials, or to the world at large.

It is not the purpose of this present study to add further information to the story of the Chinese Communist Party's growth. Rather, the study is an attempt to determine, in a limited way, how much the United States public could have known about the situation. In particular, it is a survey of how much and what variety of information about the Chinese communists was available to the American people through the medium of the country's periodical press.

American public opinion has always been of considerable importance in the shaping of United States diplomacy, as diplomats from John Jay to Dean Rusk have learned. As the information made available to the public helps determine its opinion, so it is worthwhile in the understanding of State Department actions to recognize the types and tone of data "fed," or available to, the American people.

While the earliest years of the Chinese Communist Party are not the most crucial in that Party's role in Chinese-American relations, they do provide a bedrock for later years; and it is useful, if not necessary, to have knowledge of the forces at work in this period in order to understand the attitude of Americans toward the Chinese communists in the years during and immediately after World War II.

An investigation based on but one portion of the printed material available to the public at any one time, in this instance on the periodical press, cannot hope to be a completely accurate indicator of American public opinion or even of the forces shaping that opinion. There are numerous other factors to be considered-- especially the daily newspapers of the United States. Nevertheless, such a study throws considerable light on both the views of the people and the reasons for these views, as editors of periodicals are likely to comment on other forms of news items, and the writers of magazine articles often present more considered material than do news columnists.

The period chosen for study was that between 1920, when the first Chinese Communist cells were organized, and 1937, when the Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party and the Chinese Communist Party entered into their second uneasy alliance, this time the united front against Japanese encroachment. The latter was also the year in which Red Star Over China was published. This work by Edgar Snow, an American journalist who had visited the Communists in the

Northwest, observed their life there, and interviewed their leaders, has become a classic account of the early years of Chinese Communism. Much of the book was entirely new to the United States reading public, and it made a strong impact.

To appreciate that impact is, again, to understand what was known about the book's topic before its publication. Thus, this dissertation attempts to answer numerous factual questions as to how soon the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party became general knowledge, when Russian involvement was reported, how much was known about communist activities at the time of the founding of the first soviets in Kiangsi, how much was known of the Long March at the time, and what information was available about the new bases in Shensi before Snow's observations were published. This study also tries to discover common attitudes of the period in the United States. What were attitudes about Bolshevism and Russia's involvement in China? Did they differ greatly from those of the Cold War years? If so, how? What were opinions of the Kuomintang-- before and after it came to power? Did opinions change when communists were ousted from that party? When did the practices of the communists first become, in some western eyes, a viable alternative to those of the Nationalists? Were the activities of Mao Tse-tung and his followers looked on as communist, or were these men described then, as later, as merely "agrarian reformers"?

As one small section of a country's history cannot be wholly divorced from the rest, it is necessary to mention in some degree other forces at work in China-- missionaries, businessmen, diplomats, warlords, and natural disasters--but these other forces are slighted somewhat in order to concentrate on the communists, then a fringe movement. Such facets of Chinese life are discussed only as they related directly or indirectly to the Chinese communists. Thus this study cannot be considered completely representative of the periodical press's treatment of China itself in this period, though some attempt to show perspective is made.

Research such as this also involves an evaluation of sources. Using only certain years of a selected variety of magazines results in something like a history of those periodicals and their treatment of the topic. Therefore this dissertation serves not only as a place to discuss what periodicals were telling the public about China, but as an opportunity to evaluate the information put forth, by comparing what was said to be happening with what really happened, taking into consideration, of course, whether information was readily available to correspondents.

It was decided, in selecting the periodicals to be considered at this time, to concentrate on those aimed at the general public. Thus more specialized works could be eliminated, and there was no need to search through womens' magazines, children's magazines, boilermakers' journals, and those periodicals directed toward devotees of certain hobbies or toward various professional groups. In most cases, little or nothing could be lost by such selectivity, as the majority of these would be unlikely to contain any relevant information anyway. Similarly, all quarterlies were struck from the list as being of too infrequent publication to be responsive to international events. Also omitted were such magazines as the *Saturday Review of Literature* and the *Review*, whose interests were felt to be too restricted in scope.

After a check had been made of lists of magazines published in the 1920-1937 period, twenty-seven were selected as representative and useful. Of these, twelve were published on a monthly basis, while fourteen were weeklies, and one appeared twice a month. During the eighteen years under consideration, there were a few changes in this proportion. The *Living Age*, for example, which appeared bi-monthly for most of the period, became a monthly in 1930-1931; and the *World Tomorrow*, a monthly for most of its career, became a weekly in September of 1932. Two years later it joined forces with the *Christian Century*. Two other mergers took place during the period. The *Century* was taken over by the *Forum*, while in 1928 the *Independent* joined the *Outlook*, which in turn became the *New Outlook* in 1932 and ceased publication in 1934. Magazines such as *Time*, *Life*, and *Newsweek* were begun at various times during the period.

Of the monthlies, two were directly concerned with international affairs. The first, *Current History*, contained articles about current issues as well as a monthly section devoted to the progress of events. One column in the section was usually entitled "The Far East" and contained a monthly resume of the news from China and Japan. Written by university professors who relied largely on news reports, its contents and outlook varied somewhat with the columnist, but were in general of an enlightened, conservative nature. The other monthly of this sort, Asia, as its title suggests, confined its topics to the non-western world, though this expanded from Asia proper to include Hawaii, Alaska, and the Pacific Islands, as well as Russia and parts of Africa. Its contents were almost wholly in the form of signed articles. Even its editor, when he had more to say than could be accomplished in an introduction to another contribution, spoke through articles. Selections were usually from writers in the field or just returned from there, in contrast with those of Current History, which seemed largely observations made from a distance. The general tenor of the articles on Chinese politics and Chinese life was liberal (Asia and the New Republic shared the same founder); though an attempt was made to include the opposing view, an editorial introduction often made it clear that this was happening.

Many of the other monthlies had so few articles on China that it is difficult to detect a bias or point of view. The American Mercury consistently ignored Asian matters, stopping its ridiculing of American life only long enough to condemn American missionaries to China until the 1930's, when it accepted two articles which condemned the Chinese government. In Forum, Century, Harper's, the North American Review, Current Opinion, and the Atlantic Monthly were printed occasional articles about China's politics; but there seemed no really unifying characteristic of these, though the last three were perhaps inclined to conservatism. Those writings in the Review of Reviews were more of a kind, being pro-nationalist and anti-communist. An occasional editorial showed a similar outlook.

The World Tomorrow, though never with a very large circulation, was used in this study because of its Christian Socialist orientation. The one remaining monthly also had a small circulation. The Missionary Review was selected for consideration because of the importance of Protestant missionaries in China in the period under discussion. It was hoped that information from these Americans who were not in treaty ports but in the hinterlands of China would find expression in a missionary magazine. Once or twice this was the case, but missionaries who had things to say to their countrymen about matters other than their successes at the missions said it most often through other types of periodicals.

Three weekly magazines were also selected with an eye to missionary reports. These proved of more value. The non-denominational Christian Century maintained active contact with contributors in China, and its editors frequently commented on the course of events there. Though attention was focused on issues connected with the church and on ethical problems, it shared its outlook-- and its contributors-- with other, non-religious, liberal magazines. The remaining two religious-oriented periodicals were published by Catholic groups. America contained few articles on China, but had a weekly news column which, until the mid-1930's, included information on Chinese events in perhaps three of four issues. Its information was not always accurate; but, by printing unconfirmed rumors, this column was often able to produce bits of news which the other magazines missed. The Commonweal began publication late in 1924. Its Irish Catholic editorial staff gave its editorials an anti-Bolshevist, anti-British orientation; and its few articles on China continued the tradition.

The Argonaut was another periodical with a limited circulation which was included because of its other characteristics. In this case, its location brought it to service. With a San Francisco orientation, it provided a contrast with the other, Eastern-based, magazines. Proving that closer proximity does not necessarily produce an interest, its editors managed to ignore the Far East a large part of the time, though indicating a strong anti-Bolshevik attitude when speaking of Europe. San Francisco still reflected the race bias which had threatened international affairs a few decades earlier. No other magazine spoke so contemptuously of the Chinese as a group.

Two periodicals used as their sources only information appearing in newspapers and other magazines. The Literary Digest gathered material from works throughout the United States and abroad and presented the differing viewpoints on a variety of matters. It also condensed longer articles at times. Its selections of quotes and cartoons, as well as its editorial comments, suggested an anti-communist, pro-British viewpoint; but it did give both sides. The _Living Age_ printed, rather than condensations and digests, entire selections from foreign newspapers and magazines, explaining only if the publication quoted was a liberal, socialist, conservative, or communist organ. Occasional editorials were factual or reported rumors.

Colliers and the _Saturday Evening Post_ both had very high circulation figures, the latter distributing over two million copies annually throughout the period and the former reaching that figure in the early 1930's. _Colliers_ showed no interest in Chinese politics, while the _Saturday Evening Post_ printed long but very infrequent articles on that country-- too infrequent to be indicative of any over-all attitude.

The _Independent_ and the _Outlook_ were both concerned with dispensing information and discussing trends and events. The former had a column on news events, but seldom discussed China there. However, its articles and its editorials did include information and ideas about that country, most of which displayed a considerable amount of faith in the ability of the Chinese to manage their own affairs. Articles in the _Outlook_ were varied in content, from those by a "white" Russian officer through one by the Moscow-based American, Anna Louise Strong. The editors remained independent and detached, though interested.

Two of the weeklies may be classed as "liberal." Both the Nation and the New Republic were concerned with the world situation and somewhat scornful of traditional methods of handling international affairs; both called for a new outlook. The Nation sent one of its editors to China in 1926 to observe and write on matters of interest there-- the rising Nationalist party, the changes being made in labor organization. It also accepted contributions from "liberal" journalist observers in China and printed occasional selections from foreign papers--both commentary and official communiques or statements. A weekly editorial column commented on world events, including Chinese affairs from time to time. The New Republic printed fewer official statements and used only occasional articles from the field, but maintained much the same general outlook as the Nation. It too supported Chinese nationalism-- though not always the Nationalists-- in its editorial commentary.

The only news weekly for much of the period, Time was established by the son of missionaries to China. Thus there was interest in that country, though coverage was not extensive. In the rather flippant style which has always been characteristic, it discussed the Chinese situation from a pro-Nationalist, anti-communist point of view, showing an early bias toward the Kuomintang, even when disapproving of its methods. The picture weekly Life, with the same publisher, showed similar views during the short while it was published in the period. In 1933, Newsweek appeared on the scene. It was similar in format to Time, but less flippant-- and with less interest in China. What few references appeared in the period were relatively without bias.

All of these magazines were read through as carefully as their makeup dictated. Colliers and the Saturday Evening Post were well indexed in the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature; and when a search of a few volumes failed to unearth anything not included in that guide book, it was relied on completely. The other weeklies demanded at times a page-by-page survey of editorials and news columns, though individual indices were of much value when well done (and the usefulness of any magazine's index varied considerably over eighteen years). News columns in all cases required careful perusal. From all this came the information which follows-- more at times than was expected, and less at other times than seemed at all logical.

CHAPTER I, 1920-1925

When communist activity first began in China, it was small-scale, secretive, and unheralded in the press, though not completely unexpected. Events in the rest of the world led writers to expect "Bolshevik" agitation everywhere, and they passed on occasional rumors about its presence in China. Communist Russia was at this time making overtures to various nations to gain diplomatic recognition for its new government, and correspondents tended to equate this with the attempt to spread communism throughout the world.

PARTY BEGINNINGS

In March, 1920, the Chinese government at Peking received a note from Moscow signed by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Leo Karakhan, and containing a suggested basis for the beginning of diplomatic relations between the three-year-old Soviet government in Russia and the Chinese Republic. Soviet Russia therein renounced all special favors won from China by the tsars and declared that negotiations between the two nations would be on the basis of complete equality.[1]

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[1] This note, sent via Irkutsk, was written on July 15, 1919, but, according to claims of the Chinese government, was not received in Peking until March of the following year. Different texts made different offers. The version most often quoted and given widest publicy was that which included an offer to give up Russia's interests in the jointly constructed Chinese Eastern Railway. Of great strategic value, this railway passed through northern Manchuria and was the most direct link between Vladivostok and western Russia. The railway also owned mining and timber rights in Manchuria. Russia later denied having made these offers, claiming only to have renounced extraterritoriality, concessions, and

Later that spring, though it was not known to the public at the time, the Third Communist International (Comintern) dispatched to China from Moscow two agents whose assignment was to organize China's leftists into the beginnings of a Chinese communist party.[2]

Conditions in China were ripe for the reception of revolutionary ideas. The Chinese Republic, established so hopefully after the 1911 Revolution, had not succeeded in bringing to China a strong central government. Internal chaos resulted from warlords controlling the provinces and quarreling with each other and the Peking government, while international weaknesses had been evident at the Paris Peace Conference of the year before. China had been unable to profit from the stated principles of that conference or to regain control of its own territory and its own tariffs.[3] Disappointments and

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similar results of "unequal treaties," plus treaties with third powers concerning China. This note was not answered by the Chinese. Its contents were printed in Current History XII (Oct., 1920), 47-48.

[2] According to a statement of the American consul at Canton, even the British Intelligence was unaware of the presence of Russian agents in China until after the Hong Kong strike of 1922. Jay Calvin Huston, "Sun Yat-sen, the Kuomintang and the Chinese-Russian Economic Political Alliance" (unpublished manuscript, on file in Hoover Institute and Library), p. 47.

[3] Japan was permitted to retain the formerly German holdings which it had "captured" in the early years of the war; and the French and British still held "concessions" in numerous Chinese cities, areas which were like bits of England or France, entirely in the hands of the foreigners. The customs collection in China had been under international control since 1853.

frustrations brought by the failure to do so led to the "May Fourth Movement": demonstrations begun by students and supported by workers in cities throughout China.

China had been intellectually in ferment for decades, with traditional and western thought in conflict. Since 1911 western ideas had largely won out, and the Chinese were busily trying to adapt useful concepts of western thinkers to their way of life. Especially influential were John Dewey and Bertrand Russell, both of whom visited China in the 1919-1920 period, and both of whose views of that country were widely quoted in the United States later.

Marxism itself does not seem to have made any inroads into Chinese thought prior to the Russian revolution, but some Chinese intellectuals soon saw in the Russian experience an example for China. As early as the spring of 1918, Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Li Ta-chao, professors at the National University at Peking,[4] had formed a Society for the Study of Marxism among students there. A similar group had been formed later in the year in Shanghai. By 1920 Chou En-lai and Li Li-san had helped start a communist cell in Paris among students and coolies sent to France to help dig trenches during the war, and Chu Teh had been instrumental in the formation of a cell among Chinese students in Berlin. Other groups were formed by Chinese in Japan and in Moscow.

4. For an analysis of the development of the thought of these two prominent early Chinese communists, see Benjamin I. Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 8-27.

While an interest in Marxism sprang up indigenously among certain of China's intellectuals, Moscow had a hand in the formation of the Chinese Communist Party. The Comintern, organized in 1919, largely to aid what was thought to be the natural victory of communism over capitalism, sent as agents to China in the spring of 1920 Grigori Voitinsky and Yang Ming-ch'ai, an overseas Chinese who was then in Moscow. They were to direct party organization. Working with left-leaning individuals in Shanghai, these men set up what became the nucleus of the Chinese Communist Party. Ch'en Tu-hsiu was then in Shanghai. He had been arrested earlier for spreading revolutionary ideas through magazines he edited and had gone to the International Settlement of that city after his release from jail in order to be out of the reach of the Chinese government. Later that year party cells were formed in Hunan (under the direction of Mao Tse-tung) and in Hupeh (led by Tung Pi-wu).

During the first week of September, 1920, a conference was held at Baku, in Southern Russia, on the shores of the Caspian Sea. Called the Congress of Eastern Peoples, it was attended by delegates of many Near Eastern and Far Eastern countries, including China, and was a part of the plan for extending communism toward the east. In one of the speeches delivered at this conference Grigori Zinoviev, speaking for the Communist International, whose Second Congress in July had devoted attention to prospects in Asia, called for a world revolution, mentioning Asia and Africa in particular.[5]

In the autumn of 1920, given hope by the overthrow of the pro-Japanese "Anfu government" at Peking by Chang Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu, warlords of Manchuria and central China, the Russian government again declared its willingness to negotiate with China on the basis of equality.[6] In December the Chinese government, reorganized by Chang and Wu, was persuaded to break with the present, Kerensky-appointed, Russian minister. Moscow's link with Peking at that time was through a representative of the Far Eastern Republic, formed as an autonomous buffer state between China and Russia, but later incorporated into the U.S.S.R.

The American periodical press was not overly concerned with the Chinese-Russian situation in 1920. While interest in and fear of "Bolshevism" was apparent in most of the magazines of the time, attention was largely directed toward Europe, where events were moving quickly, or toward the United States, where overtones of the previous year's "red scare" were obvious. The Far East was far away, and interest in conditions there was slight. And, as already noted, Americans and Europeans did not know that Comintern agents were at work in China.

In the April issue of Asia there appeared an article

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5. The text of this speech was printed in Current History XXIII (Mar., 1921), 463-466. The Comintern Congress had prepared practical directives based on Lenin's theory of imperialism and its application in the colonial areas. Zinoviev's speech, as well as subsequent communist actions in China, was related to these.
6. The new offer did not include renunciation of rights in the Chinese Eastern Railway.

on "Bolshevism in Asia," written by Paul Reinsch, former United States Minister to China. Reinsch stated that there was no systematic Bolshevist propaganda in China, that information on Russia and the Russian system had come in only by "free lances" (visiting Russians) and that the use of the term "bolshevist" as applied to Chinese, was only as a bad name and not welcomed by those to whom it was applied. He also said what writers were later to repeat over and over again: the situation in China was not such that Bolshevist thought was likely to make inroads. The Chinese did not fit the Marxist mold of a people ready for revolution. China was an agricultural nation where land was held by the tillers. It was not much industrialized, and the guild system prevailed in much of the industry which existed. There was no capitalist-masses conflict among the Chinese, as all organized capital was held by foreigners.

Reinsch did, however, see possible areas of conflict. If Bolshevist theory were to be translated into Chinese affairs, it could take the form of resistance to foreign capital. Moreover, if Chinese aspirations for self-government and for freedom from foreign political control should be discouraged by Japan and the western powers and if a friendly regime were established in Siberia, "the sympathy between the Russian and the Chinese people would become very intimate and strong. This would, however, have nothing to do with theories of Bolshevism...."[7]

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7. Paul Reinsch, "Bolshevism in Asia," Asia XX (Apr., 1920), 310-312.

Also concerned with possible future Russo-Chinese relations was John Dewey, who, in an article in the New Republic in June, 1920, called special attention to Karakhan's note offering to give up tsarist claims. Similar interest was shown by a correspondent to the Nation, who wrote from Moscow as delegates to the Second Congress of the Third International gathered in that city. This writer foresaw an increase in Russia's influence in the Far East, with Russia, rather than Britain, now the hope of downtrodden peoples. He noted that "things are boiling" in China and that Chinese delegates might be coming to the conference. An editor of the Missionary Review also saw Soviet moves as important for the future, listing the "menace of Bolshevism" as one of the problems faced by Christian leaders in China and recommending that the subject be made "a matter of earnest prayer."[8]

The Literary Digest, a weekly much more widely circulated than either of the above, gave, in early 1920, some insight into what foreign residents in the Orient were thinking about China and communism, by printing quotes from English-language newspapers, published largely by the British citizens of China and Japan. In January, it noted that the Kobe (Japan) Herald had quoted a Shanghai exporters' association that peace should be sought within China on the grounds that "the country is seething with Bolshevik

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8. John Dewey, "China's Nightmare," New Republic, June 30, 1920, p. 145-147; Henry G. Alsberg, "Will Russia Drive the British from Asia?" Nation, Aug. 14, 1920, p. 180; Missionary Review XLIII (Dec., 1920), 1088.

propaganda, and the least spark will ignite an uncontrollable conflagration." Two months later, this same newspaper remarked that many intellectual Chinese saw no threat from Bolshevism because the Chinese farmer owned his land. A British Peking paper claimed, however, that the "intelligent middle classes" in North China regarded Bolshevism as the best solution to the problems of China and looked to a popular uprising to bring this about. They did not consider the land question as part of the problem, rather expecting the uprising to go no further than to overthrow the parasitical officialdom so prevalent in China. But, the writer added, the intelligentsia did not look far enough and had not considered the threat to shopkeepers and other small businessmen if an uprising of coolies took place.[9]

One other reference to the prospects of Bolshevism in China appeared in the American periodical press of 1920. This was in a reprint from a French paper which was given space in the Argonaut of October 16, and which was mostly about the Near East. Its author saw no evidence that the doctrines of Lenin had made "serious inroads into the yellow world...."[10]

During the following year the communist movement took

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9. Literary Digest (quoting Kobe, Japan, Herald), Jan. 17, 1920, p. 26; ibid., (quoting Kobe Herald and North China Review, Peking), Mar. 20, 1920, p. 32.
10. L. Dumont-Wilden, "Awakening Asia" (from Revue Bleue), Argonaut, Oct. 16, 1920, p. 244. The Argonaut during this period showed considerable concern with Bolshevism in Europe and the chances of its making headway in the United States, but oddly enough, considering that it was a West Coast publication, evidenced little interest with China or Russia's overtures to China.

definite shape in China. Other cells were formed, among them one by Ch'en, who was then in Canton, where he had been invited to head the Board of Education by Kwangtung Province's new warlord.[11] In May, Ch'en met with others in Shanghai for a conference; and in July the First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party convened in that city. It was attended by delegates from various party cells throughout China, plus a representative or representatives from Moscow.[12] From then on, communist work in all China was part of a unified whole, and members were subject to party discipline. Party activity, however, did not for a few years vary much from that begun by early cells. Members became involved in union organization, with some agitators taking part in strikes.

But such clandestine activity of course did not make news, and information in America's magazines remained merely conjectural as to the presence of Bolshevism in China. Leo Pasvolsky, in the Saturday Evening Post, presented a dramatic warning of what would be the results of the ideas put forth by Zinoviev in his speech at Baku: "The lands from which the barbarians came centuries ago to inundate the civilized world and sweep away its culture-- the East-- is now being artificially stimulated into activity that may lead it to hurl again its millions against the civilization of the West."

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[11] Sun Yat-sen was at this time invited to Canton to take charge of political affairs.

[12] Sources differ as to the exact date of the First Congress, whether Soviet emissaries attended meetings, and whether joining the Third International was discussed at the time. For discussion of sources, see C. Martin Wilbur, introduction to Ch'en Kung-po, The Communist Movement in China (New York, 1960). Ch'en, who attended some of the meetings of the First Congress, wrote this work in 1924. Ch'en Tu-hsiu did not attend.

Pasvolsky's article indicated that his knowledge of Russian goals and methods was extensive, but that he shared with other westerners, as with Russian leaders and most educated Chinese, misconceptions about China's agrarian situation. The purpose of the Baku conference, he said, was to develop a structure for propaganda based on a common grievance among Eastern countries-- their economic and political dependence on the great powers, or imperialism. He pointed out that landlordism caused peasant resentment in many countries, and that this could be linked to imperialism, thus gaining peasant support for political movements. He did not believe the agrarian situation to be so useful to the Bolsheviks in China, but indicated other possibilities for agitation: a Chinese speaker at the Second Conference of the Comintern had called attention to the nationalist movement caused by disappointments at Versailles and to a developing labor movement. Communists, Pasvolsky warned, were not inflexible. They could and would work with groups whose goals were quite opposed to those of Marx, permitting small triumphs for those groups, expecting long-term gains for communism.

He concluded that conditions in China were almost ideal for the purposes of the Comintern: discontent, an ambitious minority which might be won over to the idea of an experiment in communism, and a confused and unstable political system. The stage was being set, he warned, and the curtain would go up on a "tragic farce of a revolution" unless "something unforeseen and unexpected" came about to interfere with the plans of Moscow, "laid with such devilish cunning and craftiness."[13]

Few other writers were as explicit about-- or probably as knowledgeable of-- the workings of the Bolsheviks. The Missionary Review again worried about the effects of "Bolshevism in other lands" on radicalism and on Chinese Christian students, while Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University, listed communism as one of the "three great perils to international peace." He saw Bolshevism as less a political theory or an economic doctrine than a fanatic faith which would appeal to Oriental peoples, especially those whose culture was based on communal activities and a denial of personal responsibility and personal immortality. John Dewey again warned that, although he had seen not one trace of direct Russian influence in the nine Chinese provinces he had visited and did not believe that Bolshevism "in the technical sense" could appeal to Chinese, misrule and oppression could easily produce a type of rebellion that might go by the Bolshevist label.[14] Thus Bolshevism was a threat, a problem for the future, probably, but not believed to be a reality in China at the time.

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[13] Leo Pasvolsky, "The Third International in Asia," Saturday Evening Post, Jan. 29, 1921, pp. 24-26, 97-101. Pasvolsky, a former editor of The Russian Review, became known as a student of monetary development in post-war Europe. Among his later books were Russia in the Far East (1922; see p. 1-24) and The Economics of Communism (1933).

Whereas the internal events of 1922 and 1923 are, in retrospect, of great importance to the development of the subsequent political situation within China, the interest of American magazine editors, columnists, and contributors, was directed elsewhere. In the United States, fear of Bolshevism had faded somewhat; and, except for occasional columnists and editors to whom it remained a bogey, the problem was seldom discussed, except in connection with Europe. Knowledge of the work of the Chinese Communist Party and of its negotiations with the Kuomintang, the nationalist party of Sun Yat-sen, which was slowly developing some importance in the Canton area, was generally lacking. Sun himself received some little notice; this will be mentioned in more detail later. American interest in China was directed toward the national government at Peking, still unquestioned in foreign countries as the legal government of China, though few people pretended to believe it had actual control of the country.

The Chinese government desired, at the time of the Washington Conference in late 1921 and early 1922, to gain what it had not been able to obtain at Versailles-- territorial integrity and political and administrative independence. It hoped for a negotiation of new treaties with foreign nations and an end to all the inequalities of the old. Though a few gains were made at the conference, as the return of the former German holdings at Shantung, tariff autonomy was not granted, the question of extraterritoriality was postponed until an inquiry had been made by a commission to be appointed by the powers, and foreign troops in China were left there until another "collective inquiry" had been reported on. Residential concessions in port cities remained in the hands of the various powers.

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[14] Missionary Review XLIV (Nov., 1921), 89; Nicholas Murray Butler, "Three Great Perils to International Peace," Current Opinion LXX (Apr., 1921), 463-465. Butler's other "perils" were "self-determination" and "a lack of realism about monopolies." John Dewey, "New Culture in Asia," Asia XXI (June, 1921), 584.

Meanwhile, Russian communists organized their own international meeting. Called the Congress of the Toilers of the Far East, it met in Moscow and in Petrograd during January and February of 1922. Approximately thirty Chinese attended, not as representatives of the Peking government, but as members of the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. In his speech opening the Congress, Zinoviev drew careful attention to the failures experienced by Eastern nations at Versailles and at Washington. He spoke of the oppression suffered by the nations at the hands of the imperialists and claimed that negotiations would never succeed and that a world-wide unity of the struggling working classes was needed to achieve emancipation.

RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY

In the fall of 1922, Russia sent to Peking another representative. Diplomatically, Adolph Joffe accomplished little. At the one Chinese-Russian conference he brought about, held in September, he offered China less in return for recognition than had the Karakhan notes of 1919 and 1920. Within a few months he left for Japan, visiting en route with Sun Yat-sen, then in Shanghai. The meeting was to have lasting significance.

At this point it might be well to draw attention to the distinctions between Russia and Bolshevism, between the government and the communist party, which were or were not drawn in the periodical press of these years. There existed then, as since, a vagueness as to whether the Soviet government, the Russian Communist Party, and the Comintern should be considered synonymous. Within Russia, their membership might be composed of the same persons, but the fact that they were distinct in organization made any number of odd situations possible. Thus in China the Comintern could support one or more of the warlords who were in opposition to each other or to the Peking government with which, after 1924, the Russian government had diplomatic relations. Russian advisors could be working with the Kuomintang and the Canton government, while directing the Chinese Communists in their moves to gain control of the Kuomintang, and while Kuomintang and Chinese Communists were working and planning together to move on the government at Peking, to which the Soviet Ambassador was accredited. At the same time, the chief Russian advisor in the south could be a close acquantance of the Ambassador, who had helped him gain the advisory position through his (the Ambassador's) position in the

Comintern. That the government-party distinction was not always maintained was proved later, when the Peking Embassy was found to be giving working space to Kuomintang and Chinese communist propagandists. Little wonder that onlookers were confused. Even with the perspective of several decades, scholars are still sometimes unable to say which Russian representative was sent by which group within Russia.[15]

Quotations from the early period of this present study exemplify this confusion. When Karakhan's 1919 note was printed in Current History, it was characterized as "Bolshevist overtures." Similarly, Zinoviev's speech at the Comintern-directed meeting at Baku was called valuable for the new light it threw on the Soviet government and its settled policy of stirring up race hatred and revolution in the Near and Far East. The Pasvolsky article mentioned earlier attempted to draw a distinction, as it underlined the policies of the Third International. A student of Russian history, writing in the North American Review of March, 1923, described Russian policy in the Far East as simply a new game with old cards, with Russia using Bolshevik propaganda to help her retain the position tsarist Russia once held in that part of the world. "At present," he observed, "Soviet authorities

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15. See Robert North, Moscow and Chinese Communists, second ed. (Stanford, 1965), pp. 72-73, for discussion of the appointment of Michael Borodin as adviser to the Canton government. Allen S. Whiting, in Soviet Policies in China, 1917-1924 (New York, 1954), pp. 248-262, says that the Comintern and the government represented revolutionary and diplomatic fronts which were sometimes at cross purposes and sometimes parallel before 1924. The contradictory policies resulted from sometimes divergent goals.

are playing to the gallery of radical Young China. At the same time they are voicing historical plans and desires for influence and power."[16]

Russia's diplomatic overtures to China were well documented in the American periodical press. Contents of diplomatic notes are easier to learn than the course of secret intrigues. Karakhan's 1919 note, the version thereof which promised China the most, was printed in full in Current History a few months after it was received in Peking. America had commented on the note earlier, calling it a determined effort by Russia to win Chinese recognition and cooperation. That magazine's editor expected informal agreements, necessary between two nations with such a long common border, to be made well before recognition took place. News columns through 1921, 1922, and 1923 reported on what few diplomatic exchanges there were: China's withdrawal of recognition from the Russian officials of the old regime; the text of a note to China from the Far Eastern Republic suggesting the benefits of normal relations, with interests of the two countries in the Chinese Eastern Railway to be fully guaranteed; and information on the position of Outer

16. Current History XII (Oct., 1920), 47; ibid., (Mar., 1921), 463; Pasvolsky, loc. cit., passim; Alfred L. P. Dennis, "Russian Policy in the Far East," North American Review CCXVII (Mar., 1923), 303-312. Adding to the confusion were "white" Russians who had fled the Revolution and were in China. They were accused of creating trouble in Shanghai which they wished attributed to the Bolsheviks. Literary Digest, July 22, 1922, p. 199.

Mongolia, whose status was disputed by China and Russia.[17]

As long as little actually happened except the sending of notes, which mostly went into China rather than out of Peking, there were few speculative articles in American magazines. Russian-Chinese relations were of slight interest until Joffe arrived in Peking. In May, 1922, Nathaniel Peffer, a contributor to the Nation whose later articles indicated little fear of the Bolsheviks, reviewed Leo Pasvolsky's new book, Russia in the Far East. Peffer's comments are interesting in the light of subsequent events. He gave Pasvolsky credit for having written an authoritative and penetrating history of tsarist forces in the Far East, but saw the section on Soviet Russia's policies in that area as "either incredibly innocent or unpleasantly artful." Whatever plans the Kremlin had had three or so years before should have been exposed as "demonstrably fantastic." For example, the anti-Japanese feeling which Pasvolsky saw as important actually had "as much connection with the bolshevik hopes as the election of Mr. Harding...." Moreover, "he who still talks of China and bolshevism is either ignorant or spreading propaganda. Mr. Pasvolsky is, I think, the first."[18]

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17. Current History XIII (Oct., 1920), 47; America, May 8, 1920, p. 52; Nation, Feb. 2, 1921, pp. 192-194; ibid., May 3, 1922, p. 546; Current History XIV (April, 1921), 144. Claimed by the Chinese, Outer Mongolia in 1919-1921 passed from the hands of tsarists to Chinese to "white" Russians to "Reds." A Mongolian People's Republic, nominally independent of Moscow, was then established.
18. Nathaniel Peffer, review of Russia in the Far East, by Leo Pasvolsky, Nation, May 3, 1922, pp. 536-537. Peffer was then just returned from a few years of newspaper work in China. He was later the author of numerous works on the Far East.

Joffe's arrival meant news to some magazines. He, too, was viewed from two angles. Writers questioned the effect of his presence on the diplomatic situation or saw him simply as an agent of Bolshevism.

A concern with Bolshevist influence in China seemed to recur in the American press in late 1922 and early 1923. However, most of the news items with such concern came from British sources in China. There was, for example, a reference to the _North China Herald_ in a _Living Age_ editorial in August, 1922, probably originating just before Joffe's arrival in China. In it mention is made of examples of communist propaganda then in the hands of the Mixed Court at Shanghai. The writer concluded from reading these that Trotsky himself was "never more of a Bolshevik in theory than are his Chinese adherents today."[19]

Also in the _Living Age_ and reprinted from the _North China Herald_ was an article by Rodney Gilbert, telling of the gathering which met Joffe when he arrived in Peking. It consisted of delegates from fourteen radical organizations, including the Principles of Karl Marx Society. Heading the group were Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, head of Peking University, and Hu Shih, a well-known leader of the new literary movement. Ts'ai greeted Joffe with a speech in which he declared that China's revolution, which had been political, should now become social-- a change for which Russia furnished a good example. "Please," he said, "accept the hearty welcome of the pupils

[19] _Living Age_, Aug. 19, 1922, p. 437.

to the teacher."

To Gilbert, Ts'ai's speech was important because all was not well within China. The failure of the Republic to form a strong, effective government had led intellectuals to believe a republican government to be absurd, desired only by professional politicians and militarists. The intellectuals, rather, looked to compromise. Meanwhile, the young in China were in need of a cause. Because Bolshevism had so much adverse propaganda from sources unpopular with China's youth (Japanese and Chinese government pronouncements), it was being welcomed by young people who really did not know what it was all about. In addition, favorable advertising had been "patiently, consistently, and cleverly supplied by Russian agents in every town all up and down the China Coast." Bolshevism was thus always kept in reach of intellectuals "groping for an 'ism!" It was especially serious that those who directed the thinking of youth were themselves led by Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, Hu Shih, and others, whom he incorrectly described as "all professed Communists now." Because the Republic had been a failure, the intelligensia might be able to persuade the Chinese that communism was the only alternative to chaos.[20]

Another discussion of the Chinese intellectual appeared the following year in Asia. In a more considered article,

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20. Rodney Gilbert, "A Soviet Envoy in Peking," (from the North China Herald, Peking, Sept. 2), ibid., Nov. 4, 1922, pp. 255-258. Gilbert, an American living in China and writing for British papers there, typified the "treaty post" viewpoint.

Upton Close admitted that Russian influence on Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei was great, that Ts'ai combined the anti-religion of Russell with the anti-capitalism of Marx and was trying to "out Bolshvik the Bolsheviki"; but he did not have as much belief in Ts'ai's effectiveness. As for Hu Shih, he was less radical, would welcome a consolidation of Asian sympathies, but less to build a new regime than to save the good things of Asia which were threatened by the West. Close, however, was not as completely convinced by Joffe's pronouncements as was the Living Age editor who stated that Joffe's goals in China were purely diplomatic, and that "the suspicion that he also wants to Bolshevise China is probably ungrounded, because he personally considers such an undertaking impossible." Rather, Close saw the Russians as going slowly, being careful not to bewilder the Orientals with too much Marxism, building on what was already there and deferring to Chinese prejudices. This was illustrated by Joffe's influence on Sun Yat-sen, who had been convinced by him to accept a national centralization, built on existing communal institutions.[21]

[21] Upton Close, "Russia and Japan-- Champions of a New East," Asia XXIII (Aug., 1923), 555-556; Living Age, Mar. 24, 1923, p. 678. Evidently this editor had read the "Sun-Joffe Declaration," a joint statement issued by Joffe and Sun Yat-sen in Jan., 1923. Among other things, it stated mutual agreement that conditions in China were not suited to Bolshevism. No mention of this declaration had been made in American periodicals up to this time. Neither of the intellectuals mentioned by Gilbert and Close was communist, though both had "radical" thoughts. Hu Shih, though once associated with Ch'en Tu-hsiu, had parted with him in 1921, as Ch'en moved left. Hu became a KMT member though he, as a literary man, was not very active in politics. He served as ambassador to the U.S. in 1938-1942, moved to Taiwan with the Nationalists, and died there in 1962. Ts'ai had been a member of Sun's

Russia's diplomatic aims were given full consideration in the periodical press. The Living Age editor mentioned above said that they were three: the return of the Chinese Eastern Railway, autonomy for Mongolia, and resumption of diplomatic relations. Joffe himself had referred to all of these in a speech made in Peking on the fifth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. He stressed the selflessness of Russia's behavior in the East, piously wishing that other nations would be the same. He explained that Russian troops were in Mongolia to help China as well as Russia. He suggested that Russia had no desire to force its will on China and was waiting for China to propose negotiations. He called the Chinese Eastern Railway a matter between China and Russia alone, though it was being ruined under present management and should somehow be made more efficient. Over and over again he emphasized the friendship of Russians for Chinese.[22]

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early revolutionary party and a cabinet member in the 1912 government. His views of communism in China appeared in a Paris review early in 1924. China, he said, would never follow Russia's example of class warfare. Chinese history gave an example of an earlier, more pleasant experiment in communism; and if China were ever to come to any type of communism as a means of righting the wrongs in its society, it would be through similar, pacifistic means. Y. P. Tsai, "The Case for China" (from La Revue Bleue, Paris, Feb. 2), ibid., Apr. 19, 1924, pp. 741-743. See also Camille Armand, "China's Communist Experiment in 1067 A.D." (from La Revue de France, Paris., Feb. 1), ibid., Mar. 18, 1922, pp. 640-647; N. Tourneur, "For the Glory of Lowly Man: China's Eight Hundred Year Old Communist Experiment," Independent, Sept. 19, 1925, pp. 319-336; and Ta Chen, "Labor's Part in the New Nationalism," World Tomorrow IX (Jan., 1926), 12. All stressed that the early experiment had failed.

[22] Living Age, Mar. 24, 1923, p. 678. A. A. Joffe, "Russia's Policy in China" (from North China Herald, Nov. 18), ibid., Jan. 13, 1923, pp. 73-76. Joffe's reference to the Chinese Eastern Railway was a slap at France, who claimed an

The friendship motif was mentioned in a number of writings at that time, and more and more later. A German correspondent was quoted as saying that the Russians stood out in desiring no special treaties, only peace and friendship. They were, he claimed, propagandized by China's foreign press; but this was less important than that Joffe's statements would circulate throughout China by word of mouth.[23] Upton Close also mentioned that the common people of China were finding that the Russians were like them, while a contributor to the *North American Review* noted Joffe's friendly speeches and the warm reception he was granted among Chinese in Peking.

Neither of these last two writers, however, had much faith in Russia's soft talk. Close suggested that China's slowness in accepting Moscow's early offers had been because the Chinese did not want to appear to accept as a gift what might be theirs for the taking. The implication was that Russia's offers were only window dressing. The *North American Review* article regarded all Russian moves as aimed toward acquisition of power, especially such power as was represented in the control of the Manchurian railway.[24]

The arrival of Karakhan as Russia's new representative

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interest in the railroad which had been built by the tsars with money borrowed from the French.

[23] *Living Age* (quoting Eric von Saltzmann of *Voissische Zeitung*) Dec. 16, 1922, p. 618. Germany had lost its treaty status in China as a result of World War I.

[24] Close, *loc. cit.*, p. 601. Dennis, *loc. cit.*, *North American Review* CCXVII (Mar., 1923), 306-309.

in China aroused less speculation about Bolshevism in American magazines than had Joffe's. Perhaps this was due to a large extent to the diplomatic gift Karakhan came bearing-- a suggestion that, if recognized, Russia would appoint him full ambassador to Peking. The news set the diplomatic corps buzzing, as all other nations had but ministers in the Chinese capital. Oddly enough, the press reports of Karakhan's arrival appeared only in February of 1924, five months after the Russian appeared in Peking. Even then, interest centered largely on the matters being negotiated, in particular on the Chinese Eastern Railway, which "white" Russians had been running and had but recently been taken over by Bolsheviks. There was also discussion as to whether Russia really had demanded a resumption of Boxer payments, then several years in arrears.[25]

The agreement between China and Russia was signed on May 31, 1924; and reactions in the American periodical press varied with the views of the editors. The more liberal magazines voiced a degree of approval: the Nation, which had recently carried an article decrying suspected United States influence on Peking, quoted Karakhan that the affair was, after all, the business of nobody but the Russians and the Chinese, while the New Republic said that Russia had outmaneuvered the other powers by being more reasonable. Both an Asia article and an Outlook editorial called the agreement a victory for Russia, but the former spoke with grudging

[25] Living Age, Feb. 2, 1924, p. 197; Payson J. Treat in Current History XIX (Feb., 1924), 880.

admiration for Russian methods, while the more conservative Outlook remarked that though China had gained from Russia what it had been unable to get from other nations, Russia had actually "given up" what it could not hold anyway.[26]

The influence of the agreement on the future was expected to be mostly in the diplomatic area. Time suggested that China's note to the other powers about the new ambassador "was a virtual invitation to them to raise the rank of their representation." A Japanese correspondent saw Japan as having to revise her own unequal treaties with China soon. Other problems were raised about the status of the new ambassador in the Peking diplomatic corps and the positions of "white" Russians and the Russian Church within China. Both of these last were now shorn of special privileges held before. The Chinese Eastern Railway also gave grounds for speculation. Would Chang Tso-lin, the Manchurian warlord, permit the Soviet Russians to control the railroad, which ran through his territory?[27]

But few attempts were made to link Karakhan's mission with the spread of Bolshevism. In this instance the Comintern-Russian government dichotomy seemed well observed. The

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26. Nathaniel Peffer, "Russia, China, and Mr. Hughes," Nation, Apr. 30, 1924, pp. 499-501 (The Russian press was making similar suggestions, Literary Digest, Mar. 29, 1924, p. 22); ibid., Aug. 20, 1924, p. 199; New Republic, July 30, 1924, p. 255; Josef W. Hall (Upton Close), "The Case for China," Asia XXIV (Nov., 1924), 924; Outlook, Sept. 24, 1924, pp. 114-115.

27. Time, July 28, 1924, p. 13; K. K. Kawakami, "Russia's Move to Treat China as an Equal," Current History XX (Sept., 1924), 959; Payson J. Treat column in ibid. (June, 1924), 520; Time, July 7, 1924, p. 15.

Literary Digest's quotes from Moscow's Isvestia on the negotiations made no mention of communism or world revolution, but voiced a hope that Russia might participate in Pacific affairs and a claim that imperialist nations feared Russia's recognition. The Nation quoted Karakhan that Bolshevism had nothing to do with the situation. A former Chinese premier writing on the treaty for Current History referred briefly to the Russian system, explaining that China had earlier feared Bolshevism and had refused recognition until its people had come to the realization that that system could never succeed in China. Now formal recognition of the Soviet seemed a benefit.[28]

SUN YAT-SEN AND CANTON

The government which Sun Yat-sen established in Canton in late 1920 received passing mention in the American periodical press in the next few years. Magazines such as Current History, the Review of Reviews, Independent, and America, which specialized in current events or at least devoted a few pages of each issue to comments in recent occurrences, spoke on occasion of the political situation at Canton, of Sun's military moves, or of his defeats by his opponents. Views of Sun himself varied. The Review of Reviews treated him as a great visionary leader and spoke of Canton's future development with optimism.[29] A long article in the Saturday

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28. Literary Digest, May 24, 1924, p. 19; Nation, Aug. 20, 1924, p. 199; Liang Shih-yi, "China Faces the Modern World," Current History XX (Sept., 1924), 954.
29. Review of Reviews, 1921-1922, passim.


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TIBET
Chengtu
SZECHWAN
CHEKIANG
SIKANG
KIANGSI
Changsha
HUNAN
FUKIEN
Juichin
KWEICHOW
KWANGTUNG
Swatow
YUNNAN
KWANGSI
Canton
Hong Kong
HAINAN

China

Evening Post also viewed the Canton regime as the great wonder of China, speaking enthusiastically about the government organization, streets, parks, and electric lights (all of which were to be mentioned over and over again by visitors to Canton in the next five years).[30] Current History was as pleased with material progress, but saw Sun Yat-sen a bit differently. Whereas the Saturday Evening Post article pictured the Chinese leader as a great revolutionary with a vision of the future, Current History wondered if he were really a patriot-- or just a self-seeker? Another writer saw Sun as "a combination of the Apostle Paul and William Jennings Bryan, with a dash of megalomania... a magnificent visionary [who] can also be the victim of delusions... an extreme case of verbal auto-intoxication. Far beyond most men he can attain a passionate belief in that which it is pleasant to him to believe."[31]

In January, 1923, Sun met with the Soviet envoy, Adolph Joffe, and the two reached an understanding. Agreeing that China was not suited to communism, they worked out a plan whereby Russia might aid Sun's Kuomintang (National People's Party) and his Canton government. The Sun-Joffe Declaration, stating their areas of agreement, was issued in Shanghai in late January, but not immediately commented on by American magazines. The earliest mention seems to have been in an

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30. Isaac F. Marcosson, "The Changing East: Sun Yat-sen and South China," Saturday Evening Post, Nov. 25, 1922, pp. 20-21, 98-104.

31. Ibid., pp. 101-102; Current History XV (Mar., 1922), 921; Nathaniel Peffer, "Currents and Characters in China," Asia XXII (Jan., 1922), 72.

article which appeared in Current History the following May. The author saw Sun as the only hope of China-- the one man who could arouse a popular movement to combat the warlords. As for Bolshevism, he was sure Sun had given up that idea long ago.[32]

Not everyone was so certain. The Literary Digest mentioned that April that some French writers pictured Sun as "dreamer, a schemer, and unscrupulous Bolshevist of the worst type."[33]

By the end of 1923 Sun took what a Current History columnist called "drastic measures" to raise money for his government. Government lands and temple sites were sold to private purchasers, and a share of the Canton customs receipts was requested-- and refused. (They were being sent on to the Peking government.) Time and Current History described the arrival of foreign warships to prevent Sun's seizure of the Customs House, the former reporting that Sun, in answer to questions about what he would do next, "would only gurgle something about Russia and an 'alliance.'" Other writers were less flippant about possible results. Three months later, in March, 1924, the Literary Digest quoted a New York paper: With Soviet agents reportedly active in China, the show of force at Canton could be "the last act necessary to drive the Chinese millions into the arms of bolshevism, into the

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32. Gardner L. Harding, "China, Ill-Governed and Bankrupt, yet Prosperous," Current History XVIII (May, 1923), 323.
33. Literary Digest, Apr. 7, 1923, p. 21.

experiment of sovietism."[34]

By this time, the Canton government had a number of Soviet advisors (Michael Borodin had arrived in September, 1923); but the periodical press made no mention of this fact. It was another year before a magazine spoke of a definite link between Canton and Russia.[35] Throughout most of 1924, little attention was paid to developments at Canton. Once Sun's death was rumored, and a few magazines repeated the tale. (Only Time went so far as to suggest that "the death of Dr. Sun would have removed a serious obstacle to China's great task of self-unification.") An Independent columnist described Sun in as unflattering terms, calling him more a "tender pink deepening blush-wise" than a true red. The Nation reprinted a Bertrand Russell article which described the Canton government as mistakenly called proletariat. It was, he said, not at all comparable to the communist system.[36]

In October, 1924, there was fighting in the streets of Canton between an association of merchants and some organized laborers. Six periodicals with news columns reported this incident in the next few months. All of them mentioned the laborers as either "Red" or "Bolshevized." Four (America, Time, Current Opinion, and the Nation) used the terms "Fascist" or "Fascisti" in reference to the merchants' organization, though the Nation did explain that the merchants were not really fascist in the European sense, but were simply weary of "twelve years of revolutioneering." No attempt was made to qualify the use of "Red."[37]

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[34] Payson J. Treat in Current History XIX (Jan., 1924), 704; Time, Dec. 17, 1923, p. 12; Literary Digest (quoting China Review, New York), Mar. 29, 1924, p. 22.

[35] Missionary Review XLVIII (Mar., 1925), 170.

[36] Time, May 26, 1924, p. 12; Henry W. Bunn in Independent, May 10, 1924, p. 263; Bertrand Russell (reprinted from the New Leader, Sept. 19), Nation, Nov. 5, 1924, p. 504.

Canton received comparatively little notice after the fighting died down, but what notice there was linked Sun to Bolshevism. The Literary Digest, in January, 1925, quoted European papers as expecting Sun to set up a Soviet Republic of China (for nationalistic as well as Marxist reasons) and to follow this with an abrogation of existing treaties and a banishment of all foreigners but Russians. A month later the same periodical saw communism gaining in popularity in China as anti-Bolshevik propaganda increased in the foreign press. Calling Sun a "Bolshevik" only equated "Bolshevism" with "good" in Chinese minds. In March this magazine discussed Russia's role in China, mentioning that Sun's left wing was now using Russian methods of agitation, but still not remarking on the Russian advisors.[38]

In this same month, a short editorial in the Missionary Review indicated that more was known about Canton than had yet appeared in the periodical press. In a discussion of

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37. America, Oct. 25, 1924, p. 26; Payson Treat in Current History XXI (Dec., 1924), 475; Current Opinion LXXVII (Dec., 1924), 693; Review of Reviews LXX (Nov., 1924), 473-474; Time, Oct. 27, 1925, p. 11; Nation, Oct. 29, 1924, p. 456. See also Russell article, ibid., Nov. 5, 1924, p. 504, and answer (from Morning Post, London, Oct. 9), ibid., Feb. 4, 1925, p. 128. This clash received the most attention of any occurrence up to that time. The Merchants Corps was actually defeated by a troop of cadets from the newly-established Whampoa Military Academy, led by Chiang Kai-shek.

38. Literary Digest, Jan. 24, 1925, p. 18; ibid., Feb. 21, 1925, pp. 16-17; ibid., Mar. 14, 1925, p. 18.

anti-Christian demonstrations then frequent in Chinese cities, the editor noted that in Canton propaganda was directed against all religions and suggested,

> This may be due to the fact that the Russian or Bolshevistic influences are more marked in the South than in other parts of China. Many believe that the movement has had Russian influence and money behind it and this seems to be borne out by the fact that members of the military school at Whampo /sic/ have taken part in anti-Christian demonstrations.[39]

Not only did this indicate the first real information that Russians were in Canton, but it linked them with the Whampoa Academy, never mentioned before although its cadets had played an important part in the street fighting of the previous October.

On March 12, 1925, Canton lost its leader. Dr. Sun Yat-sen died while in Peking to confer with government officials there. The Literary Digest admitted that there were a variety of opinions concerning the effect of his death and noted that a Shanghai paper wondered about the communist versus non-communist question within the Kuomintang. What

39. Missionary Review XLVII (Mar., 1925), 170. It is uncertain how much American writers and correspondents knew about the presence of the Russians in Canton. Only hints of "Reds" in that government had appeared before, yet their presence must have been known in other Chinese cities. Michael Borodin had appeared at social gatherings in Canton, and news of him spread among the Chinese, reaching their foreign friends. See Nora Waln, The House of Exile (Boston, 1933), for a letter about him written in late 1923. He spoke at a memorial service for Lenin on Jan. 6, 1924; and this was reported in a Shanghai English-language paper, as was the drowning of a Russian military advisor that summer. Hin Wong column on South China in China Weekly Review, Feb. 9, 1924, p. 396; ibid., Aug. 9, 1924, p. 338. The New York Times first mentioned Russians in Canton after the Shameen shootings (June 25, 1925, p. 1) and first named Borodin on Jan 25, 1926 (p. 2).

hope was there for unity now? America's editor and a Current History columnist saw import in another matter. Sun had asked to have his body embalmed and placed in a casket like that of "his friend, Lenin."[40]

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In the five years between the formation of the first communist cells in 1920 and the death of Sun Yat-sen early in 1925, the Chinese Communist Party had grown considerably. By 1925, its members, though relatively few in numbers, were making progress in union organization and control. They had been permitted to join the Kuomintang and held some important seats on that party's Central Executive Committee and in influential departments. The Kuomintang itself had been strengthened by being reorganized, on the advice of Borodin, along the lines of the Communist Party.

The American periodical press was as yet almost oblivious to this development. There were suspicions of communist sympathies in China, and hints of communist and Russian influence in Canton had appeared; but interest was not sufficiently high even to elicit comments on what the English-language press in China knew about the situation.

40. Literary Digest, May 2, 1925, p. 22; America, Mar. 21, 1925, p. 530; Payson Treat in Current History XX (May, 1925), 329. See also William Irwin, "The Sinking Sun of China," Independent, Oct. 17, 1925), p. 440. For lack of a suitable casket (the one sent from Russia was reportedly of poor quality and workmanship), Sun's wish was never carried out. He was given a Christian burial and his remains were ultimately moved to an enormous mausoleum built near Nanking.

CHAPTER II, 1925-1926

It was after the death of Sun Yat-sen that any extensive interest in the Kuomintang and any knowledge of its communist affiliations developed among correspondents in China. A series of events in mid-1925 indicated at least one ground for unity within China-- anti-foreignism. Repercussions from these "incidents" turned eyes toward what seemed the source of agitation, Canton; and a more thorough investigation of the situation there aroused concern about the role of Russians working with the Kuomintang.

THE SHOOTINGS AT SHANGHAI

The first of these events took place at Shanghai. On May 30, 1925, a demonstration, called to protest the killing by a Japanese foreman of a striking Chinese workman in a Japanese-owned cotton mill, marched on the police station in the International Settlement. Panicked by the crowds, the British police fired, killing and wounding unarmed young Chinese. This added to a growing resentment against foreign arrogance and exploitation found among the Chinese workers and students and gave rise to more strikes, demonstrations, and protests. The movement increased interest in China's expanding labor movement and the linking of labor organizations to student unrest. Both of these were viewed by some writers as manifestations of Bolshevist agitation.

The "Shanghai incident" received more and better coverage in the American periodical press than had any other happening in China thus far in the decade. Of the twenty-four magazines being considered at this time, fifteen had commented on the occurrence by the following August. The nine without comment were periodicals as a rule unaccustomed to remarking on current events-- magazines whose usual information on conditions outside the United States was confined to an occasional long article by a contributor in the field.[1]

All fifteen magazines mentioned the possibility of the demonstrations' being caused by communist agitation or being a communist plot, though only three, America, the Argonaut, and Current History, failed to express some doubt or to add that there were other important reasons for the Chinese to be discontented.[2] The impression given by the Nation was almost one of scorn for those blaming the Bolsheviks; but Time claimed that communist influences were undoubtably present, though other factors must not be overlooked as major causes; and the Literary Digest's selections of cartoons and quotes from the United States and abroad indicated a similar belief.[3] Four other editors said that Bolshevism might be present;[4] one noted that the British said so, but suggested they might be trying to shift guilt from themselves.[5] All five stressed the importance of other issues. Contributors to *Asia*, the *Outlook*, the *World Tomorrow*, and the *Review of Reviews* also all judged Bolshevism to be only a small part of the problem.[6]

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[1] An interesting exception was the Missionary Review, which, though dealing with other lands, evinced little interest in politics or events not directly connected with missionaries. It had spoken of Russian-backed anti-Christianity, but did not mention the May 30 incident until a year and a half later, when a contributor called it a "clash of cultures." Emory W. Luccock, "A Missionary View of the Situation in China," Missionary Review XLIX (Dec., 1926), 928.

[2] America, June 20, 1925, p. 221; ibid., June 27, 1925, p. 244; Argonaut, June 20, 1925, p. 2; Quincy Wright in Current History XXII (July, 1925), 676-677; ibid. (Aug., 1925), 849; Hewlett Hughes, "China in Anti-Foreign Mood," ibid. (July, 1925), 618-619.

[3] Nation, June 24, 1925, p. 726; Harry F. Ward, "The Meaning of Shanghai," ibid., July 22, 1925, pp. 108-109; Paul Blanshard, "The Inquiring Reporter in Shanghai," ibid., Sept. 16, 1925, pp. 299-300; Time, July 20, 1925, p. 12;

Of these writers, two explained how the China situation fitted into a large communist plan. One compared Bolshevist strategy in China and Morocco, stating that the Russians had now abandoned a direct offensive against the civilized world and were working indirectly on the grievances of colonial peoples.[7] Stanley High was more explicit in an *Asia* article. Ambassador Karakhan, he said, brought from Moscow a supply of money with which "to enlist, as aggressive proponents of Communism, a rather large number of students and professors."

Literary Digest, July 11, 1925, pp. 16-18; *ibid*., July 25, 1925, pp. 16-17.

[4] *Christian Century*, June 18, 1925, p. 788; *Independent*, June 27, 1925, p. 714; *New Republic*, June 17, 1925, p. 83; *ibid*., July 22, 1925, p. 218; *Commonweal*, June 24, 1925, p. 175; *ibid*., July 29, 1925, pp. 281-282.

[5] *Living Age*, July 25, 1925, p. 173.

[6] Stanley High, "China Astir Against the Foreigner," *Asia* XXV (Aug., 1925), 652-654, 705; Harry F. Ward, "The White Boomerang in China," *ibid*. (Nov., 1925), 936-940, 1009; P. W. Kuo, "Chinese Statement of the Chinese Case," *ibid*. (Dec., 1925), 1035; Frank L. Cartwright, "When Bloodshed Makes for Unity," *Outlook*, Aug. 12, 1925, p. 523; John Earl Baker, "The Chinese Powder Magazine," *ibid*., pp. 524-526; Paul Blanshard, "The Great Shanghai Strike," *World Tomorrow* VIII (Aug., 1925), 247; Frank H. Simonds, "Red Backgrounds in Morocco and China," *Review of Reviews* LXXII (Aug., 1925), 176; Kinn Wei Shaw, "China's National Ideals," *ibid*. (Sept., 1925), 298-300.

[7] Simonds, *loc. cit*.

One of these students had been traced for several months from university to university. During that time he had enrolled in four different schools, had stirred up trouble in each, then had moved on. Others, whose communist activities had become too well known, had left China for Russia. But, High went on, Soviet propaganda could not possibly have achieved a fraction of the victories accorded it around the world. Laying responsibility for the Shanghai outbreak "at the already congested gate of the Kremlin" was a dangerous "avoidance of the real issues involved."[8]

Although the Commonweal's editor and an Outlook contributor suggested that too much emphasis was put on China's demonstrations and that these actually had little impact on a chaotic Orient, such was not the viewpoint of the larger number of editors, columnists, and contributors.[9] Many of them saw the China situation as a matter of considerable concern for the future. It was evident that the temper of China was changing, and writers sought to discover how and why and to determine what would happen next. One of the basic causes for the Shanghai demonstrations was recognized

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8. High, loc. cit., pp. 652-653. High, whose journalistic connections included positions as correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor and editor of the Christian Herald, travelled in Asia during the mid-1920's as Associate Secretary of the Methodist Board of Foreign Missions and wrote numerous articles on China for various American magazines. Other writers agreed with him about blaming Moscow, calling it either "absurd" or overlooking "the Chinese woods for the trees." Christian Century, June 18, 1925, p. 788; Time, July 20, 1925, p. 12.

9. Commonweal, June 24, 1925, p. 175; Raymond T. Rich, "How to Read the News from China," Outlook, July 8, 1925, p. 365. Suggestions that others shared these feelings

to be labor unrest. At least seven magazines mentioned the poor working conditions in the factories, where child labor was common and wages were low, as one of the immediate causes of the riots.[10] Had not a strike in a Japanese-owned mill touched off the first demonstration?

The labor situation in China had been discussed in American magazines occasionally before the strikes at Shanghai, though mention was more frequent afterward.[11] Part of the earlier interest was aroused by a seaman's strike in the Canton-Hong Kong area, where effective organization was evident;[12] but some articles discussed labor organization throughout China, while the World Tomorrow analyzed working conditions and the impact of industrialization on the traditional Chinese family life.[13] As might be expected, there was occasional speculation about Bolsheviks working with the

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may be found in arguments by Harry F. Ward (loc. cit., Nation, July 22, 1925, p. 108) and John Earl Baker (loc. cit., p. 524).

10. Christian Century, June 18, 1925, pp. 787-788; New Republic, June 17, 1925, p. 83; G. Nye Steiger, "China Declares Independence," Independent, July 4, 1925, p. 9; Living Age, July 11, 1925, p. 80; Kinn Wei Shaw, loc. cit., Review of Reviews, LXIII (Aug., 1925), 300; Argonaut, July 18, 1925, p. 1; Literary Digest, Aug. 15, 1925, p. 30.

11. In the 37 months before May 30, 1925, nine articles, editorials, or news items in American magazines were concerned with labor unions or labor conditions in China. In the 15 months after that date, eleven such items appeared, though one or two may have been written before the shootings took place.

12. Living Age, May 6, 1922, p. 311; Rodney Gilbert, "China's New Labor Movement" (from the North China Herald, Peking, April), ibid., July 1, 1922, pp. 7-12.

13. Gardner Harding, "China, Too, Has a Labor Problem," Nation, May 3, 1922, p. 528; Elsie McCormick, "Trimming the Dragon with Red," ibid., Mar. 21, 1923, pp. 347-348; World Tomorrow VI (Nov., 1923), 331-342.

laborers and some hinting about circulating communist literature. An article in the March 21, 1923, issue of the Nation announced definitely that "Floods of literature from Russia, translated into Chinese, have had their part in the industrial education of the laborer," that Marxist ideas were being spread by lectures and a newspaper, and that one branch of the labor movement was now "avowedly red."[14]

All writers did not agree on how "red" the movement was. Two articles suggested that an interest in Bolshevism was a thing of the past among workers,[15] while a former commercial attaché in China indicated his alarm at the "astonishing headway" made by Bolshevik propaganda, "especially among the younger generation." He blamed the changes that industrialization was making in the social order for this situation and suggested western cooperation to improve living conditions in cities and on farms as the only way to compete with communism in China.[16]

That the younger generation was much involved with labor agitation was not often mentioned before the Shanghai shootings, though two writers noted that students had helped with the distribution of communist literature among laborers.[17]

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14. McCormick, loc. cit., p. 348.
15. World Tomorrow VI (Nov., 1923), 340; A. Percival Finch, "Industrial Awakening of China," Current History XXII (June, 1925), 430-432.
16. Charles G. Batchelder, "China's Industrial Revolution," ibid. (July, 1925), 751-755. For a similar plea, see Sherwood Eddy, "The Real Situation in China," Christian Century, July 9, 1925, pp. 889-891.
17. McCormick, loc. cit., p. 348; Harding, loc. cit.

It was known, of course, that some university students were showing an interest in communism; and authorities did not hesitate to brand as Bolshevism student rebellions against the *status quo*. Thus *Current History* told of the closing of Yale-in-China because of a student strike and linked the strike to communist activity; and Tangshan University was reported to have expelled as Bolsheviks a group of students who took a day off, supposedly to demonstrate sympathy with strikers in nearby coal mines.[18]

After the demonstrations, a number of Shanghai schools were raided and closed by authorities because of alleged Bolshevik propaganda found there. Harry Ward wrote two articles, one for the *Christian Century* and one for the *Nation*, both appearing in late July, 1925, and both ridiculing the moves. The net result, he said, was to gain more sympathy from students and others for the demonstraters and to fill the ranks of the Student Union.[19] The president of that union wrote a letter to Secretary of State Kellogg, protesting that the situation was not grave enough to

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18. Payson Treat in *Current History* XXI (Feb., 1925), 812-813; John Brailsford, "The Foreign Devil in Young China," *Forum* CXXIV (Sept., 1925), 394.
19. Harry F. Ward, *loc. cit.*, *Nation*, July 22, 1925, p. 108; Ward, "China Learns from the West," *Christian Century*, July 30, 1925, pp. 973-974. Ward, a professor of Christian Ethics at Union Theological Seminary, a contributing editor to the *World Tomorrow*, and President of the American Civil Liberties Union, was on a world tour, lecturing in Shanghai at the time of the outbreak. He wrote a number of articles on the situation, distributing them privately as well as sending them to periodicals. For the next few years he also chaired the American Committee for Justice to China.

warrant the landing of American marines in Shanghai. (The marines were stationed at the closed colleges.) The letter, printed in the New Republic and in the Christian Century, also denied that the students were "red."[20]

In many Chinese cities posters appeared which proclaimed,

> The Student Movement
> IS
> NOT Bolshevik
> NOT Anti-Christian
> NOT Anti-Foreign
> But Cry for Humanity [sic].[21]

The Nation indicated that the posters' statement did not hold true all over China, however, when it printed a translation of a rather anti-foreign circular, prepared by Kuomintang members in Wuchang and distributed by both the Student Union and the Communist Youth League.[22]

But not all writers for American magazines linked the students with Bolshevism. Some discussed the youth movement with little or no mention of either Russia or communism, or concluded that probably neither the student class nor "the proletariat, which it is befriending, organizing, and reforming, is consciously committed to Moscow with its schemes for a Chinese Soviet Republic."[23] There had to be

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20. Ibid., June 18, 1925, p. 805; New Republic, July 1, 1925, p. 155. See also Louis D. Froelick, "The Personal Equation in China," Asia XXV (Sept., 1925), 777-778; and Nation, June 24, 1925, p. 726.
21. P. W. Kuo, "A Chinese Statement of the Chinese Case," Asia XXV (Dec., 1925), 1035; Paul Blanshard, "Bolshevism in China: An interview with Karakhan," Nation, Sept. 23, 1925, p. 324; Missionary Review XLVIII (Nov., 1925), 840.
22. Nation, July 22, 1925, p. 127.
23. Walter Littlefield, "China in Ferment," Forum CXXIV (Sept., 1925), 404-409; T. L. Shen, "The Youth Movement in China," World Tomorrow IX (Jan., 1926), 14; Richard H.

other causes for the Chinese incident, aside from Bolshevism and deeper than labor conditions.

The Independent's editor claimed that conditions in foreign-owned mills were but an "excuse to set off the smoldering resentment of the Chinese against foreign domination." He saw the situation as political, with the radical party in China doing the fomenting, hoping to unite the country under a single national standard expressing the ideals of all the Chinese people.[24] Others agreed with him and with the Chinese student at Columbia University who wrote that the upheaval in his country was "the cry of the Chinese people for the re-creation of their nation-- for the restoration of her sovereignty and her place of dignity among the peoples of the world."[25]

It was not difficult to determine the causes of the foreign domination or the loss of Chinese sovereignty; and the unequal treaties, especially the matter of extraterritoriality, drew attention. Opinions on what to do were divided. The New Republic's editor remarked that all arguments were exaggerated, as abolition of extraterritoriality would neither cause catastrophe nor cure all the ills of China. But, he noted a week later, Russia's popularity in China was due much less to enthusiasm for Marx than to that

Ritter, "What the Chinese Students Want," Christian Century, Sept. 24, 1925, pp. 1179-1180. See also Reedlay Thomas, "Chinese Students on the Vanguard of Revolution," Current History XXIV (July, 1926), 570-575.

[24] Independent, June 27, 1925, p. 714.

[25] Kinn Wei Shaw, "China's National Ideals," Review of Reviews LXXII (Sept., 1925), 298.

government's renunciation of the old treaties.[26]

Attitudes caused by foreigners' not being answerable to Chinese laws were seen as more annoying than the fact of extraterritoriality. Writers noted that Chinese were treated as second-class citizens in Shanghai, that European arrogance was coming openly to be hated, and that the note of condescension which ran through foreign residents' conversations could easily lead thinking Chinese to feel resentful.[27]

One facet of the Chinese-foreigner confrontation, a source of friction even before the early treaties, was the difference in concept of law. An Outlook contributor saw this as the prime cause of the Shanghai riots. To the Chinese, law was a matter of principles, not of legality; and they were looking for justice in the Shanghai strikes. (The Chinese would have a rich company pay off a poor worker for an injury, even if the man were at fault. After all, the company was wealthy.) Other periodicals mentioned this difference of opinion and understanding. Where the Chinese wanted real justice in labor disputes, the western owners of the mills relied strictly on their legal positions. Foreigners were too unfeeling. Basic friendliness would serve them better with the Chinese than pure logic.[28]

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26. World Tomorrow VIII (Aug., 1925), 248; Independent, June 27, 1925, p. 714; Living Age, July 25, 1925, p. 174; Ritter, loc. cit., pp. 1179-1180; Commonweal, Aug. 26, 1925, p. 359; New Republic, June 17, 1925, p. 83; ibid., July 15, 1925, p. 190; ibid., July 22, 1925, p. 218.

27. Blanshard, loc. cit., World Tomorrow VIII (Aug., 1925), 247; Steiger, loc. cit., p. 11; Blanshard, loc. cit., Nation, Sept. 16, 1925, pp. 299-300.

28. Baker, loc. cit., Outlook, Aug. 12, 1925, pp. 525-526; Blanshard, loc. cit., World Tomorrow VIII (Aug., 1925),

RUSSIAN INFLUENCES

By late 1925 there was a definite awareness in the American periodical press that Russia was playing some sort of a role in China, though not all writers could agree on the strength and the importance of that role. Between November of 1924 and November of 1926, over forty different articles, editorials, or news items appeared in eleven different magazines, all addressed to the question of Russian influence in the Far East. There remained the old dichotomy between the influence of the Russian government (typified during this period by Ambassador Karakhan) and the Comintern, or Bolshevism. As in earlier magazines, some writers made a distinction, some did not.

In Manchuria, Russian behavior seemed much more an echo of the old tsarist policies than an offshoot of Bolshevism. Through there ran the Chinese Eastern Railway, which had figured so largely in Sino-Soviet treaty discussions. The area was not actually under the control of the government at Peking, but was rather the province of the "Marshal of Manchuria," the warlord Chang Tso-lin. Chang's refusal to accept the terms of the Peking Treaty and to permit the Soviets to resume control of the railway led to a separate treaty, made by Karakhan at Mukden and recognizing Chang as ruler of the "Three Autonomous Eastern Provinces." Such recognition undermined the Peking Government's claim to control of Manchuria and was seen as evidence of Russian

247; Steiger, loc. cit., p. 10; New Republic, Sept. 16, 1925, p. 79.

imperialism by numerous contributors.[29] Subsequent disputes between Chang and Moscow were also seen as wholly diplomatic. (Chang seized control of the railroad and ousted Russian officials in early 1926, reportedly because of disputes over free passes for his soldiers.)[30] No one suggested that the Russian presence on the railroad was a Bolshevist threat--except perhaps Chang, who censored Russian newspapers and closed Russian schools. Important to some writers was the fact that Chang was cooperating with the Japanese in Manchuria; the possibility of a new Russo-Japanese conflict in the area was not overlooked.[31]

Much more common were views of Russia as intriguing to spread communism throughout China and the rest of the world. Ambassador Karakhan was viewed with suspicion by much of the American press, and both he and his country were reported to be very influential in China in late 1924 and the early months of 1925.[32] The Nation printed two interviews with Karakhan in 1925 and 1926. Each stressed the importance of the Russian methods of emphasizing friendship with the Chinese, both

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29. Henry Kittridge Norton, "Trouble Behind the Trouble in China," Asia XXVI (Jan., 1926), 30-31; K. K. Kawakami, "Russia's Sinister Plot to Exploit China," Current History XXIII (Mar., 1926), 848-854; Norton, "The Russian Drive in China," Century CXI (Mar., 1926), 563; Harold S. Quigley, "China's Relations to the Great Powers," Current History XXIV (Sept., 1926), 869.
30. America, Jan. 30, 1926, p. 304; Time, Feb. 1, 1926, p. 15.
31. Henry Kittridge Norton, "Japan Stalks the Bear," Asia XXVI (Feb., 1926), 142-147, 170-172; Norton, loc. cit., Century CXI (Mar., 1926), 568.
32. America, Dec. 20, 1924, p. 218; Living Age, Feb. 28, 1925, p. 451; Time, May 4, 1925, p. 10; Payson Treat in Current History XXII (June, 1925), 505.

through small personal actions, such as flying the embassy flag at half mast on the anniversary of Sun's death, and by means of the grand gesture of renouncing the unequal treaties. The renunciation was not idealistic, said Karakhan: it guaranteed Chinese friendship for Russia when China became strong.

As for Bolshevism in China, the Russian ambassador candidly admitted the spreading of propaganda, though he claimed no hope of making China communist. He denied that a large Bolshevik group existed in the country, but spoke with pride of the agitation caused by the small organization which did exist. Russia had no need to pay for this agitation, he said, as students and professors proclaimed what they believed. Also, the behavior of the other powers but aided the Russian position. Disturbances like that at Shanghai came naturally from Chinese dislike of foreign actions.[33]

Among other articles describing Russian methods was one, mentioned earlier, which compared Russian movements in Morocco and China and referred to present procedures as "indirect" or a "second phase" of Bolshevist strategy.[34] Another was by Jean Bouchet, a former member of the faculty of the National University of Peking, outlining previous Russian intrigues and describing the present situation as a threat to the security of all foreigners in China.[35] A third

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33. Paul Blanshard, "Bolshevism in China: An Interview with Karakhan," Nation, Sept. 23, 1925, pp. 323-325; Lewis S. Gannett, "Bolshevism in China?" ibid., Aug. 25, 1926, pp. 171-173.
34. Frank Simonds, loc. cit., Review of Reviews LXXII (Aug., 1925), 176.
35. Jean Bouchet, "Soviet Imperialism in China" (from Le Correspondent, Sept. 10), Living Age, Nov. 7, 1925, pp. 269-276.

article, by the Christian Science Monitor's Moscow correspondent, William Chamberlin, explained the workings of the Comintern in the Far East, including ways that organization could work outside diplomatic boundaries.[36] In addition, a reprint from a Berlin paper described Russia as taking advantage of existing grievances to start movements in Asia and Africa, eventually to overthrow capitalist Europe and America.[37]

All of these writers showed an interest in the way the Russians operated. They stressed nationalism until, Bouchet remarked, "these alien reds were more blatant Chinese patriots than the Chinese themselves."[38] They played on Chinese grievances and put the emphasis on friendship as against imperialism. Chamberlin noted that speeches delivered after an historic Moscow-to-Peking flight carried a theme of brotherly sympathy. He also described the University of the Toiling East and Sun Yat-sen University, both in Moscow and both designed to train students of Eastern countries in revolution and Marxist thought.[39]

There was, however, some disagreement about the effect of Russian strategy and propaganda, even at times by the

[36] William H. Chamberlin, "The Soviet Shadow in the East," Asia XXVI (Mar., 1926), 236-241, 263-265. Literary Digest, Mar. 13, 1926, p. 38, included long quotes from this article.

[37] Nicholas Basseches, "Moscow's Real Foreign Policy" (from Vossische Zeitung, Berlin, Jan. 3), Living Age, Mar. 6, 1926, pp. 512-514.

[38] Bouchet, loc. cit., p. 272.

[39] Chamberlin, loc. cit., pp. 236, 263. See also Chamberlin, "Soviet Foreign Policy after Locarno," New Republic, Dec. 9, 1925, p. 80.

same author. Chamberlin reported in a New Republic article that Moscow was "full of Oriental diplomats and businessmen" and that Russia's course in the Far East was being pursued "with boldness and success." But he concluded his Asia essay by remarking that the influence of the Comintern in Asia was, so far, slight, "slighter than the nervous foreigner is inclined to believe."[40]

Bouchet, too, began his article with the announcement that Bolshevism was now "triumphant in China. It has the country under its heel...." But he concluded that only the cities could be converted, that communism could not reach the rank-and-file, "the illiterate, egoistic, tradition-bound Chinese peasant."[41] This last thought was echoed again and again. China was not susceptible to communism; even the Russians admitted this. All they could hope for was a rousing of class consciousness and unrest among the workers.[42] The Literary Digest quoted Far Eastern papers that Bolshevism was opposed to nationalism; therefore to claim a Chinese leader to be a Bolshevik would be to say he was no longer Chinese. Russian social and economic ideas could not be grafted onto China's social foundations.[43] Even anti-Bolshevik Russian exiles admitted that the effects of Soviet propaganda had been exaggerated in news reports. But all Soviet leaders were not in agreement. Some saw China as immune to Bolshevik teachings; others, followers of Lenin, saw the eventual "revolutionization" of China as Russia's "trump card" in the Far East.[44]

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[40] Ibid.; Chamberlin, loc. cit., Asia XXVI (Mar., 1926), 265. Reviews of Why China Sees Red, by the British publicist Putman Weale, indicate differing attitudes. Lyman Bryson (New Republic, Feb. 24, 1926, p. 22) felt that the title was probably either intended to be ironic or to catch the eye of the American public. As he saw it, the book indicated Mongolia as Russia's only area of real success. Harry Ward later (Nation, Apr. 28, 1926, pp. 479-480) indicated concern that the work did not speak highly enough of Russia or of the Kuomintang. A year later, however, after the KMT moved north, a Literary Digest reviewer found the account of Russia's machinations of great interest (Mar. 12, 1927, p. 28).

[41] Bouchet, loc. cit., pp. 269, 276.

[42] F. L. Hawkes Pott, "China in Chaos," Current History XXI (Jan., 1925), 499; America, Dec. 20, 1924, p. 218; K. K. Kawakami, "Old Allies in China," Atlantic Monthly CXXVIII (Oct., 1926), 567.

Few American writers overlooked the implications of Russian involvement in China for the world as a whole. Mostly, because British interests in China were greater than those of any other nation, Russian moves in that country were seen as backhanded slaps at Great Britain.[45] Some Americans saw British policies as the root of all Chinese evils. The Irish Catholic editors of Commonweal at times seemed to be walking a tightrope, with their sympathies both anti-Bolshevik and anti-British. Any blow at communism was cheered; at the same time there was a hint of satisfaction whenever Russian or Chinese moves hurt the British position in China. Extraterritoriality, imperialism, and the British trade in opium were seen as the background for the Chinese unrest, while the intransigence and bad tempers of the British residing in the "mercantile colony" of Shanghai were blamed for the immediate problems of 1925 and 1926.[46] Time also saw the powers as the basis of the troubles, with Great Britain mentioned in particular, but not exclusively.[47] An Independent contributor compared Shanghai with Amritsar, saying that the British had slaughtered innocents in both and remarking that the Soviets must be thankful for opportunities provided by the stupidity of the capitalist powers.[48]

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[43] Literary Digest, Feb. 21, 1925, p. 16.

[44] Ibid., May 16, 1925, pp. 19-20.

[45] Speeches and articles by Karakhan (discovered by Paris police in a raid on Chinese Communist headquarters and by International police who arrested a Comintern agent in Shanghai) seemed to prove this. Chicherin, after Britain broke relations with Russia, claimed that this was a mere pretext, that Russia had done nothing to disturb Britain's trade in China and had certainly not interfered with the internal affairs of China. Littlefield, loc. cit., Forum LXXIV (Sept., 1925), p. 407.

A few examples of communist verbal attacks on Britain were to be found in American periodicals. Karakhan, for instance, in an interview mentioned earlier, said that the British were trying to make slaves of the native Chinese. British antipathy toward Young China, the interviewer added, was actually helping the Bolsheviks. The Chinese communists would welcome the chance to smash the British Empire.[49] The Nation also printed a speech by Chou En-lai to the Swatow labor unions which corroborated this view. In it Chou proclaimed that the National Government was not against individual foreigners, but against their governments. First to be driven out must be the British. Others, unless they came to the aid of the English, would be allowed to learn their lessons from the British example.[50]

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[46] Commonweal, July 29, 1925, p. 282; ibid., Aug. 26, 1925, p. 359; ibid., Jan. 27, 1926, p. 312.

[47] Time, July 20, 1925, p. 12.

[48] G. Nye Steiger, loc. cit., Independent, July 4, 1925, p. 9.

[49] Blanshard, loc. cit., Nation. Sept. 13, 1925, pp. 323, 325.

The British were not, of course, slow to rise to their own defense. Indeed, some of the anti-communist articles mentioned earlier were from the pens of British writers, having first appeared in British or British-Chinese journals. The Literary Digest gained much of its material from foreign sources, and the best of its anti-Bolshevik quotes or cartoons came from the British.[51]

The possibility of war between Russia and England over the China situation was discussed. The New Republic noted that "Soviet 'meddling'" in China was producing a reaction which ran "half-way around the world," that England and France were displaying new hostility, and that the Russian press was declaring that a "holy war" of capitalism against them was in prospect. Harry Ward wrote that there was considerable propaganda from both sides and much war talk in the air in China.[52]

A Japanese view appeared in the Atlantic Monthly in an article by the well-known Japanese correspondent K. K. Kawakami. He pictured Japan as being quite happy to be free from the Anglo-Japanese alliance which the British had ended at the Washington Conference and noted that Britain's position had been made the butt of Soviet assaults ever since the

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50. Chou En-lai, Speech to Swatow Labor Unions, ibid., Jan. 13, 1926, pp. 44-46. This was the only mention of a Chinese later to be important in the Communist Government before late 1930, when Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh were named as leaders of the Red Army.

51. Literary Digest, July 11, 1925, p. 16; ibid., July 25, 1925, pp. 16-17; ibid., Aug. 15, 1925, p. 30.

52. New Republic, July 22, 1925, p. 218; Harry F. Ward, "War Talk in China," Christian Century, Nov. 19, 1925, pp. 1438-1439.

Russians had begun diplomatic negotiations with China. Although aware that Russia might be intending to turn on Japan after disrupting the British Empire, he did not favor siding again with Great Britain, as the Chinese nationalists, helped by the Bolshevists, seemed to have dealt a crippling blow to that country's interests in China. Feeling that the Chinese were but using the Russians, he advocated Japanese efforts to cement relations with the Chinese instead.[53]

Not all American reactions to the British panic were favorable. Many writers felt that it was greatly overdone and that more attention should be paid to reasons for Chinese discontent than to those playing on it.[54] There were British who agreed, as was indicated by a quote from the Manchester Guardian, suggesting that a new British policy for China was long overdue. A London journal was also quoted as admitting that past policies had helped bring about the present situation, but argued that the powers were not wholly at fault, that China had yet to adjust to the modern world, and that its own warlords were doing it much more harm than the foreign capitalists.[55] The Living Age printed an article which elaborated this last point. Its author, identified only as "a veteran in the Far East," claimed that the Russian campaign against extraterritoriality was designed to break the unity of the other powers and to bring war. Most Chinese, he went on,

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53. Kawakami, loc. cit., Atlantic Monthly CXXXVIII (Oct., 1926), 561-567.
54. Time, July 20, 1925, p. 12; Independent, June 27, 1925, p. 714; New Republic, July 22, 1925, pp. 217-218.
55. Literary Digest, July 11, 1925, p. 16; ibid., July 25, 1925, p. 17.

did not care about the matter in the least; and it was a fact that a renunciation of western rights in China (including tariff control) would bring nothing but chaos to that country.[56]

But most contributors to American periodicals saw the course of the United States as somehow close to the British and in opposition to the Russians. Whether calling for a recognition of the merits of the Russian methods and long range planning, for unity or compromise with Britain or Japan, or for a separate course designed to preserve Chinese good will for America, they favored some sort of program to offset Russian imperialism and Red propaganda.[57]

CHINA'S "CIVIL WAR"

Those who foresaw utter chaos or Russian domination in China if western nations withdrew from their special positions had some basis for their prognostications. China in the early 1920's, as in the previous decade, was the scene of confusing civil struggles. The American news press reported the events of these conflicts as they were known, but did not show much interest in the squabbles and intrigues between the numerous "tuchuns" and "super-tuchuns." The latter journalistic term was usually applied to Chang Tso-lin (Manchuria and North China); Feng Yü-hsiang (Northwest China); Wu P'ei-fu (Central

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56. A Veteran in the Far East, "The Case against Chinese Nationalism" (from the London Spectator, Jan. 9), Living Age, Feb. 27, 1926, pp. 445-446.
57. Outlook, Aug. 26, 1925, p. 574; ibid., Dec. 17, 1924, p. 628; Harry F. Ward, loc. cit., Christian Century, Nov. 19, 1925, p. 1439; Time, July 20, 1925, p. 12; Commonweal, July 29, 1925, p. 282.

China); and, at times, to Sun Yat-sen. The less important tuchuns held smaller areas, usually provinces, and were at times allied, sometimes only nominally, with one or more of the more powerful men. No doubt most Americans, if they thought about the matter, agreed with the Current Opinion editor who spoke of "teacup tempests" in China or of "this Hip and Tong feud in the Far East," or with the Nation editor who declared, as late as June of 1926, "The most significant thing about the confused fighting and peace-making in China is its insignificance. Whatever the outcome, nothing important will have changed."[58] Three months later, when the Kuomintang had begun to move north, the Christian Century admitted hesitation about declaring this important, remarking that the Chinese civil war had always seemed so purposeless that it had wearied other nations.[59]

If cities taken or alliances made failed to make good news copy, hints of Bolshevik involvement succeeded. Was Karakhan morally or financially behind Feng's coup in Peking in the fall of 1924?[60] Did Feng's new foreign minister really feel that Russia supplied the suggestion for a more workable type of democracy?[61] Did Chang's driving Feng from Peking signify a defeat of Russia by Japan?[62]

Chang Tso-lin's position vis-a-vis Russia has been

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58. Current Opinion LXXVIII (Jan., 1925), 20; Nation, June 23, 1926, p. 684.
59. Christian Century, Sept. 16, 1926, p. 1128.
60. Time, Nov. 17, 1924, p. 10; Outlook, Dec. 10, 1924, p. 587.
61. Ibid.
62. New Republic, Apr. 7, 1926, p. 183; Literary Digest, May 1, 1926, p. 12.

discussed. Disputes over the Chinese-Eastern Railway made them opponents, and Chang preferred to cooperate with Japan, his neighbor on the east, whose pressure was perhaps stronger. Feng Yü-hsiang was another type. Known as the "Christian General" because of his professed Methodism and his attempts to get his soldiers to live by Christian precepts, he made interesting copy.[63] His ideas of social reform gave him some interest in communism, and the proximity of his domain to Russia made him receptive to Russian offers of arms, especially after he had been driven to the west of Peking and cut off from supply lines to the ocean.[64] His true feelings about communism were never well defined and often under discussion. After both Time and the Outlook had hinted at Russian complicity in his taking possession of Peking's Forbidden City in late 1924, the Outlook's editor explained that, though friendly with the Russians who promised him aid, Feng was not a Red; and moreover, the Russians knew very well that they could have little hope for Bolshevism in Russia.[65] Feng himself was quoted as saying that China *was* fertile ground for Bolshevism, that the corruption of the government was daily

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63. Although Feng left the Methodist Church after the Shanghai incident and set up his own theological school (See Harry F. Ward, "Can China be Stabilized?" Christian Century, Jan. 14, 1926, p. 46), the Missionary Review continued to proclaim his Christianity well into the 1930's. For more discussion of his Christianity, see James Sheridan, A Chinese Warlord (Stanford, 1966), pp. 52-54, 169-176.

64. The amount of this assistance was often questioned, but Lewis Gannett insisted that transportation difficulties made large shipments impossible. Gannett, loc. cit., Nation, Aug. 25, 1926, p. 173. See also Sheridan, op. cit., pp. 163-169.

65. See above, note 60. Outlook, Dec. 30, 1925, p. 658.

driving people into the arms of Russia, but that he was not Bolshevik, as "the Bolshevistic people are against us Christians."[66] However, America reported that after Feng had been driven from Peking by a coalition of the forces of Wu and Chang,[67] he was going to Moscow to "pursue a study of Bolshevism and revolutionary methods."[68] The Nation soon thereafter suggested that Feng's alliance with Russia was "more geographical than ideological."[69]

A similar impression was held by Anna Louise Strong, who had travelled through China in 1925, en route to the United States from Moscow, and who published in American periodicals two accounts of her interviews with Feng on his home grounds. From where but Russia, she asked, could he hope to get equipment?[70] By late summer, 1926, China's civil warfare was being seen as almost international: Feng got his support from Russia, Japan was probably aiding Chang Tso-lin, and Wu P'ei-fu received arms from the British on the Yangtze.[71]

After Chang and Wu took control of Peking, Russia's

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66. Littlefield, loc. cit., Forum LXXIV (Sept., 1925), 409.
67. Quincy Wright described these two as being similar only in their opposition to communism. Current History XXIV (July, 1926), 652.
68. America, April 17, 1926, p. 2. There were also reports that Feng had to proclaim a Soviet Republic in Northeast China to get Russian aid. Literary Digest, Feb. 13, 1926, p. 19.
69. Nation, June 23, 1926, p. 684.
70. Anna Louise Strong, "China's Cromwell," Outlook, Mar. 24, 1926, pp. 454-457; "Chang and Feng and Wu," Asia XXVI (July, 1926), 600-601. See also Literary Digest, July 24, 1926, pp. 36-42. Miss Strong's life in Russia would have enabled her to recognize a real communist sympathizer.
71. Christian Century, Sept. 16, 1926, p. 1128; Quincy Wright in Current History XXIV (Aug., 1926), 882.

official position in China faded rapidly. Chang had announced that the war was being fought "to eradicate Bolshevism in China," and began accusing Russia of stationing troops in Mongolia, ready to help Feng, as well as demanding Karakhan's recall.[72] Most American reports of the situation were simply records of events, though America spoke of reason for popular encouragement. The Literary Digest, after surveying various newspapers, reported that in view of the usual "kaleidoscopic situation" in China, few papers saw any finality in Chang's demands.[73] Meanwhile, events in the South attracted greater interest.

CANTON AFTER SUN

Nowhere was the heightened interest in Chinese affairs caused by the "May 30th Movement" more marked than in the increase of information about Canton. The death of Sun Yat-sen turned the focus of attention from him to his advisors, and to the struggle for power among his political heirs. Canton became one of the places in China most visited by travelling journalists, each of whom had his own ideas about the influence of the Russians now known to be advising the government there.

With an attempt being made to wrest the city from the controlling Kuomintang and a general strike in progress,

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72. Ibid. (June, 1926), 481; ibid. (July, 1926), 652; see Nation, Aug. 11, 1926, p. 138, for Karakhan denial.
73. America, June 19, 1926, p. 218; Literary Digest, May 1, 1926, p. 12.

Canton was in such turmoil in mid-1925 that an incident similar to the shooting at Shanghai passed almost unnoticed in the American periodical press. Only America's editor noted at the time that students had been shot by foreign troops at Shameen, the artificial island which was the location of that city's foreign concessions. He claimed that Shameen had been fired on first and that "Independent dispatches assert that the firing was begun by mounted Russians who were masked."[74] A British veteran of the Far East later referred to "the attack on the Sha-mien... by the Chinese 'Red' troops led by Russian officers";[75] but Lewis Gannett, visiting Canton on assignment for the Nation the following year, was doubtful. There was no proof who had fired the first shots and no indication that the island had been threatened.[76] The Chinese retaliated by continuing the strike and boycotting the island and British shipping.

The boycott made trips to Canton exciting, and visitors delighted in describing the difficulty of reaching there, with British vessels barred from the city's docks and a state of siege maintained on Shameen.[77] As most of Canton's trade was with the Crown Colony of Hong Kong, the attention of the American periodical press was focused on the Canton-British conflict, which a German newsman saw as an extension of the old Russo-British rivalry.[78] Some British sources saw the Chinese as accomplices of the Russians, who were using Chinese nationalism as a weapon against the British and trying to destroy Hong Kong, the Far Eastern center of anti-communism.[79] As Canton was the anti-British center of China, extending the influence to other areas of anti-British feeling, the British were most sure that Canton was all Red.[80]

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[74] America, July 4, 1925, p. 268. More Chinese, students and workers, were killed here than at Shanghai, in protest of which the demonstration had been called.

[75] A Veteran in the Far East, loc. cit., Living Age, Feb. 27, 1926, p. 445.

[76] Lewis S. Gannett, "In Red Canton," Asia XXVI (June, 1926), 490.

[77] Ibid.; Gannett, "Canton-- Hope of China," Nation, Mar. 31, 1926, pp. 336-337; Paul Scheffer, "Red and Yellow Canton" (from Berliner Tageblatt, Oct. 11-20), Living Age, Dec. 5, 1925, p. 495; Anna Louise Strong, "New Women of Old Canton," Asia XXVI (June, 1926), 493-494. For a view of Shameen which appeared somewhat later, see Nora Waln, "The Rise of the Chinese Nationalists," Atlantic Monthly CXXIX (May, 1927), 679-685.

The Canton strike was amazingly effective. Commerce of all kinds with the British and their friends was halted. Even hospital nurses and workers remained off their jobs, causing the closing of the Canton hospital.[81] Lewis Gannett investigated the city's labor unions, finding them well organized. Especially strong was the Canton Strike Committee, which was almost like an independent government. (Remarked Gannett, "To some it looks alarmingly like a Soviet.") Its members policed the strike, searching all who crossed from the bund to Shameen. For the idle strikers, the Strike Committee maintained a strikers' dormitory, which was hung with a variety of posters-- some depicting labor victories or British crimes in China, others showing Sun Yat-sen or listing his principles, and still others bearing pictures of Lenin or Trotsky or slogans of obvious Russian inspiration. Courses for workers were offered at the dormitory, some in the history of labor movements in China or in the world, some in imperialism. The committee even maintained its own courts for strike offenders.[82]

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[78] Scheffer, loc. cit., p. 499.

[79] A Veteran in the Far East, loc. cit., p. 445; "The Reds: British Labor's Growing Radicalism" (from the London Spectator), Living Age, Oct. 10, 1925, p. 87; America, Aug. 29, 1925, p. 462.

[80] Time, Sept. 7, 1925, pp. 15-16; Scheffer, loc. cit., p. 501.

[81] Nation, July 21, 1926, p. 48; Time, Apr. 5, 1926, p. 16. The hospital was run by missionaries and was thus of greater interest to Americans than it otherwise might have been.

The course of events in Canton was far from smooth; and there were dissensions: a labor leader was assassinated, and bloody attempts were made to take political power.[83] With foreign and Chinese eyes on the growing power of the Kuomintang, much more attention was given political shifts there, especially as these shifts usually meant a strengthening or a weakening of Russian or Chinese leftist power. Time and Current History followed these events regularly, and other editors or contributors commented on occasion.

Time's comment was colorful and biased in favor of the nationalists, though anti-communist. On June 15, 1925, it simply reported a split between the Kuomintang and the "Yunnan Party," but a week later spoke sympathetically of the Chinese movements for liberty and followed this comment with mention of the "wholesale murder, arson, and rape committed

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82. Gannett, loc. cit., Asia XXVI (June, 1926), 569-570; Gannett, loc. cit., Nation, Aug. 25, 1926, p. 171.

83. Liao Chung-k'ai, associate of Sun, was mysteriously shot in August of 1925. Quincy Wright and Harold S. Quigley in Current History XXIII (Nov., 1925), 298; Scheffer, loc. cit., p. 498. Anna Louise Strong interviewed Liao's widow and daughter the following year. Strong, loc. cit., Asia XXVI (June, 1926), 494. This daughter and a son became important in the Chinese Communist Party.

by the bloodthirsty Kuo Min-tang" after defeating the Yunnanese, adding, "No doubt remained that they were in the employ of the Bolsheviki."[84] The next issue spoke of more atrocities, then stated, "There can be no doubt that some time the nationalists will win," and that the powers would have to get together to right China's wrongs.[85] In mid-July, Time reported the formation of "a new Government, entirely sympathetic to Bolshevism, if not in its favor," in Canton, already making demands on foreigners.[86] In September this "radical" government was reported captured by the "super-radical Whampoa College cadets, who... set the stone-mud walls to echoing a falsetto communism."[87] The following April, another coup was reported-- "by reactionary White forces backed by prominent Chinese, including Chang Kai-shek /sic/ ...."[88]

Current History's column on the Far East, written by professors of history or political science, was less flamboyant and usually about a month behind in reporting. April's events might be written up for the June issue. It was, however, more specific in details, reporting trends and attitudes and not just "newsy" events. Thus it gave a better picture of the lesser occurrences-- removals from office and "vacation" trips abroad-- and remarked on the

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84. Time, June 15, 1925, p. 11; ibid., June 22, 1925, pp. 12-13.
85. Ibid., June 27, 1925, pp. 11-12.
86. Ibid., July 13, 1925, p. 12.
87. Ibid., Sept. 7, 1925, pp. 15-16.
88. Ibid., Apr. 5, 1926, p. 16.

"somewhat less Bolshevist attitude" of Chiang Kai-shek only few months after his Whampoa cadets had helped him gain power.[89] (Only America noted that Chiang was but part of a ruling triumvirate.)[90] This column also told of signs of a right-wing-left-wing split in the Kuomintang and reported the Party Congress of January, 1926, at which the hopes of the right were dashed, as well as noting the later moves of a moderate group to take power from the radicals.[91]

In other magazines, coverage of the Kuomintang was episodic. An Independent column on world events mentioned the Yunnan struggle and linked the Cantonese with Moscow. Stanley High noted in Asia in August of 1925 that the party had broken "into a right wing, a left wing and a number of tails" after Sun's death, but did not elaborate. An article in the Living Age told of Kuomintang members throughout China who had left Canton because of disillusionment with the Russians there, and the Literary Digest printed an article about one of these. The Living Age also noted Chiang's 1926 coup as having "overthrown the Canton Communists... expelled their Bolshevist military advisers and ... set /Chiang/ up as a conventional tuchun." The Nation's interest lagged until Gannett began reporting from China, but then noted some anti-communist developments within the Kuomintang and reported on

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89. Payson Treat in Current History XXII (June, 1925), 505; Quincy Wright in ibid. (July, 1925), 678; Wright and Harold Quigley in ibid. XXIII (Nov., 1925), 298; ibid. (Dec., 1925), 453-454.
90. America, Sept. 12, 1925, p. 508.
91. Wright in Current History XXIV (Apr., 1926), 154; ibid. (June, 1926), 482.

Chiang's driving out "some of his too obstreperous advisers."[92]

From the outside, the power struggle within the Kuomintang was hard to keep defined. Was it a struggle between men or factions? How Red was the leadership? What were the connections between the Canton government and Moscow? What were the roles of the Russian advisors?

The Russians in Canton were the easiest to isolate and to declare as known Bolsheviks. It was not until late 1925 that discussion of them became general, though there had earlier been hints of Russian officers training the Cantonese army.[93] In October, 1925, the Literary Digest, using Russian anti-Bolshevist sources (the writers lived elsewhere in Europe), wrote of the military academy at Whampoa, near Canton, describing it as a school for communist propaganda, where cadets were taught military and social sciences in the light of Bolshevist theory. The commandant was named as "General Cheng" and the acting director as Borodin.[94]

Paul Scheffer, the German newsman who had visited Canton in June, while Shameen was under siege, wrote further of Borodin and his compatriots. He said that there were about one hundred Russian communists, including women and children,

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92. Stewart Beach in Independent, June 20, 1925, p. 707; High, loc. cit., Asia XXV (Aug., 1925), 705; Paul Scheffer, loc. cit., p. 498, Literary Digest, Mar. 27, 1926, pp. 18-19; Living Age, June 26, 1926, p. 654; Nation, June 9, 1926, p. 635; ibid., July 21, 1926, p. 48.

93. Quincy Wright in Current History XX (July, 1925), 678; Harry F. Ward, "China Learns from the West," Christian Century, July 30, 1925, p. 974; Missionary Review XLVIII (Mar., 1925), 170.

94. Literary Digest, Oct. 24, 1925, p. 19. This was the first mention of Michael (or Jacob) Borodin in the periodical press.

in Canton at that time, though most Chinese tried to convince him that their communism had nothing to do with the present situation. He noticed, however, that the Kuomintang had been reorganized along the lines of the Moscow party model and that the Russians exercised considerable power in various offices around the city.[95] Lewis Gannett also remarked that the Russians, especially Borodin, were extremely influential, though their official authority was almost nil. Gannett numbered the Russian advisors in Canton at thirty-four, with about thirty of these at the military academy.[96] Anna Louise Strong indicated that the Russian women should not be overlooked. She found Mrs. Borodin especially active among women's groups.[97] That the Russians could also be a moderating influence was suggested by a professor at Canton Christian College, who wrote for Current History of the situation as he saw it and credited Borodin with stopping anti-Christian disturbances which had been planned for week.[98]

In a country like China, where soldiering had been considered as one of the meanest occupations and where armies owed their allegiances to generals rather than to country or government, the academy at Whampoa was something unique. It

95. Scheffer, loc. cit., pp. 498-499. Scheffer was Moscow correspondent for the Berliner Tageblatt.
96. Gannett, loc. cit., Nation, Mar. 31, 1926, p. 337; Gannett, loc. cit., Asia XXVI (June, 1926), 491-492.
97. Strong, loc. cit., Asia XXVI (June, 1926), 493-495, 555-557.
98. John C. Griggs, "Canton's Contribution to the Chinese Revolution," Current History XXIV (Sept., 1926), 872.

received mention in about one-third of the magazines, mostly simply with the information that its troops were Bolshevist-trained or headed by Russian officers.[99] Only the Literary Digest's survey of "white" Russian papers indicated that the cadets were being instilled with communist ideals.[100] A few observers remarked that the cadets were being taught duty to their country and anti-imperialist doctrines.[101] One visitor to the academy specified that communism was not a part of the course of study at Whampoa and that it was even forbidden in extracurricular groups.[102]

It was natural to assume, from the presence of the advisors, that the Kuomintang was allied with Moscow; but some writers questioned the nature of this alliance. Gannett repeated the statement made by Sun after he had been refused a share of the Canton customs receipts-- that he could then turn only to Russia for aid -- and this appeared echoed in a Kuomintang Central Executive Committee manifesto which the Living Age printed in July, 1925. The manifesto stated Kuomintang goals of ridding the country of imperialism and fighting for the interests of the people, then proclaimed

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[99] Harry F. Ward, loc. cit., Christian Century, July 30, 1925, p. 974; Time, Sept. 7, 1925, pp. 15-16; Wright and Quigley in Current History XXIII (Nov., 1925), 298; Scheffer, loc. cit., p. 499; Gannett, loc. cit., Asia XXVI (June, 1926), 489-490. See also Allan Hunter, "Onward Chinese Soldiers," Forum LXXVI (Sept., 1926), 374-381.

[100] Literary Digest, Oct. 24, 1925, p. 19.

[101] Harry F. Ward, "The White Boomerang in China," Asia XXV (Nov., 1925), 1009; Gannett, loc. cit., Nation, Mar. 31, 1926, p. 337; Griggs, loc. cit., p. 875.

[102] Ibid.

Russia as the only nation deserving the name of equal partner with China, as it was leading the oppressed peoples of the world against imperialism. The Kuomintang should thus stand shoulder to shoulder with the Soviet Republics in this struggle.[103]

Was Russia using the Kuomintang or were the Chinese using the Russians? Observers suggested the former, that the Russians were looking at their work in China as a step toward world revolution;[104] but the Cantonese evidently felt otherwise. They assured visitors that they were independent of Moscow, that the advisors were merely giving technical advice.[105] Statements of Russian officials on the question contradicted one another.[106]

Was the Kuomintang communist? If so, how much? Many passing references to the Canton government implied that it was completely Red; but, as Gannett remarked, "It is a convenient way to discredit an inconvenient group."[107] There

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103. Gannett, loc. cit., Asia XXVI (June, 1926), 491; Manifesto of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee of May 21, 1925 (from the Peking Leader, June 6), Living Age, July 25, 1925, pp. 181-183.
104. Chamberlin, loc. cit., Asia XXVI (Mar., 1926), 237, 239, 264-265; Scheffer, loc. cit., p. 499; Walter Littlefield, loc. cit., Forum LXXIV (Sept., 1925) p. 406. Twice it was suggested that Canton was being used as a center for distributing propaganda throughout China and the Pacific area. Living Age, Oct. 10, 1925, p. 80; Bouchet in ibid., Nov. 7, 1925, p. 273. See also Charles H. Sherrill, "China as a Springboard!" Review of Reviews LXXII (Dec., 1925), 606, for discussion of Comintern methods.
105. Scheffer, loc. cit., p. 499; Gannett, loc. cit., Nation, Mar. 31, 1926, p. 337.
106. Littlefield, loc. cit., p. 407; Scheffer, loc. cit., pp. 499-500; Chamberlin, loc. cit., Asia XXVI (Mar., 1926), 263; Outlook, Dec. 30, 1925, p. 658.
107. Gannett, loc. cit., Nation, Mar. 31, 1926, p. 337.

was sufficient doubt for some to use "only pink" and "hysterical semi-bolshevist" instead of "Red."[108] With the exception of a Forum contribution which stated that "Canton has gone Bolshevist-- the usual fate of neglected, ignored, communities in a national ferment," the longer signed articles considered the question carefully and found it confused. Scheffer saw sufficient evidence to indicate Russian guidance of the Kuomintang, but also cited many facts refuting the assumption that the Russians really ruled. Attempts were made to revive trade and commerce, communism was repudiated at public meetings, and the posters he saw were without class appeal. Gannett too saw much evidence of Russian influence, but also indicated that communism was not the main theme in Canton. Another writer, after nine months of living in Canton, claimed that the "all red" epithet he had heard before his arrival was very much an exaggeration.[109]

The Kuomintang was admitted to be the single party in the Canton government and to be organized on the Russian model. There were, however, differences in outlook within the party. By 1926 it was recognized that the radicals in the party were Chinese communists. The organizational setup (communists being individual members of the Kuomintang) made it sometimes difficult to recognize distinctions, but a few

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108. Time, Sept. 7, 1925, p. 16; Harry F. Ward, "Can China be Stabilized?" Christian Century, Jan. 14, 1926, p. 48.

109. Walter Littlefield, loc. cit., Forum LXXIV (Sept., 1925), p. 406; Scheffer, loc. cit., pp. 500-501; Gannett, loc. cit., Nation, Mar. 31, 1926, p. 337; Griggs, loc. cit., p. 872.

correspondents were able to do so. In January, Harry Ward spoke of a communist left wing which was fairly weak.[110] Three months later a correspondent in Moscow reported that a Comintern official had nearly two years earlier spoken of the Chinese communists as having been permitted to join the Kuomintang, giving the latter a more active attitude against imperialism. He also noted that the Chinese students then studying at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow were looked on as future leaders of the Chinese Communist Party.[111] That the actual presence of a communist party was not well known may be inferred from a statement in America, which usually seemed especially sensitive to hints of communist movements. In January, 1926, it told of a recent meeting held "to discuss plans to form a new Chinese party outwardly professing Red doctrine."[112] This was four and a half years after the Chinese Communist Party had been formally organized.

The next mention of the Communist Party occurred in June, 1926. The Nation reported what the Moscow correspondent had said about the union of the Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Party and stated that the membership in the latter was small-- a few thousand at most-- but suggested that these few were said to control the Canton government. A Canton resident denied this. There was, he said, "a Communist party, turbulent and iconoclastic, abusive in its foreign propaganda...

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[110] Harry F. Ward, loc. cit., Christian Century, Jan. 14, 1926, p. 48.
[111] Chamberlin, loc. cit., Asia XXVI (Mar., 1926), 237, 263.
[112] America, Jan. 30, 1926, p. 364.

but... by no means dominant."[113]

The Nation also included a statement of policy of the Communist Party of Kwangtung Province (in which Canton is located). This statement declared that the party's goals were to help the propertyless proletariat and peasants and to emancipate China from imperialism. Its members had joined the Kuomintang because these goals were common to the two organizations and had worked to help the Kuomintang through the workers and peasants. It decried anti-communist agitation within the Kuomintang (caused, of course, by militarists and the compadore class), declared its loyalty to that party, and called for renewed activity to achieve the goals common to all.[114]

This work among the laborers and peasants constituted a new departure for Chinese parties. Agitation with laborers and the formation of labor unions was expected of communists; but their work with the peasants was peculiarly suited to the Chinese situation, the preponderance of land-owning agriculturalists most often being given as the reason why Bolshevism could not possibly succeed in China. There were some exceptions to this concept, Feng Yü-hsiang's statement having been quoted earlier. Gannett found disagreement among the Cantonese, too. The city's mayor felt that China could never become communist, that it might be necessary eventually to fight the Russians to drive them out, but that there was no reason to fear their doctrines.[115] Another man, described as "a veteran revolutionist," expected communism to come to China eventually, though that time was "a long way off." For the present, he added, cooperation with the militarists and petty bourgeoisie was necessary.[116] Another observer reported progress in the propagation of Bolshevist principles in Canton, but "a standstill--- not even a beginning" in changing the social order.[117]

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[113] Nation, June 9, 1926, p. 635. Karakhan gave the number of CCP members as 2500 in 1926. Chamberlin, loc. cit., Asia XXVI (Mar., 1926), 238. Griggs, loc. cit., Current History XXIV (Sept., 1926), 872.

[114] Nation, June 9, 1926, 636.

Agitation was carried on among the peasants, though toward what results was unclear. Some communists, like Karl Radek (then head of Sun Yat-sen University), were reported to believe that it would be impossible to make communists of the Chinese peasants, but that they could be used against foreign imperialists and the "reactionary bureaucracy." Others, and Michael Borodin was most quoted here, noticed that tenantry was high in many areas, that rents were exhorbitantly steep, and that class feelings could be built up. Gannett remarked on the "so-called Communist" students who spent their vacations arousing the villagers against the imperialists, never seeming "more than intense and earnest Nationalists." He also noted that "some professional prophets of communism" built "vast hopes upon the peasant proletariat," but he felt that Canton's successes in organizing peasant unions would not be permanent. Class consciousness was difficult to build where

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115. Gannett, loc. cit., Nation, Mar. 31, 1926, p. 337.
116. Gannett, loc. cit., ibid., Aug. 25, 1926, p. 172.
117. Griggs, loc. cit., p. 872.

the poor never saw the wealthy.[118]

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Thus the year and a half between the spring of 1925 and the autumn of 1926 was marked in the American periodical press by a growing interest in the situation in China, sparked by international implications of anti-foreignism resulting from the shootings at Shanghai and the later incident near Shameen. The Shanghai situation received considerable attention in the United States, with some concern being echoed that it might have been Bolshevik-directed, though the majority of writers claimed that China had real grievances and that any communism was incidental. Shortly thereafter, a strike and boycott of British goods at Canton helped turn attention to the government there, and American writers became aware of and concerned about the influence exerted by Russian communists acting as advisors to that government.

For the most part, Bolshevism in China at this time was seen only as a result of Russian intrigues, a by-product of the activities of Michael Borodin, who joined Ambassador Karakhan as a target of suspicion. Articles about them and about Russian aims in China were relatively frequent, with many writers suggesting that other nations, the United States in particular, might benefit by following Russia's "friendly" example.

Though various Russians were reported to see possibilities for agitation among China's oppressed peasantry, they denied expectation of any communist system in China in the near future. Periodical editors and contributors agreed in worrying about Russian machinations largely as merely manifestations of a new Russian imperialism. There was some knowledge of the existence of a Chinese Communist Party and some speculation as to that party's relations with the Kuomintang and with Moscow; but though writers of varying persuasions gave on-the-spot descriptions of affairs at Canton, none seemed to have information about such a party's inner workings. Names of Chinese who later proved active in the Chinese Communist Party appeared in print, but they were not labelled as Bolsheviks at the time. Despite information and speculation about communist activity in China, Bolshevism was still considered an appurtenance of Russia.

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[118] Chamberlin, loc. cit., Asia XXVI (Mar., 1926), 263; Gannett, loc. cit., ibid. (June, 1926), 492, 569; Gannett, loc. cit., Nation, Aug. 25, 1926, p. 172.


Mukden
Peking
Nanking
Shanghai
Hankow
Yoyang
Changsha
Nanchang
Swatow
Canton
Hong Kong

CHINA: THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION, 1926-1928

Canton-- Northern Expedition launched, July 9, 1926
Changsha-- captured by Nationalists, July 17
Yoyang-- captured late July
Hankow-- one of Wuhan cities, last was captured Oct. 11, 1926
Hankow later made seat of "Left" Kuomintang
Nanchang-- captured November 7-- made Chiang's temporary headquarters
Shanghai-- fell to Nationalists March 22, 1927
"Party Purification" began April 7
Nanking-- Captured March 24, 1927-- made capital of "moderate" Kuomintang
Changsha, Nanchang, Swatow, Canton-- centes of "Left" and communist uprisings, suppression, May-December, 1927
Peking-- occupied by Nationalists, June, 1928
Mukden-- under Nationalist flag, December, 1928

CHAPTER III, 1926-1927

In the eighteen months following the autumn of 1926, American interest in the Chinese political situation was to grow much more acute, as the forces of the Kuomintang moved out of Kwangtung province and spread northward. Especially did this interest increase when foreign holdings appeared threatened and then when the communist and Russian positions within China underwent a drastic reversal.

THE NORTHERN EXPEDITION

On July 9, 1926, the Canton government launched its armies on a formal campaign to reunite China under the National banner. Preceded by propaganda forces, the well-trained army started north, and had moved into Yoyang, on the Yangtze, by the end of the month. The industrial Wuhan cities (Wuchang, Hankow, and Hanyang) were next; and Wuchang, the last to fall, was entered by Nationalist forces on the "Double Tenth" (October 10, the anniversary of the 1911 revolution) after a forty-day siege.

American magazines did not immediately perceive the importance of this move. Wearied by the seemingly purposeless battles between tuchuns, they saw the beginnings of the Northern Expedition as simply another move in an endless game of Chinese checkers-- hardly worth a news report until Wu P'ei-fu's forces were ousted from Hankow. Even the siege of Wuchang, though with all the components of a dramatic tale, seemed "old stuff" to the unimpressed news correspondents-- until they were "scooped" by a young reporter new to

China.[1] Thus even the weeklies were without mention of the expedition until September, when it began to seem important that the "Red" or "Bolshevist Canton" government (all periodicals noting the warfare spoke of communist connections) was in control of nearly half of China.[2]

This quick absorption of territory naturally turned eyes toward the south, even more than before. Chang Tso-lin's bickerings with Russia took a back seat to the war along the Yangtze. Some attention was given in the next few months (September, 1926-February, 1927) to the Cantonese army and its methods.[3] A few periodicals mentioned the effective use by the Southern army of propaganda. Activists (mostly communists) had moved northward in front of the army, organizing opposition to the warlords and enthusiasm for the Kuomintang cause long before the soldiers arrived-- a tactic learned from the Russians. Not only was civilian support won this way, but the warlord armies were also stirred to revolt by nationalist propaganda and promises of fair treatment.[4] The ranks of the Kuomintang armies were thus swelled by deserters from the tuchuns. An American newswoman, in Wuchang for the siege, reported that "students and a handful of others" there evinced enthusiasm about the approach of the Cantonese Army because of advance underground work by the Kuomintang.[5]

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[1] J. B. Powell, "The American Correspondent in China," Asia XXVII (May, 1927), 382. Powell, as editor of the China Weekly Review, received much criticism from other residents of Shanghai for his early espousal of the cause of the Kuomintang. He remained firmly pro-Nationalist through W.W. II.

[2] Nation, Sept. 1, 1926, p. 185; ibid., Sept. 15, 1926, p. 234; Time, Sept. 6, 1926, p. 13; ibid., Sept. 13, 1926, p. 15; ibid., Oct. 4, 1926, p. 18; Christian Century, Sept. 16, 1926, p. 1128; Independent, Sept. 18, 1926, pp. 335,370; America, Sept. 18, 1926, p. 530; ibid., Sept. 25, 1926, p. 554; Literary Digest, Sept. 25, 1926, pp. 10-11; Outlook, Oct. 15, 1926, p. 203; Living Age, Oct. 15, 1926, p. 101; Robert E. Lewis, "The Meaning of the Chinese Crisis," New Republic, Oct. 6, 1926, pp. 184-186.

[3] The term "Cantonese Army" is one used by writers at the time. The army was not, of course, wholly composed of men from Canton, or even from South China. Chiang himself was a native of Chekiang Province. Different provincial origins caused some friction within the army's leadership.

Nor did the propaganda halt with the fall of the city. Immediately walls blossomed with colorful posters, stressing love of nation and the Chinese people, publicizing desired reforms, and praising the new government and Kuomintang principles. Some, too, were almost violently anti-foreign.[6]

The soldiers of the Kuomintang Army helped retain the enthusiasm that the activists had aroused. Whereas earlier armies had been noteworthy largely for their lack of desire to fight and their penchant for looting, the Southerners were not only well-trained but well-disciplined. It was noted that they walked unarmed about the streets of Wuchang after it had been taken and that they paid for their purchases. The only looting was reportedly by withdrawing Northern soldiers, some of whom were executed in the streets as proof that the Kuomintang was supporting the people.[7] More important to some writers was the ability of the Cantonese to fight; and news reports seemed to indicate that they did this well, with a laudable sense of purpose.[8]

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[4] Nation, Oct. 27, 1926, p. 416; Quincy Wright, "Cantonese Gain Ground in Central China," Current History XXV (Dec., 1926), 424; Literary Digest, Feb. 12, 1927, p. 17.

[5] Anna Rochester, "The Nationalists Take Wuchang," Nation, Dec. 15, 1926, p. 635. Miss Rochester was former editor of the World Tomorrow.

[6] Ibid.; Time, Jan. 17, 1927, p. 18.

[7] Rochester, loc. cit.; America, Oct. 23, 1926, p. 26; Quincy Wright, loc. cit., p. 425. One missionary in Hunan, however, wrote that the Cantonese army was "like

Even before reporting the seige of Wuchang ended, Time was suggesting that a strong central government might be on its way out of the south; and soon thereafter the Christian Century's editor also noted that great changes seemed in store for China. Within a few months, editors and contributors had written in other magazines that the Chinese themselves were favoring the Cantonese, and that the Kuomintang government, as the best in China, might well be the one with which to deal.[9] No one suggested that the Southern offensive would fail.

The likelihood that the Kuomintang might gain control of the larger part of the country set the press to reevaluating that party. It was more important to be sure of the political

a plague of grasshoppers." Missionary Review XLIX (Nov., 1926), 840-841.

[8] Independent, Sept. 18, 1926, p. 335; Literary Digest, Sept. 25, 1926, p. 11; Living Age, Oct. 15, 1926, p. 101; Time, Dec. 13, 1926, p. 17. Variant views came from an observer of the Wuchang fighting who saw it like a Gilbert and Sullivan production and from an Argonaut editor who doubted if "coolie armies" could ever be efficient. F. P. Elting, "War in Hankow," Outlook, Jan. 5, 1927, pp. 18-19; Argonaut, Feb. 12, 1927, p. 2.

[9] Time, Oct. 18, 1926, p. 17; Christian Century, Oct. 21, 1926, p. 1285; New Republic, Dec. 8, 1926, p. 52; Quincy Wright, "The Tense Situation Between China and Britain," Current History XXV (Nov., 1926), 284; Wright loc. cit., ibid. (Dec., 1926), 425; John McCook Roots, "Canton, China, and the Powers," Outlook, Jan. 19, 1927, pp. 83-84.

"color" of a potential ruling party than it had been to give the proper tint to a minor group struggling on the fringes. Editors who had temporized by describing the Cantonese as "Red" (in quotation marks) or the army simply as "Bolshevist-trained" (no quotes) now sought more definitive answers. In the months after the Nationalists had taken the Wuhan cities, five periodicals printed articles or letters, often reviewing the history of the Kuomintang and concluding that the Cantonese were less Russian-led than had been claimed, and that nationalism, not Bolshevism, was the driving force. Or, as a Chinese wrote to the *Nation*, "The Canton, or Southern, government is not Communistic, Bolsheviki, Soviet, Red, Blue, or Yellow: it is Chinese pure and simple."[10] The *Literary Digest*, which earlier had included selections mostly stressing the communism of the Cantonese, now printed more which gave another point of view.[11] The *Christian Century*'s editor, who had always shown some doubt that communist influence was extensive, almost chuckled "We told you so," as he discussed this general shift of attitude in an editorial entitled "Chinese Reds Turning Pink."[12]

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[10] Frank Hsengchi Liu, letter in *Nation*, Oct. 27, 1926, p. 430; Robert E. Lewis, "The Meaning of the Chinese Crisis," *New Republic*, Oct. 6, 1926, pp. 184-186; Chang Wei Chiu, "Origin and Aims of the Cantonese National Party," *Current History* XXV (Jan., 1927), 528-531 (author was editor of a Chinese student magazine); John McCook Roots, *loc. cit.*, *Outlook*, Jan. 19, 1927, pp. 83-84; C. C. Wu, "A Close-up of China's Only Party" (from *China Weekly Review*), *Literary Digest*, Nov. 6, 1926, p. 18 (Wu was a KMT member).

[11] *Ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1925, p. 19-20; *ibid.*, Sept. 25, 1926, pp. 10-11; *ibid.*, Nov. 6, 1926, p. 18; *ibid.*, Dec. 25, 1926, p. 36; *ibid.*, Jan. 8, 1927, pp. 16-17.

[12] *Christian Century*, Jan. 6, 1927, pp. 6-7. Individual

An upsurge of Chinese nationalism meant, almost by definition, an accompanying increase in anti-foreignism. Nationalist leaders were quoted as speaking against imperialism and demanding tariff autonomy and the end of the unequal treaties.[13] As usual, this was directed largely against the British, as the foreigners most in evidence. The British government, instead of retaliating with force when its concessions were attacked, made overtures, suggesting in a "Christmas note" to the other treaty powers that the Kuomintang movements be recognized and that conferences on tariff autonomy be held. American writers wondered if this showed that might made right, that the boycotts at Canton had really threatened the British markets, or that Britain truly wanted a strong government in China and hoped to woo the Kuomintang from the influence of Russia.[14] By March of 1927 an

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examples of this shift are difficult to cite, as many periodicals had printed materials which disagreed-- or as those once quiet were now talking, or *vice versa*. However, a dramatic instance of change may be found in *Time* magazine, which covered the situation faithfully and which had no signed articles to balance its editorials. On Oct. 4, 1926, it spoke of the "Chinese Communist tide" gaining headway and quoted "Chang" as boasting that over one-half of China was controlled by "our Communal armies." On Dec. 13, it still spoke of the "Cantonese Bolsheviks," but had received more information about (and learned the spelling of) Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang's career was outlined in that issue, and he was described as more patriotic than Bolshevist-- attempting to create a strong Chinese government, using Borodin's aid, but modifying communist principles to suit. After that time, the Cantonese were called "nationalists," not "communists." *Time*, Oct. 4, 1926, p. 18; *ibid*., Dec. 13, 1926, p. 17; *ibid*., Dec. 20, 1926, p. 18.

[13] Note from KMT Foreign Minister, Eugene Chen, to American consul, in *Nation*, Sept. 15, 1926, p. 256; Quincy Wright, "Progress of the Civil War in China," *Current History* XXV (Jan., 1927), 586.

[14] *Nation*, Jan. 5, 1927, p. 1; Nathaniel Peffer, "Seeing a

agreement had been reached whereby the Chinese regained some of the British concessions and the British promised to reconsider extraterritoriality and the tariff question.[15] This did not halt anti-foreignism, but it did help lend a different air to discussions of the nationalists.

Despite these military and diplomatic victories, all was not well within the Kuomintang government. The differences of opinion which had disturbed it at Canton continued after its headquarters had been moved to Hankow. (The move was made late in 1926; the government was officially set up there on January 1, 1927.) Chiang Kai-shek's coup of March, 1926, had shown that he was definitely in opposition to communist control of the party and government. At that time, as mentioned earlier, he had sent some Russian advisors away. Borodin had, however, come to an agreement with Chiang regarding communists on committees and had remained with the government. He and the Chinese communists in the government had the support of "left" Kuomintang members, including Sun Yat-sen's widow and Eugene Chen, the Foreign Minister.

The American periodical press had known a little of the

New Light in China," New Republic, Jan. 12, 1927, pp. 215-217; Literary Digest, Jan. 8, 1927, p. 16; ibid., Jan. 15, 1927, p. 8; Commonweal, Feb. 9, 1927, p. 368; Christian Century, Feb. 10, 1927, pp. 166.

[15] Ibid., Mar. 3, 1927, p. 260; Quincy Wright, "Tense Situation in China," Current History XXVI (April, 1927), 127. This was less an about-face than it might have seemed to readers of American periodicals. Though the Old China Hands (largely mercantile, including editors of English-language newspapers) had been crying "red" about all nationalists, the Foreign Office had viewed the situation more objectively. The "Christmas note" met with favor in the U.S. State Dept., also.

earlier splits, though not in detail. It had also mentioned rumors of further disagreements. At the time of the taking of the Wuhan cities, differences in labor policy had been noted. The following month, the Literary Digest had printed a statement by a Kuomintang member, denying any split. All party members worked together, he said, following Sun's principles. Another Chinese later put it less idealistically: the small communist group was "tolerated for the sake of the larger issue before us, namely the successful prosecution of the Nationalist movement."[16]

By March, 1927, signs of a lowered level of tolerance were evident. Current History noted that Chiang had set up his headquarters in Nanchang, rather than return to "the more radical Wuhan cities." The editor of the Independent had also heard rumors: Chiang was eager to stop fighting for a while, "in order that he may weed out some of the Reds from his organization." Borodin was said to be trying to influence Chiang's troops.[17] That there was some truth in the rumors was shown at that month's meeting of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, in Wuhan. After refusing Chiang's demand that it meet in Changsha, it proceeded to reorganize the party so that communists again could take control and to strip Chiang of all party offices. But the war did not stop: both Nanking and Shanghai fell to the Nationalists in late March.

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16. Anna Rochester, loc. cit., p. 636; C. C. Wu, loc. cit., p. 18; T. Z. Koo, "Nation-Making in China," Christian Century, Feb. 17, 1927, p. 203.
17. Current History XXV (Mar., 1927), 938; Independent, Mar. 19, 1927, p. 322.

NANKING AND SHANGHAI

The nationalist victory at Nanking was accompanied by anti-foreign violence which resulted in the deaths of a number of foreigners, including one American missionary. As these were the first foreign deaths in the campaign, and as United States ships had shelled a Chinese mob to permit other Americans to escape the city, the incident received considerable attention in the American press. There was some discussion of reasons for the riots. Had they been ordered by communists?[18] Did they mean that Chiang could not control his soldiers? Both Eugene Chen and Chiang Kai-shek were said to have denied responsibility for the disturbances;[19] and although the incident resulted in some loss of faith in the Nationalists by foreigners, it soon faded from importance in the light of other occurrences.

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[18] America, Apr. 2, 1927, p. 584; ibid., April 9, 1927, p. 608; Literary Digest (citing Frederick Moore of the N.Y. Times), Apr. 23, 1927, p. 13; Argonaut, Apr. 23, 1927, p. 2; Outlook, Apr. 6, 1927, p. 425.

[19] Ibid.; Independent, Apr. 9, 1927, p. 401. Chiang later assumed responsibility for the soldiers' acts, though he denied culpability. The New Republic remarked that some problems were bound to occur, that soldiers could not be controlled completely, that more deaths would have occurred had not the Nationalists been in control (Apr. 6, 1927, pp. 179-180). The daughter of the murdered missionary, though not present when her father was shot, claimed that communist soldiers had done the deed. (Time, June 6, 1927, p. 22; see also Margueritte Harmon Bro, "Now in China," Outlook, July 20, 1927, p. 378, for a similar statement from someone also not present.) An American in China reported that Chinese friends believed Borodin had ordered the riots to discredit Chiang. Nora Waln, "Letters from China," Atlantic Monthly CXL (Nov., 1927), 701. See also Quincy Wright in Current History XXVI (May, 1927), 331-332; Literary Digest (citing Walter Duranty, N.Y. Times), May 14, 1927, p. 8; and Thomas F. Millard, "The Kuomintang," New Republic, June 29, 1927, p. 142.

As the largest commercial city in China and the location of the biggest international settlement, Shanghai was regarded by many foreigners as much more important than Peking, the capital city.[20] Thus, almost from the time the Nationalists appeared destined to spread over most of China, the impending fall of Shanghai was mentioned. As early as November, 1926, the _Nation_, mindful of the effects propaganda had had in southern cities, called a quickly-suppressed revolt in the city the "first attempt to take Shanghai" by the Nationalists--and predicted more. The following January, the _Christian Century_ spoke of what might happen "when Shanghai falls" (not "if"). Later it noted that the drive to Shanghai had been checked "temporarily."[21]

Early in March, 1927, the _Nation_ and the _New Republic_ also predicted the city's fall, the former expecting a triumph for propaganda and the latter noting that the Shanghai workers were unusually well organized and "peculiarly accessible to the influence of the Nationalist propaganda." Proof of this had been given in a recent strike, called for purely political reasons. _America_ noted that more than 100,000 workers had struck. Acting under the local tuchun's orders, the chief of police had arrested and beheaded people "caught distributing subversive literature or speaking

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20. Of the $2.3 million of direct British, American, Russian, and Japanese investment in China in 1927, approximately 46% was invested in Shanghai. Hou Chi-ming, _Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China, 1840-1957_ (Cambridge, Mass., 1965), pp. 14, 211.

21. _Nation_, Nov. 10, 1926, p. 465; _Christian Century_, Jan. 6, 1927, p. 7; _ibid_., Feb. 17, 1927, p. 195.

seditiously." Many were students. It was suggested that the strike was due to advance propaganda from the northward march.[22]

Shanghai's capture, when it came, was viewed as "inconceivable" by the Argonaut, which hinted at an agreement between Chiang Kai-shek and the local warlord, and as "an anti-climax" by Time.[23] As news from China came slowly and at times inaccurately, it was a full month before an American periodical carried a detailed report of the city's capture.[24] Hints of disorders and general strikes, and of "Russian agitators" had appeared; but it remained for a contributor to the *Nation* to tell of the rising of laborers who seized arms from a police station and took over the civic power in the Chinese section of the city, capturing the southern railway station and laying seige to the northern one. A holiday was called to welcome the Nationalist "liberators," with meetings and parades of laborers and shopkeepers. The next day the northern railway station was taken, and the warlord troops left the city. As the article was written (March 26), the laborers had given control of the city to the Nationalist troops, but had retained their arms-- as a preventative against possible military rule.[25]

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[22] Nation, Mar. 2, 1927, p. 221; New Republic, Mar. 2, 1927, p. 29; America, Mar. 5, 1927, pp. 488-489. Not all editors were as matter-of-fact about the fate of Shanghai. Commonweal expected a battle for the city between natives and foreign troops. (Feb. 23, 1927, p. 425.) Workers had expected the Kuomintang armies, then but a few miles away, to arrive during their strike; but the order to march was not given, perhaps on purpose.

[23] Argonaut, Mar. 26, 1927, p. 2; Time, Mar. 28, 1927, p. 15.

[24] The problem of news coverage was of long standing. Bertrand Russell had complained in 1924 that it was impossible to get the truth from China in less than six weeks, that Britain's telegraphic agencies transmitted only "such news as they think good for us, not without a certain economy of truth." At the time of the Shanghai incident, writers had been disturbed that correspondents in China sent out only the sensational news, thus giving a very distorted picture. In the spring of 1927 the complaints began again... high tolls made long messages almost prohibitive, and many correspondents were too lacking in understanding or felt the need of sending opinions rather than facts. The Nation and the New Republic both carried editorials condemning the reporting of an anti-Nationalist N.Y. Times correspondent as presenting a warped picture to the American people. Bertrand Russell (reprint from New Leader, Sept. 19), Nation, Nov. 5, 1924, p. 503; Christian Century, June 18, 1925, p. 787; ibid., July 2, 1925, p. 847; ibid., July 16, 1925, p. 912; G. Nye Steiger, "China Declares Independence," Independent, July 4, 1925, p. 9; ibid., May 14, 1927, p. 501; Raymond Rich, "How to read the News from China," Outlook, July 8, 1925, pp. 363-366; Time, April 4, 1927, pp. 16-19; Nation, Mar. 30, 1927, p. 331; ibid., Mar. 16, 1927, p. 277; ibid., Apr., 20, 1927, p. 413; ibid., Apr. 27, 1927, p. 464; New Republic, Apr. 13, 1927, pp. 210-211; cartoon, Current History XXVII (Dec., 1927),

With details lacking, early comments on the fall of Shanghai were concerned with the meaning for the future. Journals did not overlook a dispatch which had arrived from Moscow: news of the capture of Shanghai had brought on jubilant rejoicing in the streets of the Russian capital, with workers waving red flags and singing the "Internationale." Even editors who had earlier decided that the Kuomintang was not really communist wondered what this meant.[26]

Moscow soon had cause to cease rejoicing, however. The

452. For a reporter's view, see J. B. Powell, "The American Correspondent in China," *Asia* XXVII (May, 1927), 380-382. See also Quincy Wright, "China's Revolt Against the Old Order," *Current History* XXVI (June, 1927), 347.

[25] *Christian Century*, Mar. 31, 1927, p. 391; *Independent*, Apr. 2, 1927, p. 369; Frank Godwin, "Labor Takes Power in Shanghai," *Nation*, Apr. 27, 1927, pp. 475-477.

[26] *Time*, Mar. 28, 1927, p. 15; *Outlook*, Mar. 30, 1927, p. 391; *Literary Digest*, Apr. 2, 1927, p. 10; *ibid*., Apr. 9, 1927, p. 5.

Nationalist forces which took Shanghai did not leave its control in the hands of the workers. Instead it was reported that Chiang refused to follow orders from Hankow and "has taken definite steps to suppress Red leadership and trade unions in Shanghai." The Nation's editor viewed the situation with alarm: Chiang seemed "to have succumbed to the human ambition for personal power" and to have accepted, as an old-fashioned militarist, the financing of Shanghai merchants. The Shanghai workers had been "bloodily disarmed" at a cost of several hundred lives.[27]

THE SPLIT IN THE KUOMINTANG

Chiang Kai-shek's coup against the communist labor leaders in Shanghai was followed in less than a week, on April 18, 1927, by the establishment of a new Nationalist capital at Nanking, rivalling that at Hankow. The two moves together gave substance to rumors which had been circulating throughout the early months of the year, suggestions that there were important differences of opinion between Chiang Kai-shek and the more radical members of the Kuomintang. So common had these rumors become that seven of the ten American weeklies which ordinarily commented on international news had spoken of the rift within the two previous months, mostly within the month. Opinions had differed as to whether the problem was one of slight internal dissension or of a "hopeless" or

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[27] Independent, Apr. 23, 1927, p. 431, America, Apr. 30, 1927, p. 50; Nation, Apr. 27, 1927, p. 464, 477. Orders from the Comintern had had the workers bury or hide their arms before this.

"dangerous" split.[28]

The *Nation* was most outspoken in its claim that the rift was of small import. On March 23, 1927, its editor stated that "The wish is obviously father to the thought in much of the cabled reports /sic/ of splits within the Chinese Nationalist Party." He admitted that there were factions in the Kuomintang, but no such great opposition between Bolsheviks and moderates as correspondents claimed. Any disagreement which existed was between military and civilians; and even there, Chiang knew the importance of civil rule while Borodin would compromise with more conservative elements to prevent a party split. A week later, however, this editor gave more credence to reports of an "anti-Russian" party within the Kuomintang, though he again insisted that the real crux of the disagreement lay between "personal military dictatorship" and "group civilian rule."[29]

As antagonism between the governments at Hankow and Nanking continued into the summer months, different views of the nature of the split were aired. Whereas most writers accepted Chiang's own statement that he was opposed to the communist element which had gained control in the Wuhan area, a few had other ideas. The *Nation*'s editorials reflected the civil-military conflict theory of that magazine's contributing

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28. *Christian Century*, Feb. 17, 1927, p. 195; *Independent*, Mar. 19, 1927, p. 322; *ibid*., Apr. 16, 1927, p. 425; *Time*, Mar. 28, 1927, p. 15; *Argonaut*, Apr. 2, 1927, p. 2; *America*, Apr. 16, 1927, p. 26; *Outlook*, Apr. 20, 1927, p. 491; *Nation*, Mar. 23, 1927, p. 301.
29. *Ibid*.; *ibid*., Mar. 30, 1927, p. 329.

editor, Lewis S. Gannett, who had written a number of articles from China the previous year. It was Gannett's contention that the crisis in the Nationalist movement was really caused by militarists who merely wanted to replace northern generals with southern generals, men who were now beginning to "look longingly upon the fleshpots of the old system." As the civil aspects of the new government had previously been stressed, in a favorable contrast with the regimes of the tuchuns, there seemed room for concern. One writer, who had earlier praised the Kuomintang's habit of rule-by-civilians, found it ironic that military moves were now necessary to root the communists out of the government they had so carefully fostered along civil lines. Later other editors and contributors, looking at the split with the hindsight of a few months, also considered militarism as a factor in the dispute, though not the only one.[30]

A few other conjectures are of interest. The New Republic's editor proposed that the disagreement was largely over anti-foreignism, with Chiang more willing to temporize with the imperialist powers and favoring the more orderly legal processes for their removal than did the leaders at Hankow. To this editor, the split in the party leadership had little to do with communism as such, but was over "the manner in which the white man is to be kicked out."[31] A Christian Century editor, writing a series of articles to explain the China situation to his readers, spoke in similar terms. One group in the Kuomintang, he said, was for force; the other, for negotiation. Chiang headed the moderates, while the radicals were at Hankow. There had been no fighting yet.[32] To one observer at Hankow and contributor to Asia, the matter was even simpler. Chiang Kai-shek felt a personal dislike for and distrust of the Soviet advisor, Michael Borodin; and those feelings were transferred to a hatred for the ideology for which Borodin stood-- communism, which Chiang actually understood not in the least.[33]

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[30] Lewis S. Gannett, "'Bolshevist' China," ibid., Apr. 20, 1927, p. 419 (also quoted in Literary Digest, May 14, 1927, p. 9); John McCook Roots, "The Canton Idea," Asia XXVII (Apr., 1927), 286-288; Roots, "China, Now," Atlantic Monthly CXXXIX (June, 1927), 836; Fritz Witkowski, "Canton's Gains from Russia" (from China Weekly Review, Shanghai, Jan. 15), Living Age, Mar. 15, 1927, p. 497; ibid., Sept. 1, 1927, p. 382; Review of Reviews LXXVI (Oct., 1927), 440; Christian Century, Oct. 6, 1927, p. 1156; Vincent Sheean, "Moscow and the Chinese Revolution," Asia XXVII (Dec., 1927), 1004. America (May 21, 1927, p. 122) quoted Chen as saying that the question of communism was a red herring, that the difference of opinion lay in the realm of party government against personal government.

News dispatches originating in Moscow helped color the picture of Chiang as an anti-communist. The Chinese general's son, who had gone to Russia two years earlier to study, was reported by Time to have written that his father "used fine words about the revolution, but at the most convenient

31. New Republic, Apr. 27, 1928, p. 258. According to the Literary Digest (May 14, 1927, p. 9), this concept was also expressed by the New York World. See also Outlook, Apr. 27, 1927, pp. 520-522.
32. Paul Hutchinson, "What and Why in China, V," Christian Century, June 9, 1927, pp. 722-723.
33. Vincent Sheean, "The Disruption of the Kuomintang," Asia XXVII (Aug., 1927), 692; Sheean, "Some People from Canton," ibid. (Oct., 1927), 860.

opportunity betrayed it."[34] Other periodicals quoted Moscow sources as calling Chiang a "traitor" and a "scoundrel" or speaking of his movement as "a bourgeois counter-revolution."[35]

That Moscow sources were so busily condemning Chiang indicates how important he had become in the past year or so. He had been in the news ever since his coup at Canton in March of 1926, but not much was written of him until his army was well on its way to moving into the north. Although Chang Tso-lin was branding him a Bolshevik, the majority of news items prior to the split had been either noncommittal or mildly favorable, suggesting that he was "not as 'red' as he is painted" or that he had "marked military ability." After the steps to suppress communist leadership of trade unions in Shanghai, residents of that city looked to Chiang as the best safeguard against riots, though the fear yet remained that a Nationalist victory might doom foreign businesses there. Still, as the Nation pointed out, foreigners tended to look for a strong man in a time of crisis, and Chiang was now just that.[36]

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34. Time, Apr. 25, 1927, p. 16. This was Chiang Ching-kuo, who rejoined his father after the 1937 united front was effected and remained with the Nationalists when they withdrew to Taiwan in 1949-- to become heir-apparent to the National Government. The authenticity of these statements from Moscow is questioned.
35. Literary Digest, May 14, 1927, p. 8; Current History XXVI (July, 1927), 668; A. Stetzki, "China-- the Communist Side" (From Die Rote Fahne, Berlin, May 3), Living Age, June 15, 1927, pp. 1057-1058. Stetzki wrote from Moscow. His paper was a Communist Party organ.
36. Time, Apr. 18, 1927, p. 18; Literary Digest (quoting Marc Green of the Christian Science Monitor), Oct. 30, 1926, p. 13; Quincy Wright, "Cantonese Gain Ground in Central China," Current History XXV (Dec., 1926), 424; Independent, Apr. 23, 1927, p. 431; Stanley High, "Shanghai: Where Fear Breeds Hate," New Republic, May 4, 1927, p. 295; Nation, May 4, 1927, p. 490.

The question remained: what kind of strong man was Chiang? Men familiar with China had their doubts. J. O. P. Bland wrote that the American public was deluded in thinking that the Chinese could have public-spirited, able, and really nationalistic administrators. "Foreign university degrees," he said, had "never yet modified in any perceptible way the traditional methods and paramount motives of Chinese officials... the only thing which matters in Chinese politics, from Mukden to Canton, is money...."[37] Other writers were less outspoken, but some questioned whether Chiang might not be setting out to become an ordinary tuchun. The *Nation* saw him as different from the regular bandit generals, but spoke regretfully of his high-handed methods in Shanghai and those of his allies in other cities. This was something else than "crushing communism." It might get him support from foreigners and merchants; but, this journal concluded, it would lose him what popular support he had and eventually cause him to lose control of China.[38]

Balancing information about Chiang Kai-shek was, of course, news about the situation at Hankow. In general, those who were critical of Chiang and suspicious of his motives approved attempts made by the Kuomintang to set up a people's government in Canton and central China. Those who were frightened by what seemed excesses under the Kuomintang and the communists

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37. J. O. P. Bland, "China: And Yet Again," *Atlantic Monthly* CXL (July, 1927), 105-106. Bland was an historian of Imperial China, and a former customs official.

38. *Living Age*, May 15, 1927, p. 852; *Christian Century*, July 28, 1927, p. 892; Sheean, *loc*. *cit*., (Aug, 1927), 692; *Nation*, May 4, 1927, p. 490.

were more likely to look with favor on the moderates and to regard their leader as a sign of hope for China.

Conditions in the south and the interior were the most-used arguments for and against the Hankow regime. Getting special notice were three areas of change. First were unions. After moving into an area, the agents of the Kuomintang had organized laborers, peasants, and women. Resulting strikes and demonstrations had brought about higher wages, shorter hours, lowered land rents, intimidation of landholding "gentry," and new "schools for oppressed groups." Next came social changes, which included relaxed marriage laws, permitting free choice of partners, and an emphasis on youth in a land where age had always been venerated. Third, the new government had shown that honesty could work wonders. Without the graft common to the Chinese scene, taxes, without being raised, proved sufficient to permit new public works, like repairing dikes left untended for years.

Among those praising the new regime was Lewis S. Gannett, of the Nation, whose disapproval of Chiang and other military men has already been mentioned. Gannett spoke highly of union work in Hankow and found Bolshevism of minor concern: "You may call them Communists-- some of them even call themselves Communists-- but in judging them and the men who oppose them it is well to remember that the outcome of their extremism is ... that men who were paid $1.50 a month now receive $3.75 and instead of working sixteen hours a day work twelve." Again, Gannett's ideas appeared in the Nation editorials, which, but a few weeks earlier had claimed that there was no real Bolshevism, just strong nationalism, in China.[39]

So also argued a Chinese professor at Georgetown University, who stated that the "communists" (his quotes) in China were less "strict followers of the theories of Carl Marx and Lenin [than] men who dare to act and die." Their labor unions might be a bit radical at present, but Chinese conservatism would soon cause them to tone down.[40]

Labor radicalism was the cause of considerable hesitancy about the Kuomintang regime that year. John McCook Roots, who observed life under the Kuomintang in central and south China in 1926, wrote a series of articles for Asia in early 1927. He had approved much of the new regime, but was doubtful about the unions. The government did not have control over them, he wrote; and they tended to be over-bearing, intimidating members and non-members alike.[41] Vincent Sheean, another contributor to Asia, admitted that there were great problems brought on by too many unions in the Wuhan area, but this did not dim his enthusiasm for the "left." The revolution was only beginning, he said, and the upheaval caused by mob action was but a step along the way.[42]

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39. Lewis S. Gannett, "'Bolshevist' China," Nation, Apr. 20, 1927, pp. 419-420; ibid., Mar. 30, 1927, p. 332.
40. Yang Kuang-sheng, "The Growth of Nationalism," Current History XXVI (June, 1927), 354-358.
41. John McCook Roots, "Chinese Head and Chinese Heart," Asia XXVII (Feb., 1927), 94; Roots, "The Canton Idea," ibid., (April, 1927), 347-350. Roots, a student at a theological seminary, had spent his boyhood in China and had returned there to teach after college. In late 1926 he had walked through south China, returning to the U.S. in October.
42. Vincent Sheean, "The Disruption of the Kuomintang," ibid. (Aug., 1927), 692-693. Sheean had written earlier for

Most other writers merely mentioned the labor situation in passing,[43] as did George Sokolsky, an American living in China, who wrote approvingly of changes being made in the social system. These, he stated, were of deeper significance than any political changes. They would outlast many governments. He made no mention of communism.[44]

Commendation for the new government was usually given by those who had lived under it. Roots and Gannett both viewed with pleasure the efficiency of the economic program directed by Finance Minister T. V. Soong. Sheean also had only good words for the group in control at Hankow. Unabashedly partial to Borodin, whom he described as "far too intelligent, too experienced, too charming not to have been able to control a child like Chiang Kai-shek," he claimed that the Soviet advisor had even manipulated the situation so that the "inevitable" disruption of the Kuomintang came when he wished. Sheean praised the leaders of the "Left": T. V.

Asia about Persia, had visited Moscow before going to China, where he stopped at Shanghai briefly and spent much time with the Hankow army and Russian advisors before going to Peking and back through Russia.

[43] An interesting and highly laudatory account of Kuomintang union activities with laborers and peasants appeared in three issues of the Living Age in August and September. Written by a French communist who had toured China with a group of communists from other nations (including Earl Browder of the U.S.), this account gave a class-oriented view of China. Jacques Doriot, "A French Red in China" (from L'Humanité, June 25-July 28, Paris), Living Age, Aug. 15-Sept. 15, 1927, pp. 299-304, 403-407, 515-524. Doriot later headed the French Communist Party-- until 1934, when he became Fascist.

[44] George Sokolsky, "China's Deeper Change" (from North China Review, Shanghai, Jan. 8), Living Age, Mar. 1, 1927, pp. 385-387. Sokolsky had also ignored the communists when writing of labor in late 1925. He was at times employed by the Kuomintang.

Soong, his sister Mme. Sun Yat-sen, her stepson Sun Fo, Eugene Chen, and Wang Ching-wei, none of whom, he said, were communists. Chiang he found to be unstable, but mostly friendly with the forces of reaction. A less sweeping view of the government at Hankow was provided by a young American then teaching in the area, who described the transfer of government, admitted that the situation was favorable to the communists, but found conditions peaceful, with the government well in control of finances, public works repairs, and schools.[45]

More information from the interior was condemnatory than otherwise, however. In March, 1927, America and the Literary Digest discussed a letter which had appeared in the Times of London, accusing Borodin of using his trained propagandists and a secret police, "a regular cheka," to wage war against capitalism in Hankow. The Living Age printed the tale of a refugee from Hankow who told of the "almost insane excesses" by excited students who took charge of Christian schools and hospitals. This refugee added, however, that the leaders had urged circumspection, the excesses had passed, and the people now seemed more free and safe. An account from Hangchow, in the same magazine, also described agitations and mob action, but saw no control from above, concluding, "Life or property is never safe where Russian-subsidized, Cantonese 'Nationalism' sets its heel."[46]

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[45] Gannett, loc. cit., Nation, Apr. 20, 1927, p. 419; Roots, loc. cit., Asia (Apr., 1927), 346-347; Sheean, loc. cit., ibid. (Aug., 1927), 625; Sheean, loc. cit., ibid. (Oct., 1927), 816-817, 850-859; John S. Littell, "The Revolutionary Spirit on the Yangtze," ibid. (June, 1927), 482-486, 529-531.

The violence of Chinese mobs and the chaos following radical agitation were frequently mentioned as reasons to fear Kuomintang control of all of China. It is probable that the relief accompanying a release from fear of similar conditions in their areas helps account for the equanimity with which treaty-port foreigners accepted Chiang's bloody purges of communists. Hunan was especially prone to violence. A few writers claimed that the Hunanese were of a more fiery nature and more anti-foreign than other Chinese.[47] In Changsha, the location of Yale-in-China, students had gone on strike in 1925. In 1927 the college was again reported closed, because of "impossible" demands for self-government made by the students there. Some felt that the abusive methods employed by those students indicated that the Kuomintang could not control its members.[48]

In May, 1927, there were reports of plundering and terrorizing in central China, especially in Hunan, where an American mission had been burned and looted "by Bolshevized Chinese." A British writer told of the "terror" in Changsha when the soldiers withdrew and left a weak "figurehead" government which had no real power. Though he mentioned a "freer" social life, he stressed strikes and demonstrations, closed schools, anti-foreignism, and mobs out of control. News like this, in addition to reports that workers had seized a British cigarette factory in Hankow and were running it along communist lines, indicate why no American periodicals openly backed the Hankow regime, even if they distrusted Chiang Kai-shek.[49]

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[46] America, Mar. 5, 1927, p. 489; Literary Digest, Mar. 12, 1927, p. 29; Living Age, May 1, 1927, p. 758; Floyd Tangier Smith, "Hangchow in Revolution" (from North China Herald, Mar. 12), ibid., pp. 781-784.

[47] Marguerittе Harmon Bro, loc. cit., Outlook, July 20, 1927, p. 378; Littell, loc. cit., Asia XXVII (June, 1927), 531.

[48] Current History XXV (Mar., 1927), 938.

RUSSIA'S ROLE

Although overshadowed by news of mob violence and political confusion, there remained during early 1927 considerable interest in determining the role of Russia in the Chinese situation. Much of what was said was repetitious; enough vagueness remained about the relationship to permit speculation. As an Independent editor wrote in March, the United States was more interested in the role played by Russia than in military successes by the Chinese armies. What seemed important was

> ... whether or not Borodin is the real Cantonese dictator, whether or not Chen and his cohorts are fully Bolshevized or only pink, whether or not the anti-foreign feeling had reached a point where outrages on foreigners can be expected, and whether this feeling is deliberately fostered by Russian or other agents.

Most Americans, he said, were sympathetic with the stated aims of the Cantonese, "But what we don't know and should like to know is how great the destructive influence of Communism may have become. It is that doubt which causes uneasiness."[50]

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[49] America, May 21, 1927, p. 122; Times Correspondent, "Changsha Under the Terror" (from the Times of London, May 23), Living Age, July 1, 1927, pp. 22-23. Similar information was given Nora Waln by Chinese refugee friends from the interior. Waln, "Letters from China," Atlantic Monthly CXV (Nov., 1927), 700-701. Hunan and Hupei were regions mentioned especially by Vincent Sheean as suffering from "a premature experiment in communism" or "the exigencies of the newly empowered labor unions." Sheean, loc. cit., Asia (Aug., 1927), 692; Time, Mar. 28, 1927, p. 15.

Nearly every article or editorial on the political or social aspects of Chinese life mentioned Russia in one way or another, whether to compare the Chinese revolution with that of Russia or simply to mention that the Nationalists received advice and aid from the Soviets. Many times it was repeated that Russia had been the first or the only nation ready to give assistance to Sun Yat-sen and his followers.[51]

By this time there seemed to be more awareness of the influence of the Third International and its part in the Chinese revolution, with less emphasis on Russian diplomacy, though not all writers noticed a difference. Quincy Wright noted in *Current History* in January, 1927, that the Comintern had met in Russia in November and had discussed the Chinese revolution, deciding that revolutionary development in China should be an extension of the Nationalist government. Roots' February article in *Asia* stated that the Russian

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50. *Independent*, March 26, 1927, p. 327. This was obviously written before news of the Nanking killings (Mar. 22) or Shanghai's fall (Mar. 24) had reached this editor.
51. Chang Wei Chiu, "Origins and Aims of the Cantonese National Party," *Current History* XXV (Jan., 1927), 528-531; *Living Age*, Jan. 1, 1927, p. 7, Roots, *loc. cit.*, *Outlook*, Jan. 19, 1927, pp. 83-84; Roots, *loc. cit.*, *Asia* XXVII (Feb., 1927), 91-97, 157-160; T. Z. Koo, "Nation-Making in China," *Christian Century*, Feb. 17, 1927, pp. 202-203; *Literary Digest*, Feb. 19, 1927, pp. 16-17; Arthur A. Young, "Canton, the Revolutionist's Paradise," *America*, Feb. 26, 1927; pp. 472-473. These are but references for the first two months of the year. Similar examples might be cited for the rest.

advisors to the Canton government were agents of the Third International, rather than of the Soviets. Current History in May remarked that the Comintern, in response to the action of warships at the time of the Nanking rioting, had called on the workers of the world to assist the Chinese.[52]

Louis Fischer, then a correspondent in Russia, wrote for the Independent of April 16 an article discussing Russian goals in China. He outlined the various methods employed there, both with the Kuomintang and against Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria, and explained that the U.S.S.R. could not officially recognize the Hankow government because such recognition would mean a scrapping of the 1924 treaty giving the Russians special rights over the Chinese Eastern Railway.[53] Before the article appeared, however, on April 6, 1927, Chang Tso-lin had made Russia's position more difficult. After gaining permission from the diplomatic corps at Peking to investigate the offices of the Chinese Eastern Railway and a Russian bank in the embassy compound, his police had gone on to search the offices of the military attaché, where they discovered and arrested a number of Chinese and Russians whom they declared to be "bolshevik agitators." Some of these were later put to death. The raid also disclosed a quantity of documents which the embassy staff were unable to destroy before being discovered. Subsequent publication provided proof that Russia

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52. Quincy Wright, "Progress of the Civil War in China," Current History, XXV (Jan., 1927), 587; Roots, loc. cit., Asia XXVII (Feb., 1927), 157; Current History XXVI (May, 1927), 334.
53. Louis Fischer, "The Bear's Paw in China," Independent, Apr. 16, 1927, pp. 410-411.

had definitely been involved in the Chinese Revolution.[54]

REACTION AT HANKOW

Few viewers of the Chinese political scene in the spring and summer of 1927 were sure what they were seeing. Editors of the periodicals, having to depend only on short dispatches, cabled mostly from Shanghai, were less certain. Often they prefaced their remarks about the China situation with a statement to this effect or sprinkled their editorials with qualifying "reportedly's" or "it seems that...." The New Republic in late April compromised a dilemma by giving the gist of two recent dispatches, one stating that the split between Chiang and Hankow was complete, the other suggesting that the real quarrel between the two groups was patched up and what remained was a pretended indifference calculated to lull the Peking government and the foreigners at Shanghai. The

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[54] For a more complete discussion of the Peking raid, as well as for translation of those documents found there which deal with nationalism and communism in China, see C. Martin Wilbur and Julie Lien-ying How, Documents on Communism, Nationalism and Soviet Advisors in China, 1918-1927 (New York, 1956). These authors feel that the larger number of the documents, which the Russians immediately denounced as forgeries, where in fact authentic. They also point out what newsmen of the time seem to have missed: that some of the Chinese arrested and executed as communists were actually strong anti-communists. It is one of the ironies of the Chinese situation that these Kuomintang members, ardently right-wing, were able to carry out their party activities only in the embassy compound of the only communist nation of that day. Others in the group, including Li Ta-chao, were Communist Party members. American periodicals did not indicate much excitement about the raid; in general it proved what they had believed to be true. Time, Apr. 18, 1927, pp. 18-19; Outlook, Apr. 20, 1927, p. 491; New Republic, Apr. 20, 1927, p. 232; Christian Century, Apr. 21, 1927, p. 483; America, Apr. 16, 1927, p. 26; ibid., May 7, 1927, p. 74; Living Age, July 15, 1927, p. 100; Commonweal, June 15, 1927, p. 143.

Christian Century of the following week had three possible explanations for the reported split. One involved trickery: the powers would be at a loss to do much about the Nanking disturbances if there was no definite government with which to deal. The other two were reasons for a real split. One, to which "the panicky city" of Shanghai was leaning, was that Chiang Kai-shek, as a patriot, wished to keep the Chinese revolution from Russian control. Or, Hankow might not be radical. Perhaps Chiang had sold out to the "exploitationists" in the treaty ports.[55]

With such uncertainty, there was little unanimity as to which incidents to report. Although the split itself was mentioned in all the news-conscious weeklies and some of the monthlies within a few months, editors seemed to pick and choose at random which other happenings would be discussed. Thus some magazines spoke of the meeting following the Shanghai coup, when the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang expelled Chiang from the party, dismissed him from all his posts, and ordered his arrest. Other periodicals mentioned the gathering at Nanking which demanded the arrest of the Soviet advisors and "impeached" the Nationalist cabinet at Hankow, excluding Eugene Chen, who was said to be "misguided," but loyal to the party. While some writers seemed to assume

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55. New Republic, Apr. 27, 1927, p. 258; ibid., May 11, 1927, p. 311; Christian Century, May 5, 1927, p. 547. See also Outlook, May 11, 1927, p. 40; Quincy Wright, "China's Revolt Against the Old Order," Current History XXVI (June, 1927), 346-347; Independent, May 14, 1927, p. 501. Another suggestion that the quarrel was a pretense appeared in F. Britten Austin, "The Hidden forces in China," Saturday Evening Post, June 11, 1927, p. 194.

that such a proclamation heralded a fait accompli, Asia's editor explained that political splits were not like those in the West. Despite the harsh words, reconciliation was not unlikely.[56] Occasional hints appeared about what might be happening in Hankow: Chen was irked by the Russian advisors. His government seemed weakening, was about to collapse. Borodin was to be withdrawn. The Left Kuomintang had offered the command of its armies to Feng Yü-hsiang.[57]

Feng had been out of the news for a few months, but the split in the Kuomintang brought him again to prominence. After meeting the representatives from Hankow, he journeyed on down the Yangtze and conferred with Chiang Kai-shek. The telegram he sent to Hankow after that meeting was immediately announced in American weeklies: Radical elements in the Kuomintang must accept party discipline, Borodin should return to his own country at once, Chinese members of the Hankow executive committee "who wish to go abroad for a rest" should do so, and other sincere believers in the Kuomintang should join the Nanking government.[58]

American reactions to Feng's pronouncement were guarded. As the New Republic remarked, it might mean the doom of the

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56. Independent, Apr. 30, 1927, p. 474; Quincy Wright, loc. cit., Current History XXVI (June, 1927), 337-338; Time, April 25, 1927, p. 16; Literary Digest (quoting Indianapolis Star), May 21, 1927, p. 10; Louis D. Froelick, "An A-B-C of the Chinese Puzzle," Asia XXVII (June, 1927), p. 452.
57. Argonaut, Apr. 2, 1927, p. 1; America, June 4, 1927, p. 170; New Republic, May 11, 1927, p. 311 (The editor questioned the truth of the report); Quincy Wright, loc. cit., Current History XXVI (June, 1927), 339-341; America, Apr. 30, 1927, p. 50; Independent, Apr. 30, 1927, p. 474.
58. Text in Time, July 4, 1927, p. 15.

Hankow government, but that doom had already been predicted often. Most writers preferred merely to mention the telegram and to wait and see.[59] Nearly a month later signs of a change appeared. In late July, Borodin and other Russians were said to be on their way to Urga, heading back to Russia, and "The *Pravda*, of Moscow, which ought to know, is openly mourning the failure, for the present, of the attempt at Communist revolution in China."[60]

Any suggestions that Feng's turning against the "Left" had caused this failure were but weakly presented.[61] Instead of throwing his strength behind Chiang, Feng, "as usual," seemed to be "waiting to see how the wind blows" after the advisors had left.[62] Obviously, something else had happened. The *Outlook* wondered if the split in the ranks of Russia's leaders had any bearing on the situation, and the *New Republic* claimed that "a divorce between the Hankow government and the Communist elements which have been endeavoring to control it" had been "brought about partly by suppression on the part of the non-Communists and partly by the edict of Moscow against collaboration."[63]

The split in the Russian communist leadership, between

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59. *Ibid.*; *New Republic*, July 6, 1927, p. 160; *Nation*, July 6, 1927, p. 3; *America*, July 9, 1927, pp. 289-290; *Outlook*, July 13, 1927, pp. 334-335; A. M. Nikolaiff, "On to Peking," *ibid.*, p. 345. This event was noted more than any other since the split appeared definite.
60. *New Republic*, July 20, 1927, p. 211; *Nation*, July 27, p. 76.
61. *New Republic*, July 20, 1927, p. 211; Harold S. Quigley, "The Nationalist Drive on Peking," *Current History* XXVI (Aug., 1927), 831.
62. *Nation*, July 27, 1927, p. 76.
63. *Outlook*, July 27, 1927, p. 398; *New Republic*, Aug. 10, 1927, p. 292.

the Stalinists and the "Opposition," a loose collaboration of factions led by Leon Trotsky, Grigori Zinoviev, and Karl Radek, had previously been discussed in connection with Russia's activities in China by Quincy Wright. In the June, 1927, issue of Current History, Wright had suggested that Stalin's communism was of a more "compromising" type than that of the others. Most of the Soviet advisors in China had been reported to favor Stalin's ideas, but those Chinese communists in positions of power in Hankow had been educated under Radek at Sun Yat-sen University. They wanted to divert the revolution from nationalism toward true communism. It was rumored that Stalin wished to try to heal the Kuomintang split, even at the sacrifice of a few radical Chinese communists, and that Stalin's proposals were accepted by the Communist Party.[64]

A useful article outlining the relationship between the Comintern and the Kuomintang appeared that same month in Asia. Louis D. Froelick, the editor, provided his readers with what he called "an A-B-C of the Chinese Puzzle," beginning with Sun Yat-sen's principles of government, then explaining the relationship between the Chinese Communist Party and the Kuomintang-- the former described as "still virtually a separate organization, a party within a party." There was evidence, he said, "that the Third International at Moscow sends its instructions to Chinese members of the

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[64] Wright, loc. cit., Current History XXVI (June, 1927), 341. Wright cited Walter Duranty, the New York Times' Moscow correspondent, who was on special assignment in China in 1927, concerning Stalin's wish to heal the Kuomintang split. A similar reference to Duranty's statement had appeared in the Literary Digest, May 14, 1927, pp. 8-9.

Communist Party, as distinguished from the Kuomintang. Solidarity is therefore almost inconceivably difficult to maintain." Froelick also told of a decision made six months earlier at a meeting of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Third International in Moscow, a decision to intensify work in the Kuomintang and the Canton government and to make that government "a dictatorship of the proletariat, peasantry, and petty bourgeoisie." He then went on to discuss China's land and labor problems, explaining that Red influence was strong in port cities and areas of tenantry near there, adding, "In regard to the extremist program, there is evidence, however, that the shrewd Borodin has attempted to hold the Chinese Communists to moderation, on the ground that a full social revolution is premature if not impossible." Froelick also related the divergent tactics in China to the conflict of opinion in Moscow.[65]

For the most part, events in Hankow just preceding or just following the departure of the Russians were not well chronicled in the American periodical press. No one seemed to know just what was happening. There were reports that communists were being expelled from Kuomintang offices, though they at first appeared to remain within the party.[66] Other sources reported disagreements among members of the "Left."

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65. Louis D. Froelick, "An A-B-C of the Chinese Puzzle," Asia XXVII (June, 1927), 451-454.

66. Feng's telegram had suggested only that the Russians be asked to leave, not the CCP members. See Paul Blanshard, "The Future of the Chinese Revolution," New Republic, Sept. 7, 1927, p. 64; and America, Sept. 17, 1927, p. 530.

Mme. Sun voiced her disapproval of the recent events in a long statement released to Chinese papers, then, along with Eugene Chen and others, left China for Europe (via Moscow) to stay "until wiser councils prevail."[67] The more flexible members of the Hankow organization began negotiations with the Nanking group and, after Chiang had "retired," joined them to set up a new Nationalist government at Nanking.[68]

A few "post-mortem" articles on the Russian-Chinese relationship appeared in the late months of 1927. Mostly written from Moscow, they speculated on the Comintern's part in the Chinese revolution and elaborated Froelick's explanation of the effects of disagreements within the Russian leadership. The Living Age reprinted a German correspondent's

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67. Mme. Sun's statement, released on July 14 at Hankow, was reprinted from the July 30 China Weekly Review by the Nation, Sept. 21, 1927, pp. 296, 298. See also America, Aug. 6, 1927, p. 386; Time, Aug. 8, 1927, p. 18; and Harold Quigley in Current History XXVI (Sept., 1927), 989.

68. Chiang's retirement, on August 8, was noted within a month by seven of the weeklies: Time, Aug. 22, 1927, p. 14; Outlook, Aug. 24, 1927, p. 526; New Republic, Aug. 24, 1927, p. 2; America, Aug. 27, 1927, p. 458; Independent, Aug. 27, 1927, p. 215; Nation, Aug. 31, 1927, p. 194; Literary Digest, Sept. 3, 1927, p. 8--also by Living Age, Sept. 1, 1927, p. 382. The first five discussed his reasons, both his stated ones (that the Nationalists did not understand his anti-communist moves and had lost faith in him) and others: that Feng had "urged" his retirement, that he had recently suffered dismaying military defeats, that Hankow yet distrusted him, and that his generals were disloyal. The Nation gave Chiang credit for having been better than most military leaders, but thought his retirement to be for the best, as did the editor of the Living Age. Paul Blanshard (loc. cit., New Republic, Sept. 7, 1927, p. 64) felt his resignation was a "blessing" and was echoed in this by the Review of Reviews LXXVI (Oct., 1927), 440. Harold Quigley ("The Passing of Chiang Kai-shek," Current History XXVII-- Oct., 1927-- 150-151) remarked that the move was true to Chinese custom, while Stanley High ("The Chinese Scene," Outlook, Sept. 14, 1927, pp. 45-48) doubted it would last: Chiang was too important in China.

description of Borodin's return to Moscow and the reasons therefore. Moscow, he said, was blaming the militarists for the failure of the revolution; and the Third International was claiming that the Chinese Communist Party had not followed its instructions properly. Paul Blanshard wrote in the New Republic that the Hankow government had announced on July 20 that Chinese communists had been caught passing a resolution calling for a general seizure of the land. He felt that the Chinese, rather than acting independently of Moscow, were too much "fundamentalists in political thought, reporting to their mission boards in Moscow," to be able to "practice that scientific opportunism, free from all doctrinal presuppositions, which China so badly needs."[69]

From Moscow came two more views. Louis Fischer wrote in the Nation in November that Stalin and his opposition were blaming each other for failures in China and suggested that "This placing of the blame assumes acceptance of responsibility-- one reason why the Russian view of the Chinese situation is so interesting and important." He then proceeded to outline what the Opposition had had in mind for China. In the December issue of Asia, Vincent Sheean also explained the stand of the Opposition, but proposed that "The Revolution is

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69. Paul Scheffer, "Borodin's Home-coming" (from Berliner Tageblatt, Aug. 2), Living Age, Sept. 15, 1927, pp. 503-505; Paul Blanshard, loc. cit., New Republic, Sept. 27, 1927, p. 64. See also Aage Krarup Nielsen, "Borodin's Swan Song" (from Berliner Tageblatt, Oct. 12), Living Age, Dec. 1, 1927, pp. 999-1004, for interesting view of the Comintern Agent as seen in Hankow just before KMT-CCP split. Author was in Hankow at time of split, but knew nothing of reasons.

not Russian property and never was." He blamed the rightist Nationalist leaders and those who supported them for the failure of the "Left."[70]

RED HUNTS AND COMMUNIST INSURRECTIONS

The rounding up of communists and labor leaders accused of being communists at Shanghai on April 12 had been but the beginning of "red hunts" staged throughout China in the last three quarters of 1927. Similar purges had taken place in Canton and in sections of central China, led both by allies of Chiang and by military forces allied with the "Left." These units were headed by officers who objected to the land confiscation carried on in Hunan and who set out to "modify" the peasant movement. Later, after the "Left" had determined to oust the communists from power, they moved against labor unions around Wuhan.

References to these purges were scattered and brief. Chiang was mentioned as suppressing red leadership and trade unions, raiding strongholds of communists in labor unions, or "cutting off the heads of some of the 'red' dissenters." Various estimates were made as to the number of executions, usually set at 100-200 in Shanghai, more in Canton. The situation in the interior seemed to pass unnoticed in American

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70. Louis Fischer, "China-- Seen from Moscow," Nation, Nov. 30, 1927, p. 613; Vincent Sheean, "Moscow and the Chinese Revolution," Asia XXVII (Dec., 1927) 1004-1009, 1064-1065. For more recent discussions of Russia's role, see Conrad Brandt, Stalin's Failure in China, 1924-1927 (Cambridge, Mass., 1958) and Harold Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, rev. ed. (Stanford, 1951). Isaacs also denounced the weakness of the Chinese "leftists," though he viewed Stalin's policy as poor, too.

magazines throughout the summer.[71]

What the columnists and editors, who had to rely mostly on regular correspondents, missed at the time was supplied later by journalists from the field. From Moscow came a report printed in the Nation in December on the "white terror" in China, with figures on the numbers of executions in April, May, and June. Since then, numbers had not been available; but "most of the known Communists have already been hunted down"; and conservatives placed the numbers of Communist Party and left Kuomintang members killed at 5,000. Revolutionaries suggested it would be nearer 20,000.[72] Another article in the same periodical, this one by an American who had worked with the Kuomintang until the split, told of the situation in Hankow in July and August and said that news of a "communist" revolt of two "Left" generals at Nanchang had led to a reaction which "cowed" the masses and "emasculated" the unions.[73] A third description of revolution and

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71. Independent, Apr. 23, 1927, p. 431; Literary Digest, Apr. 23, 1927, pp. 12-13; Nation, Apr. 27, 1927, p. 477; America, Apr. 30, 1927, p. 50; Independent, Apr. 30, 1927, p. 455; Literary Digest, May 14, 1927, p. 8; Outlook, May 11, 1927, p. 40; Time, May 2, 1927, p. 16; New Republic, May 4, 1927, p. 287; Nation, May 4 1927, p. 490; Quincy Wright, loc. cit., Current History, XXVI (June, 1927), 339; Vincent Sheean, loc. cit., Asia XXVII (Aug., 1927), 691; Edward H. Lockwood, "China's New Style Labor Movement," Christian Century, Aug. 11, 1927, p. 945. Harold Issacs (op. cit., pp. 179-180) put the figure for Shanghai at over 300.
72. Scott Nearing, "The White Terror in China," Nation, Dec. 28, 1927, pp. 734-735. This was written on Nov. 25, in "Moscow, en route for China." Nearing was an American Socialist, then interested in, but later disillusioned with, communism.
73. Roy Cort, "What is happening in China's Kuomintang," ibid., Dec. 7, 1927, pp. 636-638. The uprising at Nanchang was one of the "Autumn Harvest Uprisings" with which Mao

counterrevolution in the interior was written by Anna Louise Strong and printed in Harper's in November. This was in the form of a story about a Chinese Christian girl who came under the influence of the Kuomintang, worked for revolutionary ideals in her home town, then was turned over to the "reactionary soldiers" later and killed by the old method of "slicing." No mention of communism appeared in the tale.[74]

News of events in the port cities reached magazines in the United States much more quickly. Two last-ditch attempts by Chinese Communist Party members to save something of their revolution occurred in late fall. The uprising at Swatow, led by the generals who had been defeated at Nanchang and supported by communist forces from Kiangsi, was mentioned by two American periodicals. In early October, 1927, America told of chaos in the city as government officials disappeared, and noted that the situation could be serious: this could provide a port to which Russia could ship munitions and form a new base for propaganda. The Nation characteristically was less disturbed, referring to "a so-called 'communist' army," but seeing as yet no signs of any more genuine devotion to the people than characterized other armies preying on the civilian population. Swatow was soon retaken by the Nationalists, who were next faced by problems in Canton, where small armed bands of communists had been reported awaiting their

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Tse-tung was associated. This one was brought about under the banner of the Kuomintang.

74. Anna Louise Strong, "Head-High-in-the-Wind," Harper's CLV (Nov., 1927), 744-749. Writers then and since have stressed the slow and painful methods of death meted out by the soldiers of the "reaction."

chance to take the city months before.[75]

The Canton uprising received more attention than that in Swatow, partly because Canton was a larger, more important city, and was better known to Americans. The communist take-over there, however, lacking support from the workers, was of short duration. Nationalist forces again took the city and slaughtered the revolutionaries and those suspected of having helped. The government of Chiang Kai-shek, by then returned to office, claimed that the Russian consulate had served as a center for the revolt and severed relations with the Soviet. Communism and Russian influence in China were at a new low.[76]

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As the year 1927 marked a high point for the communists in China, so too it was a period when American interest in that country was great. As events were confused, so the magazines were filled with speculation. As times were exciting and outcomes seemed important, so concerned Americans went to China and wrote back of what they saw. Though without entré to the making of decisions, some of them met the decision-makers and wrote back of their impressions. Much passed unobserved, but coverage of news events and personalities,

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75. *America*, Oct. 8, 1927, pp. 601-502; *Nation*, Oct. 26, 1927, p. 442; Harold Quigley in *Current History* XXVI (Sept., 1927), 989.
76. *America*, Dec. 3, 1927, p. 170; *ibid*., Dec. 24, 1927, p. 250; *Living Age*, Dec. 15, 1927, p. 1040; *Outlook*, Dec. 21, 1927, p. 487; *Independent*, Dec. 24, 1927, p. 639; *ibid*., Dec. 31, 1927, p. 663; *Time*, Dec. 26, 1927, p. 17; *Nation*, Dec. 28, 1927, p. 772. For a view of Russia's position, see Stanley High, "Russia's World Gone," *Harper's* CLVI (Dec., 1927), 110-118.

particularly those concerned with Chinese communism, was better at that time than at any other period in the decade.

Successes of the Northern Expedition focused attention on the Kuomintang; and as editors and contributors were trying to determine how "red" that party was, turmoil within made it clear that there were differences and that consideration had to be given to individuals. No communist was singled out; but other Kuomintang members were, with special attention being accorded Chiang Kai-shek. Although conservatives were inclined to label the Kuomintang and Chiang both as Bolshevik, the majority of magazine writers, while cognizant of such fears, tended to look with favor on the Kuomintang even before a split took place. Indeed, the more liberal magazines expressed concern that Chiang's "moderates" might be too reactionary. Still, with Russian communist ties with the "Left" known, no American periodical openly supported that regime. A "wait and see" attitude was adopted; and with a few exceptions, most writers approved the removal of Russian advisors and the repudiation of the Chinese communists. The violence of communist uprisings that fall seemed to indicate that that was the proper choice, but many writers pointed to the Kuomintang's "red hunts" as proof that violence was not confined to any one group in China.

Communist insurrections and "red hunts" both indicated that the Chinese revolution was not wholly a Russian production, as Russian advisors had mostly left the country before the biggest uprisings took place and as the victims of the "hunts" were Chinese. Still, a future for communism in China appeared entirely unlikely by the end of 1927, with communists and other radicals mostly executed and even Russian consulates closed.

CHAPTER IV, 1928-1930

During the three years after the communists were driven from the party, the Kuomintang appeared on the way to a real reunification and strengthening of China. Its members established a new government and drew most Chinese business, intellectual, and military leaders to its side-- though the allegiance of the warlords, usually left as "governors" of their areas, was at best conditional. In the United States, the periodical press lent moral support; even the "liberal" magazines which had accused Chiang Kai-shek of diverting the revolution to his own purposes spoke in glowing and hopeful terms of the new government.

Meanwhile, the communists slipped from the spotlight. The remnants of their party were reorganizing in the hinterlands, but almost nothing was known about this, either in the United States or by the majority of the Chinese. Until late in 1930, when a major assault on a Nationalist city was attempted, there appeared in American magazines only infrequent mention of China's Reds, and then writers were not certain that "communist" was not a misnomer.

CONSOLIDATION AND "BANDITRY"

The year 1928 was to a large degree one of reorganization in China. The Kuomintang, having settled on a moderate course and having eliminated the threat to its power from the left, moved to spread over North China and then to consolidate. In June its armies captured Peking, driving Chang Tso-lin back toward Manchuria.[1] In October a governmental

[1] Chang's train was bombed on its way north, and he died

framework, the Organic Law of the National Government, was promulgated; the old capital of Peking ("Northern Capital") was renamed Peip'ing ("Northern Peace"); and the government was begun at Nanking ("Southern Capital"), with great plans announced for the building of a grand new center of administration and lawmaking there.

For the communists, there was a different kind of stocktaking. Many Chinese Communist Party members were in Moscow, where the party congress of that year was held in conjunction with the Comintern Congress in June. Other members were scattered. After the failure of the Autumn Harvest Uprisings, which he had been sent to organize in Hunan, Mao Tse-tung, a former assistant to Li Ta-chao in the library of the university at Peking, withdrew with a few of his troops to an old bandit stronghold, Chingkangshan, on the Hunan-Kiangsi border. There he was joined by Chu Teh, the man who had helped form a communist cell among Chinese in Berlin. Chu had later commanded Kuomintang forces and had most recently failed at a revolt in Hunan. Their small armies, together with bandit groups in the area, were combined in the spring of 1928 to make up the Fourth Red Army. A few months later this force was augmented by the arrival of another "army" under the leadership of P'eng Teh-huai. P'eng had also been a Kuomintang officer until recently, when he, too, had led a short-

of his injuries. There was discussion at the time as to who was responsible, many observers suggesting a Nationalist coup; but the Japanese were finally learned to be the culprits. Chang's son, Chang Hsueh-liang, became the Manchurian leader.

lived rebellion in Hunan.

In their mountainous stronghold, unwatched by the press, these refugees from earlier communist failures set about the organization of a peasant soviet and army. It was not the first such in China, as a former landlord's son named P'eng P'ai had established a soviet among the peasants at Hailufeng, Kwangtung, in November of 1927. P'eng's experiment was ended by Kuomintang troops three months after its founding. The soviet itself received no mention in the periodical press at that time, though the Nation did, in February, 1928, speak of peasant unions which were in turmoil in "the hinterlands of Canton Province," adding, "This is a movement to be watched. It is erratic, bloody, and tumultuous; but it may mark the development of a significant class revolt against the allied forces of landlordism and militarism."[2] Chingkangshan proved much more easily defended than had Hailufeng; and, though enduring hardships, the communists there survived and became stronger.[3]

The myth that peasants were too conservative to be organized effectively was attacked by Anna Louise Strong in an article appearing in Asia of January, 1928. Miss Strong wrote of the situation as she had seen it in the Hankow region five months earlier. (An editorial note told readers that she had returned to Moscow with Borodin's party and was writing from there.) As was usual in her writings for American publication, she did not speak in terms of communism or communists, but of "nationalists" as opposed to "reactionaries" among the Kuomintang. She told how the "nationalists" had been working with the peasants since 1923, secretly until May 30, 1925, and how the peasant unions had grown stronger after that date and much stronger after the Kuomintang armies had moved north. She described especially the social accomplishments of the peasant organizations-- in education, in stopping opium smoking, and in stamping out gambling among members.[4]

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[2] Nation, Feb. 22, 1928, p. 199.

[3] It is likely that P'eng did not give much thought to the defense of his area. See Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, pp. 102-103.

Most magazines which spoke of China during 1928 simply reviewed and commented on the more recent events. Especially common were expressions of awe and revulsion at the large-scale slaughter carried out in the name of ridding China of communists. Not only Kuomintang police and soldiers, but the armies of the warlords, joined in the "red hunts." Time and the Nation reported unconfirmed rumors that any young female in Canton with bobbed hair was assumed to be a communist and was shot forthwith. A month and a half later, this situation was recorded in Current History as a fact, in other cities as well as in Canton. The Commonweal's editor for once agreed with the editor of the Nation and with the columnist for Current History in decrying this "ghastly orgy of revenge," remarking that it was none the less horrible in that it was anti-red. The columnist claimed that many receiving such

[4] Anna Louise Strong, "The Awakened Peasantry of China," Asia XXVIII (Jan., 1928), 32-35, 64-66; editor's note, Ibid., p. 7.

"barbarous treatment" were, "in fact, those leaders, as well as the rank and file of the liberal element of the Kuomintang or Nationalist Party, who refuse to act like stool pigeons for the parasitic tuchuns."[5] During the next few months there were other news reports of more arrests and more executions, letters of praise for the spirit with which the "Bolsheviks" met their deaths, or editorials denouncing the fact that the Kuomintang could actually win friends in foreign lands through such bloody deeds.[6]

In April, 1928, there appeared in an American magazine a communist version of the Canton uprising. Taken from a Paris communist daily by the Living Age, this eyewitness account told of the background of communist revolts in China, then described the growing unrest in Canton under the middle-of-the-road commander who took over the city in mid-November. Trying to appease all and pleasing none, his policies had been opposed by worker and peasant movements. The writer described the workers as eager to fight, with the Chinese Communist Party practically forced to lead an uprising in order to retain the workers' faith and confidence. About a week's preparation had preceded the revolt, which had been joined by the local soldiers as well as by workers and by prisoners released from the jails. The article concluded

5. Nation, Dec. 28, 1927, p. 722; Time, Jan. 2, 1928, p. 15; Harold Quigley in Current History XXVII (Feb., 1928), 764; Commonweal, Jan. 4, 1928, p. 886; Nation, Jan. 4, 1928, p. 1.
6. America, Apr. 14, 1928, p. 2; Nation, Apr. 25, 1928, p. 489; ibid., Apr. 18, 1928, p. 420; America, June 23, 1928, p. 242; ibid., Aug. 11, 1928, p. 410.

with the statement that the uprising had not been marked by any political error, but that its failure had come about only because there was insufficient time to arouse all the people to its support.[7]

The previous summer's revolts in Hunan also were described and discussed that spring. Anna Louise Strong wrote for the World Tomorrow how the social revolution was over "for the present" and how "order" was being restored by the hunting down and slaying of peasant leaders. (This time she added, "and communists.") The soldiers, she said, were killing far more and looting more than had the revolutionaries. The Hunan generals had effected a coup in Changsha, had expelled all unions, and had started a "cleanup." Nothing was left of the unions or of the Kuomintang there now. She herself had questioned missionaries and soldiers after the coup and had found none able to give concrete examples of the "excesses" of the peasants, while those of the soldiers were well known-- killings, burnings, and theft.[8]

[7] An Eyewitness, "Three Days of Terror at Canton" (from L'Humanité, Paris, Feb. 5,6,7) Living Age, Apr. 1, 1928, pp. 603-607. Harold Isaacs described the Canton uprising as directed by party functionaries who misjudged the strength of peasant organization as in P'eng's soviet, and lacked the support of the Canton workers. It was probably ordered from Moscow over the misgivings of Chinese leaders. The "correctness" of the revolt was party line. Isaacs, The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution, pp. 282-292.

[8] Anna Louise Strong, "Peasants and Soldiers in Hunan," World Tomorrow XI (June, 1928), 269-271. A third article by Miss Strong on Chinese Unions appeared later that year, telling of social gains against slavery, marriage tyranny, and concubinage made by women's unions in Hankow. "Some Hankow Memories," Asia XXVIII (Oct., 1928). 794-797, 832-833.

Also receiving attention from American periodicals in early 1928 were China's international relations, in particular those with Russia. The closing of the Russian consulates was duly noted, as was Mme. Sun Yat-sen's protest at the move and Chiang's reply to his new sister-in-law that Soviet interference in China's internal affairs had made this necessary.[9] There was some magazine commentary on the move. The Literary Digest summarized Russian press reactions, reporting that Soviet papers were rueful about the fact that though millions of rubles had been spent in behalf of the Nationalists, those Nationalists were now shooting their own communists and refusing to deal with Moscow. A speech by Nikolai Bukharin, president of the Comintern, printed in Pravda and mentioning with pleasure the tense situation in Canton, was seen by some as proof that Russia had had a hand in the revolt. Soviet headlines had also praised the new "soviet" there and had appealed to Russian workers to send aid. Russian anti-Bolshevik papers saw no doubt that Soviet consuls and propaganda had helped. One of these claimed that the Bolsheviks had suffered a terrible defeat in China, but that it would not be their last. A deal with Japan was predicted as possible.[10]

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[9] Outlook, Feb. 1, 1928, pp. 176-178; Independent, Jan. 7, 1928, p. 2; Time, Jan. 2, 1928, p. 886; Harold Quigley in Current History XXVII (Feb., 1928), 764. Chiang Kai-shek and Soong Mei-ling had been married in early December. This union of the then-retired Kuomintang leader and the woman who was sister to Mme. Sun and to the Nationalist government's finance minister was felt by many to be important to China's future, Time, Dec. 12, 1927, p. 22; Marie L. Darrach, "A Chinese Alliance," Commonweal, Feb. 22, 1928, pp. 1086-1089.

[10] Literary Digest, Jan. 28, 1928, p. 20.

In addition, the Literary Digest noted that the Russians blamed Great Britain for having made "the Nanking rulers its henchmen." The Nation's editor also mentioned that Chicherin was claiming the red hunts to be the fruit of anti-communist propaganda by the British. Anyone, this editor added, could feel certain that this was so. The anti-British Commonweal, too, had heard rumors that a foreign power was behind the anti-red moves. There was no need, it stated, to name that power.[11]

Two of the more conservative magazines spoke with satisfaction about the course of events. The Independent remarked, "Russia's activities in China have been conducted with that finer sort of stupidity for which Moscow has become famous in the days since 1917," suggesting that the communists had been too eager. The Outlook's editor was almost complacent. Democracy, he said, seemed to have won out over communism in China. But the Christian Century expressed caution about the anti-communism of Nanking. It was of great appeal to other countries, but was it wise for China? "This present situation..." ran an editorial, "only makes sure more ferocious outbursts in the future. For the ideas of Sun Yat-sen, and the doctrines of proletarian power preached by the Russians, now driven underground, are bound eventually to produce another explosion."[12]

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[11] Ibid.; Nation, Jan. 4, 1928, p. 1; Commonweal, Jan. 4, 1928, p. 886.

[12] Independent, Jan. 7, 1928, p. 2; Outlook, Feb. 1, 1928, pp. 176-178; Christian Century, Jan. 23, 1928, p. 228.

Small "explosions" from "underground" continued the tradition of the Hunan, Swatow, and Canton uprisings. Being concerned about the well-being of missionaries, the Catholic weekly America chronicled these incidents most faithfully, though now and then another periodical would tell of a disturbance. In late January, 1928, America's news editor reported that though communist outbreaks and executions had considerably lessened, disorders continued. It was estimated that at least 10,000 had been executed recently "and that during the reign of terror the Reds had practiced ghastly cruelties." In March, communist activities were again said to have "assumed appreciable proportions." A million salt-makers, fishermen and peasants just east of Canton were said to have "gone red" and to be threatening that city. Communist terrorism was also reported in northeastern Kwangtung. One entire village, numbering 3,000, was said to have been massacred "by the Communists in the Swatow hinterland because the whole village was Roman Catholic." Later that month a news column in the Outlook also reported "Chinese Red massacres of native Christians... rioting and terrorism in regions near Canton." However, the May issue of Current History indicated that these news items might not be completely factual. It admitted that there were "reports of a shocking character" in newspapers of communist bands killing hundreds with "fiendish tortures." But, the columnist went on, this news was all badly authenticated. Probably the disturbances were little more than bandit-village warfare.[13]

[13] America, Jan. 21, 1928, p. 354; ibid., Mar. 17, 1928,

According to Pearl S. Buck, China-raised daughter of missionaries and wife of a professor at the university at Nanking, such reports appeared almost daily in Chinese newspapers. They were, she wrote for the Nation, proof that "although Russian propagandists and agents have been forcibly ejected from China and although thousands of Chinese Communists have been killed by the Nationalist Government, the Communist cause on the whole continues to prosper," adding, "and he is a blind patriot who denies it." She then listed massacres "by bands of peasants calling themselves Communists" in Hunan and Honan and mentioned the problems Shanghai had, even with its police force in operation.

To Mrs. Buck, it was important that this was not Russian, but Chinese communism. Russia, she said, had contributed little but the name-- had given funds once, but this financial support was unlikely now. Moreover, she said, "If one dared prophesy in China these days, one would prophesy this 'communism' is going to increase, certainly for a time...." Why was this so? She believed that communism was rooted in the ancient Chinese habit of mind. There had always been secret societies in China and uprisings against corrupt officials. Roving bands of thieves were an accepted part of society. Land held in common was historically a part of China, as under the old well-field system. The Taipings of the 19th century practiced a form of ultra-communism long before Bolsheviks existed. Therefore, it would take more than

p. 545; ibid., Mar. 24, 1928, p. 570; ibid., Apr. 21, 1928, p. 26; Malcolm W. Davis in Outlook, Mar. 28, 1928, p. 492; Harold Quigley in Current History XXVIII (May, 1928), 333.

severe measures to eradicate communism in China.[14]

Two months later, a rebuttal appeared in the same periodical. Arthur W. Hummel, curator of the Chinese collection of the Library of Congress, was opposed to Mrs. Buck's use of the term "communism." She made it, he said, much too general. She was also incorrect in suggesting that the Chinese were often sympathetic toward the bandits in their midst. Such was seldom the case, and the recent episodes of ruthless killing by armed bandits were far from normal in China. Moreover, her interpretation of the "well-field system" was an old one, recently disproved by Hu Shih. In short, Mrs. Buck's history was all wrong.[15]

By far the greater proportion of the news from China in 1928 was directed toward the Nationalist government, its triumphs over the northerners, and the establishment of the new system. Only a few comments on the situation involved the question of communism. There was one word of regret for the withdrawal of northern troops, in that they had managed to maintain a non-communist situation in Peking, accomplishing their stated reason for being there. Opinions of the new government varied. Everyone was not sure that the communist coloration was gone; there were different reasons for the "mingled joy and skepticism" with which the Nation's editor claimed the new Nationalist government was greeted. In California, the Argonaut's editor continued his bias against Chinese in general in an editorial which suggested that officials at Nanking were merely Chinese ex-reds who had tired of Red Russian control and had thrown out Bolsheviks and executed "extra-reds" because of personal ambitions. He took exception to a newspaper which had likened the Nationalists to the American revolutionaries. There was no comparison, he said: China even now had no responsible government. The editor of the World Tomorrow distrusted Chiang Kai-shek, referring to his "spotted record" and the likelihood he would be just another warlord. He saw Japan as a possible problem for the Nationalists.[16]

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[14] Pearl S. Buck, "Communism in China," Nation, July 25, 1928, pp. 97-98. Mrs. Buck had at this time published stories and articles about Chinese life in various periodicals. Her best-known novel, The Good Earth, appeared in 1932. George Soklosky did not agree that this communism was all Chinese, saying rather that the Chinese communists might yet throw off their Russian tutors, that Chinese radicals stood at the crossroads. Literary Digest, June 2, 1928, p. 18.

[15] Arthur W. Hummell, letter in the Nation, Sept. 19, 1928, p. 271. Though the idea that every ninth field, that holding the well, was once communal, may be idealized, some sort of communalization is believed to have existed in ancient China.

Japan was becoming more and more of a threat. Having worked with Marshal Chang Tso-lin, the Japanese were rumored to wish to control his successor. The New Republic noted in August that Japan was beginning to act as if it had annexed Manchuria, and that it had objected to the northward spread of the Nationalists. Two reasons were given for this objection: the Nationalist government was insecure, and it had "a Red tinge." Remarked the New Republic, which avidly championed the Nanking regime during its earliest years, "The first of these charges is no business of Japan's and there is every reason to believe that the second is false."[17]

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[16] Harold Quigley in Current History XXVIII (June, 1928), 701; Nation, Oct. 24, 1928, p. 413; Argonaut, July 28, 1928, p. 3; World Tomorrow XI (July, 1928), 291-292.

Paul Blanshard, who had toured China for the League for Industrial Democracy, also doubted the red label. To him, China was no more likely to go Bolshevik than the United States. In some ways he regretted the change in the Kuomintang, because the goals of the Nationalist government had been diverted and were no longer to aid the workers, who still labored long hours for small wages.[18]

Another voice of concern for the Chinese worker was raised by William Prohme, who, with his wife, had edited the English-language People's News of Hankow, an official paper of the Kuomintang left, in early 1927. Prohme saw the "bandits" or "communists" of central and southern China as largely the oppressed who were rising against their oppressors. The government, he wrote in the Nation, was telling labor vaguely to "wait," and the revolts of the disillusioned marked the "so-called radical" movement everywhere.[19]

In 1929 news from China grew even more infrequent; and what appeared was still mainly about the Nationalists, who were still consolidating. Editors and other writers were largely hopeful about the future of that regime. Communist-bandit depredations continued, but were seldom mentioned, except in America. Nathaniel Peffer did not even speak of the communists when, in July, he wrote for the New Republic an article on the domestic problems of the Nationalist government. Observers could discuss Chinese communism as a thing of the past, except for an occasional author like Harry Ward. Reviewing China's Millions, Anna Louise Strong's account of the Chinese Revolution as she saw it and as it had been told to her by those she had met in Canton and Hankow, Ward wrote that there was much to be learned from this journalistic history, namely that "China's revolution has passed through only its initial stage," and that "The peasants will write the last chapter of the story of the revolution."[20]

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[17] New Republic, Aug. 22, 1928, p. 1.

[18] Paul Blanshard, "The Future of China," World Tomorrow XI (July, 1928), 294-295.

[19] William Prohme, "Internal Conflicts in China," Nation, Dec. 26, 1928, pp. 724-725.

CONFLICT WITH RUSSIA

Attention shifted in June, 1929, to Manchuria. On the death of his father, Chang Hsueh-liang, known at times as the "Young Marshal," had assumed the position of power in Manchuria. Unlike his father, however, he had refused to work with the Japanese and had, in late 1928, come to terms with Chiang Kai-shek. Though Chang maintained virtual control of the Manchurian situation, he flew the Nationalist flag at Mukden and proclaimed his allegiance to the Nanking government.

Thus, when the Young Marshal's police raided the Soviet consulate at Harbin, America could report that it was

20. America, Jan. 5, 1929, p. 295; ibid., Apr. 6, 1929, p. 610; ibid., Apr. 27, 1929, p. 50; New Republic, Apr. 17, 1929, p. 237; Nathaniel Peffer, "What Next in China? II- Domestic Problems of the National Government," ibid., July 31, 1929, pp. 283-285; Harry F. Ward, Review of China's Millions, by Anna Louise Strong, ibid., Feb. 27, 1929, p. 52.

understood that the raid was inspired by a suspicion "that the Consulate was the meeting place of Communists with whom Marshal Feng was in communication" and that the raid was supposed to be under the direction of Chiang Kai-shek. Unconfirmed rumors indicated that the consulate at Suifenho, on the Siberian border, had also been raided. Feng Yü-hsiang, as was his wont, had been retaining his independence and supporting only those groups within China whose aims appealed to him at the time. Though early in 1929 he had helped Chiang quell a rival group of generals from Kwangsi, at present he was at odds with Nanking; and there were again rumors that he was getting assistance from Russia. It was reported that the government hoped to find in the raided consulates proof of such connivance.[21]

The Sino-Soviet disagreement continued for the remainder of the year. In July, 1929, the Chinese Eastern Railway was seized and its Russian executives arrested and deported. Diplomatic relations between China and Russia were completely broken at this time, and war was threatened. Some military action took place on the border; and the Russians, under a general who had been an advisor to Chiang Kai-shek until 1927, moved into Manchuria and took back control of the railroad. At peace negotiations at Khabarovsk the Chinese gave in and agreed that the railway would be returned to Russian management.

Despite Chinese statements that the consulates had been

[21] America, June 8, 1929, p. 194; Outlook, June 12, 1929, p. 254.

serving as centers for the distribution of communist propaganda,[22] the border situation was treated by the American periodical press much as any border situation, without reference to ideology. There were, of course, mentions of "Red troops" or "Communist agents"; but these adjectives seemed merely to be a variation on "Russian." Only an occasional editorial even discussed communist involvement as such. The _Living Age_ blamed the whole of China's troubles on the rivalry between Chiang and Feng: some, especially "the imperially minded Englishman" saw in the dissensions an opportunity "for the wily Russian... to apply the ancient maxim of 'Divide and conquer.'" There was no suggestion of communist plots. Similarly, the _New Republic_ chided the U.S.S.R. for its threats, suggesting that any remaining bitterness over the failure of the communist campaign in China should not make Russia give in to imperialism. The _Nation_, too, saw the biggest peril as "not that China may fall prey to communism, but that the factional disorders of its government and a restless ambition to test its strength may provoke Russian retaliation on a larger scale." Only the _Argonaut_'s editor suggested that something should be done: "Non-communist civilization, especially Japan and the United States, cannot stand by and allow China to be eaten piecemeal by Bolshevik Russia." He proposed that

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[22] _New Republic_, July 24, 1929, p. 243; _ibid_., July 31, 1929, pp. 272-273; _Nation_, Aug. 28, 1929, p. 208; _America_, Aug. 31, 1929, p. 482; _ibid_., Sept. 7, 1929, p. 501.

China let some international board of control take over.[23] The Chinese communists' open support of Russia in this confrontation was not discussed by American periodicals, though the New Republic did remark in July that communist propaganda was adding to the complexity of the situation.[24]

MORE "BANDITRY"

That this propaganda was heard but not even recorded is probably a good indication that writers did not feel the communists in the area south of the Yangtze to be of much importance. What with the continuation of the "warlord" squabbles (now called opposition of generals supposedly members of the Kuomintang) and the Manchurian-Siberian conflict, there was little news space devoted to communists in late 1929 or early 1930. America again (or yet) was almost alone in reporting communist activity, telling of massacres of peasants and the problems of missionaries. Other magazines were less inclined to believe that the banditry was connected with communism. The Literary Digest informed its many readers in January, 1930, that ten missionaries had been murdered during the previous year, thirty-two others held

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23. Living Age CCCXXXVI (July, 1929), 320; New Republic, July 31, 1929, pp. 272-274; Nation, Aug. 28, 1929, p. 208; Argonaut, Nov. 30, 1929, p. 3. Also considering Russia as largely imperialistic was Nathaniel Peffer, who wrote a history of Chinese-Soviet relations at this time, claiming that the 1927 break had been to keep from becoming a Russian protectorate, not because of anti-communism. Russia, he said, was willing to help others get their rights, but on its own terms. Peffer, "Russia and the Orient," New Republic, Jan. 1, 1930, pp. 160-161.
24. Ibid., July 24, 1929, p. 243.

for ransom, and seven robbed violently, but spoke of the perpetrators of these crimes as "brigands," not as communists or even as "communist-bandits." That magazine had reported the previous month, however, that some German papers claimed that a state of almost chronic war existed between the Nanking government and the communist armies in the south of China. The red armies were said to be made up of hungry peasants with a red band on neck or sleeves as informal insignia. Though poorly armed, they continued to resist-- and to frustrate-- government troops.[25]

As 1930 wore on, a few more writers joined the editors of America in their apprehension about the communists. The Literary Digest quoted a Chinese as expecting the next challenge to the Nanking government to include communists as well as opposing generals. Current History reported that minor insurrections by "Communist bands" in December had twice cut the railway from Nanking to Shanghai, once only thirty-five miles from the port city. In April this column told that bandits were roaming the countryside of Hunan, Hupei, Szechwan, Anhwei, Kiangsi, and Kiangsu provinces and that missionaries had been kidnapped and missions burned. In May and June it again told of kidnappings and murder by "Communist" bands or groups "reputedly of 'red' tendencies."

[25] America, Oct. 19, 1929, p. 26; ibid., Dec. 28, 1929, p. 270; ibid., Apr. 5, 1930, p. 610; ibid., Apr. 12, 1930, p. 2; ibid., Apr. 19, 1930, p. 26; ibid., May 10, 1930, p. 98; ibid., May 17, 1930, p. 123; ibid., May 31, 1930, p. 170; ibid., June 7, 1930, p. 194; ibid., June 14, 1930, p. 218; Literary Digest, Jan. 4, 1930, p. 24; ibid., Dec. 14, 1929, p. 17.

The Argonaut in May saw among the problems of China the fact that "Russians of the Third Internationale were inciting mutiny in the Nanking armies and helping the Reds among Chiang's enemies." In June the Commonweal spoke of communists and bandits in the southern territory.[26]

By June, 1930, enough interest had been aroused to elicit more frequent comments and some real consideration of the situation. It had been suggested earlier by some of the above magazines that the problem in the south was worsened by rebellions in the north, where Feng and other leaders were establishing a Peking rival to Nanking's government. Armies called to fight the rebel generals left the areas which were threatened by communist gangs virtually unprotected. America told in May of an unsuccessful attempt by Nanking troops to crush "bandits" near Hankow. A strong anti-communist campaign was agreed to be necessary, but it was doubted if the government could carry it out successfully.[27] Already a large part of the Nanking budget went to the maintenance of the military-- enough to have made the Finance Minister threaten resignation if it were not cut down.[28]

An editor of the Nation discussed the situation that month. Chiang Kai-shek's rivals, he noted, were in part rival generals and in part "those curious bands which the correspondents call 'Communist armies.'" The latter were groups of unemployed soldiers and bandits, among whom convinced communists had gone, "preaching a hatred of landlords and encouraging the peasants to throw off the feudal yoke." Although signs of more organization were appearing,

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[26] Ibid., Jan. 25, 1930, p. 18; Harold Quigley in Current History XXXI (Feb., 1930), 1029; Robert T. Pollard in ibid. (Apr., 1930), 178-179; ibid. (May, 1930), 403; ibid. (June, 1930), 601; Argonaut, May 31, 1930, p. 2; Commonweal, June 4, 1930, p. 121.

[27] America, May 31, 1930, p. 170.

[28] Ibid., Aug. 24, 1929, p. 458.

> it is difficult to believe that the movement has the solid basis in either peasant or industrial-worker organization which any really significant economic revolution must have, and a Communist movement can hardly be seriously Communist so long as it accepts the leadership of generals.

But, he added, this would bear watching.[29]

The YMCA's Asia representative, Sherwood Eddy, gathered more information, which he published in the Christian Century. Communism, which he called a "foreign germ in the Chinese system," seemed to be developing there in worse forms than in Russia itself. According to a map "in the foreign office of the one country that probably knows China best," there were twenty-two red areas, areas which were under the control of communists. Population of those red spots on the map included at least 150,000 soldiers. In cities such as Shanghai and Peip'ing, communist meetings were held among students and laborers. Eddy did not expect all of China to go red, but he predicted that parts of it would "sink into chaos, banditry... or local 'red' dictatorship." He did not see that the Chinese version was in essence much different from the Russian communism.[30]

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[29] Nation, June 18, 1930, p. 690.

Current History's columnist also tried to assess the situation south of the Yangtze that summer. He found it difficult. Provincial governments there were not well established, and the newspapers told mostly of "red" raids. A raid on communist headquarters at Amoy, in Fukien province, was said to have yielded much material, which the authorities were prevented from using "by the strength of Communist sentiment in the city." The American consul at Swatow reported that five of the twenty-five counties in his area were in the hands of communists.[31]

A contributor to the magazine, a journalist who lived in Peip'ing was less ready to label the "armies" of the south as communist. He felt that these groups were "in reality... bandits led by deserters from the armies who while they were still in uniform picked up a smattering of Communist slogans and eagerly embraced the idea of taking everything away from the rich and dividing it among the poor." He went on to explain that such slogans could have an enormous appeal "to a people who for nineteen years have been overtaxed and misgoverned."[32]

Readers of Russian newspapers would have been less sure that there was all sound and no fury among the groups under

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30. Sherwood Eddy, "China's Ominous Future," Christian Century, June 18, 1930, p. 782.
31. Harold Quigley in Current History XXII (July, 1930), 816.
32. Hallett Abend, "The Causes of the Civil War in China," ibid., p. 696.

discussion. The Literary Digest gathered interesting information from a Pravda article. The South Chinese rebels, it said, were definitely communists. They had a "Red Army" which obeyed the Chinese Communist Party and thus the Third International and Moscow. The thirteen corps of this Red Army now had control of 127 of the 773 districts in the southern provinces and were expanding into more. Numerically, the army reached 62,000 fighters, with additional volunteer Red Guards (workers in cities) and peasant organizations. In most areas there were soviet forms of government, which had peasant support because of the policy of confiscating land and property of exploiters and counter-revolutionaries, who were tried by revolutionary tribunals of the Red Army. The goals of the "Chinese Soviet Congress" were stated as to work to overthrow Nanking and to place the power in the hands of the peasants, workers, and soldiers.[33]

A quite different view was provided by a Review of Reviews editorial, which erroneously portrayed the southern communists as receiving Russian supplies "shipped by a Soviet volunteer fleet from Vladivostok." It also showed the influence of virulent anti-communists in reporting that the program of the communists included death to all opponents of communism, all wealthy and socially undesirable persons, plus the incurably diseased and the aged poor. Overpopulation was supposed to be thought of as China's greatest problem. The

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33. Literary Digest, July 26, 1930, p. 14. This is possibly a reference to the "Congress of Delegates from Soviet Areas" which had met that May in Shanghai.

editorial closed with the statement that the Nationalists still had the upper hand, as the people wanted only to be left alone.[34]

CHANGSHA

By July, 1930, the communists had been out of power for two and a half years, during which they had been preparing again to foment a revolution. Although they were making many gains among the peasantry, the party line still insisted that the real basis of revolution would be the proletariat, or the workers in the cities. The Pravda article mentioned above had echoes of this belief.[35] Boasting of the gains made by the Red Army in rural regions, it found proof in those victories that "the proletarian revolution is bound to win in China."[36] Thus when a favorable situation appeared, and local Kuomintang forces were withdrawn to help fight the northern rebel generals, an attack was planned and executed on the city of Changsha, in Hunan and not far from the rebel areas. The city was taken on July 27, 1930, and held until August 5.

The capture of Changsha brought an increased interest in China in the American periodical press, though not nearly to the degree caused by the May 30th incident six years earlier. Seven magazines-- five weeklies and two monthlies-- spoke of the affair within a month and a half. Although America, the first to mention the incident, was by this time convinced that the armies wandering about that part of China were truly communist, all other periodicals hesitated to make a definite statement to this effect. Whereas correspondents from China were said to use the "red" label, Time and the Outlook noted that the United States Department of State yet put quotation marks around "communist" when referring to the city's attackers. The latter remarked that "a few red placards do not necessarily mean the Third International" and opined that this "so-called Red Army" was composed of "descendents of Robin Hood, not Lenin." The New Republic, too, found examples of "something different from what is generally meant by Communism, especially in Moscow," but stated that there was "no doubt that Communists are at least participating...." It seemed logical that they should. Another expression of doubt came from the editor of the Nation, who gave the opinion that although "the Third International openly claims them as its own..., it is doubtful whether the ragged soldiers have any inkling of the gospel of Nikolai Lenin." He, too, suggested that there was some similarity to the "primitive communism" of Robin Hood in these farm boys made soldiers, then released to drift until someone organized them. Of such, he said, was the legendary peasant army. But the roots of communism were weak in the hinterland and strongest in the port cities; and the editor echoed party line when he added that it was in these coast cities that the decisive battles of China's revolution would be fought.[37]

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[34] Review of Reviews LXXXII (Aug., 1930), 78.

[35] For party line during this period and the attempts to carry it out, see Schwartz, Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao, pp. 126-143.

[36] Literary Digest, July 26, 1930, p. 14.

World headlines about the uprising, viewed by the Literary Digest, repeated many of the doubts and convictions expressed above. Some saw the hand of Russia there, again acting to humiliate the western nations. Others felt that the "red" label might simply be a handy tool for the anti-communists. An entirely different idea appeared in Current History, whose columnist saw as too easy the retaking of Changsha by Nationalist troops. Could it be possible that the Nationalists had planned the incident, hoping to rid themselves of foreigners and to be able to blame it on the communists?[38]

Details of the period when Changsha was held were not easily learned. Current History's columnist remarked that the correspondents in Shanghai worked only on rumors and that to get an authentic account of communist activities was impossible. All sources giving any details at all remarked that the attacking army looted the city, though it was recorded in Current History that returning government troops had also engaged in this activity.[39] An estimate of the number of Chinese executed by the Reds was 2,000, with more said to have been kidnapped.[40] The communists were reported to have extorted a ransom for the city from its officials.[41] Tales differed as to the amount of destruction brought about. Public buildings were said to have been destroyed, as well as business establishments and missions. Only Yale-in-China was stated by all to have been spared, though some accounts said that the Standard Oil refineries were also untouched.[42] Names of the army leaders were not known, though the Literary Digest named Li Li-san as president of the soviets.[43] The strength of the Reds was estimated at 10,000, augmented by deserters from the "defending" garrison.[44] No communist slogans or banners were reported seen or heard, and no communist government believed to have been set up in the city.[45] Foreigners escaped harm as gunboats on the Hsiang River picked them up and carried them to safety.[46]

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[37] America, Aug. 9, 1930, p. 412; ibid., Aug. 16, 1930, p. 436; Time, Aug. 11, 1930, p. 28; Outlook, Aug. 20, 1930, pp. 613-614; New Republic, Aug. 13, 1930, pp. 353-354; ibid., Aug. 20, 1930, p. 3; Nation, Aug. 13, 1930, p. 165.

[38] Literary Digest, Aug. 16, 1930, pp. 8-9; Harold Quigley in Current History XXXII (Sept., 1930), 1234.

[39] Ibid. (Oct., 1930), 158-159; America, Aug. 9, 1930, p. 412; ibid., Aug. 16, 1930, p. 436; Time, Aug. 11, 1930, p. 28; Nation, Aug. 13, 1930, p. 165; Literary Digest, Aug. 16, 1930, p. 8; Outlook, Aug. 20, 1930, p. 613.

After the Nationalists had retaken Changsha, it was expected that the communists would continue upriver to the Wuhan cities, which were put under closer guard. However,

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40. America, Aug. 16, 1930, p. 436; Harold Quigley in Current History XXXII (Oct., 1930), 159.
41. America, Aug. 16, 1930, p. 436; Outlook, Aug. 20, 1930, p. 613.
42. America, Aug. 9, 1930, p. 412; ibid., Aug. 16, 1930, p. 436; Literary Digest, Aug. 16, 1930, p. 8.
43. Ibid. Li Li-san was at the head of the Chinese communists at this time, though he was to be made scapegoat for the failure to keep Changsha. His name was not familiar to readers of American periodicals, having appeared only once before, at the time the communists left Hankow. Vincent Sheean, "Moscow and the Chinese Revolution," Asia XXXVII (Dec., 1927), 1007. P'eng Teh-huai's leadership of the attacking forces was known within months.
44. America, Aug. 9, 1930, p. 412.
45. Time, Aug. 11, 1930, p. 28; Outlook, Aug. 20, 1930, p. 613.
46. America, Aug. 9, 1930, p. 412; Literary Digest, Aug. 16, 1930, p. 8.

this one urban failure was enough; and the Red Army, failing an attempt to retake Changsha, withdrew to the countryside, continuing its activities in the rural areas. Changsha's governor instigated a new seizure, with torture and execution, of communist suspects; and communists were executed in other areas as well, as warnings. Foreigners were cautioned to stay out of the Hunan region, and consulates and businesses in Changsha were closed.[47]

As in previous months, America showed the most interest in these developments. However, articles about the communists in China began to appear soon in other magazines. One, by Agnes Smedley, an American journalist very sympathetic toward the communists, was printed in the New Republic in early September with the notation that it was especially interesting in view of the recent happenings on the Yangtze. It was devoted to an exposé of the way rich landowners exploited the peasantry in central China, especially those who used the communist bogey as an excuse for persecuting any and all peasants who dared oppose them. It suggested that there was sufficient reason for the peasantry to unite and rise against the status quo.[48]

One of the most complete coverages of the Chinese communists appeared just a month after the Changsha attack,

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47. America, Aug. 16, 1930, p. 436; ibid., Aug. 23, 1930, p. 460; ibid., Aug. 30, 1930, p. 484; ibid., Sept. 6, 1930, p. 508.
48. Agnes Smedley, "Peasants and Lords in China," New Republic, Sept. 3, 1930, pp. 69-71. Other suggestions that there were reasons besides Bolshevism for the attack were found in ibid., Aug. 20, 1930, p. 3, and Literary Digest, Aug. 16, 1930, p. 8.

though written a few weeks before it, in the Nation. Its author, Maxwell S. Stewart, was an instructor in sociology at Yenching University, near Peking. Stewart announced to his readers that communism, though dealt what seemed a death blow in 1927, was once again a factor with which to reckon in China. Indeed, it was perhaps stronger than before, as the present movement seemed indigenous, where before it had been directed by Russian advisors, whom the masses were unable to trust. Now it might use Russian tactics, but it apparently received no Russian aid.

Perhaps one-twentieth of the entire population of China, said Stewart, now governed themselves through local organizations resembling soviets. Most of these were peasants, but they included an army said to number 100,000, and "reputed to be reasonably effective." There were also perhaps five million laborers in China who belonged to communist-led unions. Rising costs without corresponding wage increases were adding to communist strength in the cities. For an example of this strength, in Shanghai alone there were 119 magazines and periodicals of the proletarian left wing in circulation; and radicals appeared to be working more or less openly with impunity.

Peasant unrest and peasant revolts were not uncommon in China's past; but the communists had been "quick to utilize the seething discontent of the peasants and have transformed disorganized upheavals into organized revolts of a definitely revolutionary character." Such progress had been made in organization that an "All-China Soviet Congress" had been held in Shanghai on May 30, 1930. Of the fifty-four delegates, eleven had come from district soviets in different regions in central and southern China. Seven came from districts planning to rise and to organize soon. Eighteen were representatives of the "more militant trade unions," and seven were from the Red Army. Others came from left-wing organizations like the Communist Youth League, the Chinese League of Left-wing Writers, and the Anti-Imperialism League. Most were quite young, as ages ranged from sixteen to forty-eight.

Stewart was even able to give the program of the "congress," which discussed the role of soviets in China's political situation. They also passed temporary land and labor laws, as well as regulations for the guidance of soviet organizations, and made decisions on the task and tactics of the Red Army. Their political platform called for an overthrow of imperialism; the socialization of banks, factories and railways; the destruction of militarism; the seizure of land from landlords without compensation; a single tax on land only; freedom of the press, of speech, and of assembly; and self-determination for all minorities within China.

As for the future, Stewart did not feel that the communists, though organized, need present too great a threat. He saw hope for future stability within China and felt that the militarists, if they would stop fighting among themselves, could handle the communists, who were supported by but a small minority. Still, the role of the peasants might have some portent for years to come and should be considered.[49]

A far different approach to the Chinese communists was found in the only other extensive discussion of them to appear in American magazines in the fall of 1930. Rodney Gilbert wrote, for the North American Review, that the summer's action of the communists

> has, in a few months, not only given an effective pause to agriculture, industry, and trade, throwing a native population of perhaps fifty million into a state of hopeless confusion; it has also laid a heavy hand on foreign interests throughout this territory and has wantonly done much damage to mission and other foreign property.

Gilbert's main thesis was the relating of the "butcher, torture, arson and rape" in the regions attacked by communists to Russian plans. This he did by outlining a history of the Soviet maneuvering within China, saying that in 1927 Russian agitators had left the cities and gone "subterranean." He also told of communist attempts in Europe, then of Lenin's turning to Asia, hoping to slow down the industry of the West by closing the East to its trade. The present movement, he said, was to disrupt economic life, which helped explain "why a massacre in Hunan is as highly esteemed by one bureau in Moscow as an American tractor is by another."[50]

Gilbert, who had earlier been classified by an editor as "an out-and-out reactionary in foreign policy, but with enough experience to make his views worth reading,"[51] included in this article both ideas typical of the views of many "old China hands" and information indicating some real knowledge. He provided the first list to appear in American magazines of the Chinese communist leaders, including "Chu Teh, Mao Tze-tung and Pang Teh-kuai," /sic/ whom he described as "politically obscure persons with Russian training whose names mean nothing abroad." He also explained that the center of the communist enterprise lay in the mountains between Kwangtung, Fukien, and Kiangsi, a border area being especially good for outlaw activities in that provincial authority never went beyond its own borders. As officials were content merely to push trouble over to their neighbors and seldom worked together with those neighbors, the Reds could just move back and forth as the pressure came from one province or another.

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[49] Maxwell S. Stewart, "Communism in China," Nation, Aug. 27, 1930, pp. 217-218.

[50] Rodney Gilbert, "Moscow Goads China," North American Review CCXXX (Oct., 1930), 391-392, 397.

The communists, Gilbert went on, while working with the Kuomintang, taught to elements who had nothing to lose, "the semi-criminal rabble of the great cities and the landless countrymen from whom bandits have always been recruited... the kind of Bolshevism that they were capable of understanding." The Chinese characters for "communism" could literally be translated "public wealth idea," and the tenets taught were that the poor could slaughter and loot property owners, that the old were useless and to be exterminated, that alien religions were designed to spread imperialism, and that the women of the rich should go to those who could afford no

[51] Asia XXX (Mar., 1930), 171.

wives. These concepts were carried by disbanded soldiers to the rural districts and by "the floating riff-raff of the cities" from town to town. Thus, when hurt by militarism, banditry, and high taxes, the farmers, coolies, and small merchants were ready to rise. Such was the background of the present raids, in which small bands moved about the countryside, attacked and butchered garrisons to get weapons, killed off the rich and aged, carried off property, kidnapped rich merchants and missionaries for ransom, seized the young women (many of whom became "converts"), and disappeared. Except that they were well organized, they were not unlike the bandits of old.

It seemed to Gilbert that there was "a method in their mad barbarities which reveals that they operate under highly intelligent direction. Their military tactics ... indicate that they march under orders from a master strategist." Unlike Stewart, Gilbert could not believe that the movement was indigenous. He was sure that Vladivostok was "the source of inspiration, orders, money, and of some munitions and supplies" and mentioned evidence from literature seized in raids on communist headquarters in Amoy, Shanghai, and Hong Kong. To clinch the argument, he added,

> If the Russian press did not boast of the activities of its allies among the 'workers and peasants' in China, it would still be too absurd to suggest that these mimicries of Bolshevist abracadabra were spontaneous in Chinese coolies whose vision of the world and world affairs is much that of a Mexican Indian.

In his concluding paragraphs Gilbert gave some indication why the Nationalist government had attempted to have him deported earlier in the year.[52] The Nationalists, he said, helped the communists via "onerous taxation, maladministration, and petty persecution." Their program actually discouraged production and trade. (Admittedly, the world-wide depression was a factor here.) All of this was "like a long fuse leading to world revolution."[53]

For the remainder of 1930, there was only a small amount of information about Chinese communism in American magazines. Depredations continued and were well chronicled by America, with somewhat more interest shown by other periodicals, largely because of the murders of two women missionaries by their kidnappers.[54] In November Chiang's government announced a "Five Point" program, one point of which was to clean up the communists; and an anti-communist program was directed toward south central China.[55] This, however, received less attention than did Chiang's conversion to the Methodist faith, which was seen as a step in the right direction by some, but questioned by the *Christian Century* as perhaps bad for Christianity in China. Might not the communists now link the government's massacres of Reds with Christianity? Others wondered if this might not make an anti-government rallying point for the radicals.[56]

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[52] The Nationalist government, in the summer of 1929, asked the American minister to deport four journalists for "false and malicious reporting" against the Chinese government. Two, Hallett Abend and Charles Dailey, represented American papers in New York and Chicago. Gilbert was described by the Nation as a "dispenser of gloom to various British papers" in China, and George Sokolsky as writing "vitriolically illuminating articles" for a British paper. Extra-territoriality prevented the Chinese government from punishing foreign correspondents for disobeying censorship regulations, and the American minister lacked the power of deportation. The Chinese could and did refuse mailing privileges to particularly annoying papers. Nation, Aug. 21, 1929, p. 186; Harold Quigley in Current History XX (Sept., 1929), 1176; ibid. (Oct., 1929), 202. See also Hallett Abend, My Life in China (New York, 1943), pp. 102-137.

[53] Gilbert, loc. cit., North American Review CXXX (Oct., 1930), 391-399. Gilbert underestimated the Chinese, of course. Very few Comintern advisors were with the Chinese communists after 1927. Though some directions came from Russia, instructions one way and information going the other were often vague. Neither Mao nor P'eng was trained abroad, while Chu received most of his foreign education in Berlin. Gilbert's communist "programs" were exaggerated. His view of the Nationalists was shared by one Italian writer who was quoted as saying they "secretly played into the hands of the communists." Living Age CCCXXXIX (Dec., 1930), 343.

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By late 1930, the Chinese communists, who had slipped from news headlines and almost from sight in 1928,[57] became again an important consideration in the American periodical press, though news coverage was still far below what it had been in 1927. Though there had been some reports of communist activities in the years in between, these had not received much attention, except from the news editor of America, who regularly wrote about the positions of Catholic missionaries in south and central China. Of the three other periodicals who mentioned the depredations in 1928 and 1929, one made passing reference to communist raids; but the other two doubted the "communist" label and preferred to speak of "bandits" who *might* be "red."

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[54] *America*, Nov. 29, 1930, p. 169; *ibid*., Dec. 6, 1930, p. 198; *ibid*., Dec. 13, 1930, p. 222; *ibid*., Dec. 20, 1930, p. 246; *Missionary Review* L (Dec., 1930), 933; Harold Quigley in *Current History* XXXIII (Dec., 1930), 476.

[55] *Ibid*., pp. 475-476.

[56] *Ibid*., p. 475; *Christian Century*, Nov. 5, 1930, pp. 1335-1337; *Outlook*, Nov. 5, 1930, p. 368; *Commonweal*, Nov. 12, 1930, pp. 30-31.

[57] Chinese communism was treated as just history in two short stories in the *Saturday Evening Post* in early 1930. One supposedly took place in the 11th century, the other in 1927. Neither suggested any future for communism in China. F. Britten Austin, "The Red Flag: In Willow Pattern," *Saturday Evening Post*, May 24, 1930, pp. 24-25, 91-98; Austin, "The Red Flag: The Dragon Wakes," *ibid*., Oct. 18, 1930, pp. 26-27, 92-101.

Stepped-up activity in 1930 brought an increase in magazine accounts, with eight periodicals speaking of communist activities in China in the six months before the capture of Changsha. All were willing to use "communist," although a few doubted whether the "communist bandits" had any knowledge of Marx or Lenin. Early reports of the taking of Changsha echoed this disbelief. However, the following months brought more information about Chinese communist organization and activities. The leaders' names were published, though not widely as yet, making the movement appear increasingly Chinese, rather than Russian. By the end of 1930, especially after the Nationalist government began an anti-communist campaign, most writers, though they might doubt the orthodoxy of the Marxism of the majority, were willing to consider that the leaders, at least, were communist, and that most of the Red Army felt itself to be so.[58]

[58] See C. Kuangson Young, "Republican China's Achievements," Current History XXXIII (Nov., 1930), 207-208. Young, a Chinese government official, felt that it was enough that the Chinese communists rallied under the red banner, with direction from Moscow. Whether or not their beliefs paralleled those of Russia was unimportant.

CHAPTER V, 1931-1934

After the Nationalist government began its communist-suppression campaigns, more information about the Chinese communists was printed. The capture of Changsha had made it clear that a great gap existed in the world's knowledge; not enough was known about the city's captors. When the central government set out to crush the rebels, periodicals seemed to feel the need to tell their readers just who it was the Chinese government saw it necessary to suppress and how the situation had developed. As "anti-bandit" campaigns followed one another, interest in and respect for the rebels grew. Completely reliable information about life in "Soviet China" was still almost impossible to obtain, but correspondents made good use of what material they could get.

EARLY ANTI-COMMUNIST CAMPAIGNS

The January, 1931, issue of Current History gathered what information it could find on the communists. The news column devoted to the Far East spoke of the communist movement as gaining momentum despite government efforts to curb it and described communist activities in various provinces--annihilation of Hupei provincial troops, reigns of terror against Honan tax officials, thefts from river pirates in Anhwei, pillaging of towns in Kwangtung, and kidnappings of missionaries. It repeated a Pravda report that the communists held 200 counties, with a population of 30 million and an army of 300,000 (not all of whom were party members, however).[1]

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[1] Harold Quigley in Current History XXXIII (Jan., 1931), 636-637.

That same magazine included two articles by correspondents in China. Edgar Snow, then special correspondent for the New York Sun, discussed the Bolshevist influence, tracing known activities of the Chinese Communist Party since 1927 and averring, "No one doubts that behind the major strategy of the Communist Party in China there is the directing hand of Moscow." He mentioned both Comintern and Moscow-financed trade bulletin exultation over Red gains in China, as well as evidence gathered from captured party members and in consular raids in Manchuria in 1929, as proof that Russia was aiding the Red Chinese.[2]

Reginald Sweetland, correspondent for the Chicago Daily News and author of the companion article to Snow's, did have doubts, however. He traced the attackers of Changsha back to a small "Communist Club" which he believed had flourished in Changsha but a few years before, owing to the indulgence of certain officials. Its members, he said, were aged about sixteen. As founders he listed "Mao Tseh-tung, Chu Teh (now believed to be dead) and Peng Teh-hui," all described as deserters from the provincial army. "Each," he announced, "had a personal grievance and so each became a rebel, cast around for a platform that was not already occupied, collected a few troops, and found himself at the head of a movement that spread like a prairie fire...." Sweetland described Chinese communism as "indigenous to the soil" and the hand of Russia

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2. Edgar Snow, "The Strength of Communism in China: I- The Bolshevist Influence," ibid., pp. 521-525.

as "hard to find," though he thought perhaps the "un-Chinese efficiency" of the movement might possibly be a clue to its presence.

The efficiency to which Sweetland referred was evident in his description of the capture of Changsha under P'eng Teh-huai. The communists, he said, were quite different from the old bandits, who had looted wildly when they took a town. In contrast, the troops at Changsha, though they had also engaged in looting and killing, had had a plan. They saved what they needed. In the case of Changsha, there had been little opposition, and the taking of the city had not been difficult. Once in control, they had moved according to prearrangement. There had been executions, but little wanton murder. Government buildings had been burned, as signs of the old authority; but useful goods had been taken out before the torch was applied. All businesses and factories were preserved for communist use. A municipal government was organized on pre-set lines after all old boundaries, property marks, and title deeds had been destroyed.[3]

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3. Reginald E. Sweetland, "The Strength of Communism in China: II- Banditry in a new Guise," *ibid.*, pp. 526-529. Sweetland's material on Changsha's capture, while not wholly in accord with news articles previously cited, does agree with the account in Agnes Smedley, *China's Red Army Marches* (New York, 1934), pp. 143-162, written from information gathered from Chinese communists and observers of their methods. His "facts" about Mao, Chu, and P'eng are erroneous, except that Mao had been instrumental in the forming of study groups in Changsha, 1917-1920. Snow, *Red Star Over China*, pp. 146, 153-154; Jerome Ch'en, *Mao and the Chinese Revolution* (London, 1965), pp. 56, 72, 73, 78, 376-378.

Snow indicated more interest in the conditions that existed, rather than in any particular incident, as did two other writers whose articles on China and its communists appeared in American magazines that year. William Prohme wrote from the view of one who had been in Hankow, working for the "left wing" of the Kuomintang at the time it had been entrenched in that city; and Dr. A. F. Legendre spoke as an ex-medical missionary. Whereas both Sweetland and Snow attempted to be non-partisan in their reporting, Prohme and Legendre represented definite and opposing viewpoints. The former was very much a liberal, while the latter was characterized by the New Republic's reviewer of his recent book as one who had spent much time in China but had evidently learned nothing there.[4] He was an avid interventionist. Neither Prohme nor Legendre had been in China for the past few years.

Life in the communist areas was a matter of speculation. Snow cited a newspaper issued by the Kiangsi soviets to show that there was an organized government. At the First Soviet District Conference of that province in May, 1930, delegates from villages and industrial areas had gathered in Kian and had adopted a revolutionary program, calling for new land, governmental, tax, and working day regulations, as well as for the confiscation of the property of anti-revolutionary groups. Legendre added that in Tongku, Kiangsi, the Chinese communists operated schools, hospitals, and even a bank with paper money bearing pictures of Marx and Lenin and "forced on the population as legal tender." Snow characterized the leaders only as "well-educated," but Legendre gave examples. New students, he said, were constantly arriving there from France and Russia. Moreover, when a neighboring town had been taken by force, the Reds had carried off its electrical equipment to Tongku, indicating that their numbers included skilled workers and electricians.[5]

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[4] Isidor Schneider, Review of Modern Chinese Civilization, by A. F. Legendre, New Republic, Dec. 18, 1929, p. 116.

The Red Army was characterized by Legendre as armies of bandits. Snow admitted that there were numerous mere outlaws and marauders working in the same areas, but claimed that many in the armies were really communists. Both mentioned that the armies were growing, being augmented by more and more peasants and by deserting Nationalist troops, who brought modern arms and equipment with them. Both also noted that the communist fighters were growing skilled in guerrilla warfare.[6]

None of these four authors overlooked the appeal of the Reds to the local population. This was, indeed, Prohme's main thesis. The conditions of the farmers were bad. They were improved by the Reds. Basing his conclusions largely on the situation as he had seen it in the Yangtze Valley in early 1927, Prohme mentioned the appeal exercized by the

5. Snow, loc. cit., p. 523; A. L. Legendre, "Can Japan Save China?" (from Mercure de France, Paris), Living Age CCCXL (June, 1931), 349. Yet radio sets captured in the first campaign were called the first the communists had seen. Ch'en, op. cit., p. 167.
6. Legendre, loc. cit., Snow, loc. cit., p. 522.

appropriation of the lands of the large landholders, many of whom owned so much property that they needed "small private armies" of rent collectors. He wrote with evident pleasure of the village soviet now existing, without a landlord on its council. Sweetland spoke of the problems caused by incessant civil warfare, high taxes, unemployment, irresponsible government, profiteering, and floods. The Nationalists had made promises about improvements, but these were unfulfilled. He suggested, "Soviet ideas may have influenced some of the leaders, but the great mass of their followers need look no further than the end of their own village street... to see that any change suggested by the slogan shouters must be for the better." Snow, too, listed these difficulties, adding that of usury, and regretted that the Nationalists had not met the problem with proper legislation. Legendre suggested hatred of Nationalist soldiers as another reason for the peasants' preferring the "bandits."[7]

These points were constantly reiterated in the early months of 1931. As the first and second campaigns against the Reds met with varying degrees of failure, editors and other writers realized that, though the military moves had begun with high hopes, all was not going well with the Nationalist forces.[8] Armies got surrounded by communists and

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7. William Prohme, "Soviet China," *New Republic*, Aug. 12, 1931, pp. 334-334; Sweetland, *loc. cit.*, p. 527; Snow, *loc. cit.*, p. 525; Legendre, *loc. cit.*, pp. 349-350.
8. There seems considerable disagreement as to the number of communist-suppression campaigns waged between 1930 and 1934, as well as to the dates for each. Edgar Snow, in *Red Star Over China*, pp. 183-186, quoted Mao that

either were captured by or defected to the enemy. An unransomed Nationalist commander was tortured to death. Peasants helped the rebels. The Reds had no organized base of supplies which could be attacked. Their forces could disintegrate and melt into the farm population in the face of a large attack, then reform later in full strength.[9] On May 20, 1931, a strengthening of Nationalist government censorship was announced;[10] and news seemed better after that, with the government troops reported to be making headway.[11] However, an occasional release indicated that this was not completely the case, and T. V. Soong was quoted as saying that the government had first to remove the causes of

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there were five campaigns. He himself thought the number was right, though the dates he gave (Dec., 1930-Jan., 1931; May-June, 1931; July-Oct., 1931; Apr.-Oct., 1933; and Oct., 1933-Oct., 1934) did not exactly correspond with Mao's reminiscenses. Chiang Kai-shek, in *Soviet Russia in China* (New York, 1957), pp. 62-64, also spoke of five campaigns, but placed one in 1932. A Kuomintang book on the campaigns, issued in 1934, mentioned three campaigns in 1931-- in Feb., June, and Sept. T'ang Leang-li, *Suppressing Communist-Banditry in China* (Shanghai, 1934), pp. 40-54. John King Fairbank lists one campaign in 1931, two in 1932, and one each in 1933 and 1934. *The United States and China* (Cambridge, 1961), p. 234. Contemporary writers were as uncertain, some speaking of a sixth campaign in 1933, another calling the 1934 push the third. Snow claimed that offensive and defensive campaigns were confused; and with constant warfare going on, it is evident that one campaign melted into another.

[9] *Time*, Jan. 19, 1931, p. 21; *America*, Jan. 31, 1931, p. 394; *ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1931, p. 442; *Literary Digest*, Feb. 28, 1931, p. 16; *ibid.*, Apr. 11, 1931, p. 13; Harold Quigley in *Current History* XXXIII (Mar., 1931), 960; *ibid.*, XXXIV (May., 1931), 317-318; *ibid.* (Aug., 1931), 796.

[10] *Ibid.*

[11] *America*, Aug. 1, 1931, p. 386; *ibid.*, Aug. 8, 1931, p. 410; *ibid.*, Aug. 22, 1931, p. 458; *ibid.*, July 18, 1931, p. 377; Harold Quigley in *Current History* XXXIV (Sept., 1931), 954.

communism before it could hope to extirpate it.[12]

Meanwhile, the anti-communist campaigns were extended to the cities, also. Raids staged in April, in anticipation of May Day troubles, on Communist Party headquarters in the International Settlement at Shanghai yielded, not only prisoners, but more information about the communists. Reporters were astounded at the revelation of the existence of a "Kiangsu Soviet Provincial Government" (Kiangsu province is the location of Shanghai), as well as by other items uncovered: arms, ammunition, artillery range-finders, printing presses, leaflets and documents, bookbinders, type, printing paper, electric batteries, and lists of party members and officials.[13]

Executions of the communists arrested in this period were reported factually by some periodicals, but with great condemnation by the New Republic. This magazine had shifted perceptibly in its views of the Nanking government during the previous year or so. From a position supporting that government, it had turned to decrying its moves and complaining about its ineffectiveness. This change may have been due in part to the coming to its editorial staff of Malcolm Cowley, known as a "pink" if never a real communist in the thirties. Cowley contributed a "human interest" version of the killing of one group to his magazine in July, 1931, giving in detail the horror of the executions and remarking, "A vigorous and hopeful generation is being butchered off."[14]

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[12] New Republic, Aug. 26, 1931, p. 29; Harold Quigley in Current History XXXIV (Sept., 1931), 955.

[13] Time, Apr. 27, 1931, p. 23; Literary Digest, May 2, 1931, p. 14; Quigley in Current History XXXIV (June, 1931), 479.

Meanwhile, the Nationalist government was faced with more opposition. A group of anti-Chiang Kuomintang members made news headlines in the late spring, when they set up a separate government in Canton. With the communists between them and the central government, the Cantonese were neither able to begin a new Northern Expedition nor open to an attack.[15] Natural disasters, in the form of floods, also increased China's difficulties. Though the Nationalists tried to make use of the opportunity to discredit the communists by accusing them of breaking the dikes, little was accomplished this way. The floods increased the feeling of discontent on which the communists thrived; the dike-breaking accusation was dismissed as immaterial, even if true, as the waters were too high for the dikes anyway; and adverse publicity came to the Nationalists because of their supposedly turning flooded-out peasants away from the cities on the excuse that they might be communist.[16]

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14. Ibid.; America, June 27, 1931, p. 266; New Republic, June 17, 1931, p. 109; Malcolm Cowley, "Twenty-four Youngsters," ibid., July 8, 1931, pp. 205-206. Cowley's name first appeared in the list of editors on Mar. 26, 1930, in a period when the magazine was saying little about China. Its praises for the Nanking regime had all come before that date. Most of his work was of a literary nature.
15. Time, May 11, 1931, p. 24; ibid., June 8, 1931, p. 27; Christian Century, June 24, 1931, p. 828; Harold Quigley in Current History XXIV (Aug., 1931), 794-796; Outlook, Aug. 12, 1931, p. 456. In time, the Canton government was to cooperate with Nanking, then to fade from importance.
16. America, July 18, 1931, p. 337; ibid., Aug. 8, 1931, p. 410; ibid., Aug. 22, 1931, p. 458; ibid., Sept. 12, 1931, p. 530; Outlook, Aug. 12, 1931, p. 456; New Republic, Sept. 9, 1931, p. 87; ibid., Sept. 23, 1931, p. 138.

JAPAN IN MANCHURIA

On September 19, 1931, a small explosion on the South Manchurian Railway provided an excuse for the Japanese army, which had been guarding this Japanese investment, to move into areas beyond the railroad zone. Within months, all of Manchuria was under Japan's domination; and by March of 1932, a separate state of "Manchukuo" had been set up there, nominally headed by the last Manchu emperor, but actually controlled by the Japanese.

The "Manchurian Incident" and its aftermath absorbed most of the news from the Far East for months thereafter. The communist-suppression campaigns were not only wiped from the headlines by this new occurrence, they were also called to a halt in order that the Japanese threat might be faced.

Although it was only a very minor theme in the over-all picture, there was a small amount of discussion linking the Japanese aggression to communism-- or rather, to anti-communism. In May, 1931, the Living Age had told of editorials in foreign-owned Chinese papers, arguing that Japan might attempt to extend its power over China by pretending to be checking Russia. Dr. Legendre, in his article mentioned earlier, had proposed that this might be a good idea, that Japan was the best counterpoise to Bolshevism in China. He suggested that the other powers prepare to back Japan "in its resistance to Bolshevist barbarism." In fact, Japan should be given a mandate to reinstate order in all of China.[17]

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17. Living Age CCXL (May, 1931), 229; Legendre, loc. cit. (June, 1931), pp. 351-354. See also A. L. Legendre,

In part because of Chang Tso-lin's earlier policy of active anti-communism, Manchuria at this time had but a small amount of reported communist activity; and authorities were attempting to prevent Bolshevism from gaining a foothold there. In recent years, since China had been in upheaval, many Chinese, both peasants and more prosperous individuals, had migrated to the three eastern provinces to start life anew in a relatively undeveloped area. (The Manchus had forbidden Chinese migration to Manchuria; and as a consequence, this section, rich in minerals and agricultural potential, had been developed slowly.) It was reported in mid-1931 that Manchurian officials had initiated a system of search and oral examination for all entering Manchuria, hoping to guard against Communist infiltration.[18] There were a few hints that Japan regarded these migrants as definite problems. The *Living Age*'s editor evidently thought so. In November he remarked that Japan had been "more activated by fear than by any other emotion," with Chinese "pouring into Manchuria," communism spreading in China, and Russians still in control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. A month later he added that Japan was *legally* correct in China, by the terms of the 1915 treaties, that it had attacked to halt the growth of the U.S.S.R. and Bolshevism, and that some Europeans were hoping

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"The Menace of Red Asia" (from *Le Figaro*, Paris), *ibid*. CCCXLIII (June, 1932), 300-302; and *ibid*. CCCXLIII (Oct., 1932), 104.

[18] *America*, July 25, 1931, p. 362. For conversations with Chinese fleeing warfare for peace in Manchuria, see Nora Waln, "Letters from China," *Atlantic Monthly* CXL (Nov., 1927), 708.

Russia would thus be involved in a fatal war.[19]

The evangelist Sherwood Eddy viewed the Japanese aggression from another angle. On a trip to China during early 1932, he wrote back of his alarm at the "ominous growth of communist sentiment among the student classes" and feared that China might go communist. For the Christian Century he wrote that Japan's move was threatening the world (and Japan) in that it could conceivably bring about the fall of the Nanking government. If this happened, he said, the result could not but be the triumph of communism in China.[20] Thus Japan was aiding the Bolsheviks, not attacking them. One Chinese writer claimed that Russia was, instead, helping the Japanese. He suspected a Russo-Japanese agreement whereby the Chinese communists, as Russian puppets, were expanding their activities to break down Nanking's resistance to Japan. He quoted as proof a joint statement to that effect by 243 Chinese ex-communists.[21]

One farther linkage of the Japanese invasion of

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[19] Living Age CCCXLI (Nov., 1931), 198-199; ibid. (Dec., 1931), 283-284. The 1915 treaties (the "Twenty-one Demands") had been particularly unpopular in China. Though agreed to by the Peking government, they were never ratified by a Chinese parliament. For more on Japan's fears of communism, see G. Warren Heath, "China Plays the Innocent," Current History XXXVI (Sept., 1932), 682-683. For a report that powerful groups in London were secretly encouraging the Japanese, hoping to stop Russia, see Jonathan Mitchell, "Catastrophe in Siberia," New Republic, June 8, 1932, p. 90.

[20] Christian Century, Jan. 6, 1932, p. 105; Sherwood Eddy, "Japan Threatens the World," ibid., Mar. 16, 1932, p. 347.

[21] Living Age CCCXLII (May, 1932), 198. The writer was cited as Paul K. Whang, of the China Weekly Review. His thesis had been rejected by that paper's editor, but printed to show the extent of communism in the country.

Manchuria to communism or Russia came from the Japanese Foreign Minister. Current History quoted Count Uchida Yasuya's speech to the House of Peers of the Imperial Diet on the occasion of the opening of a special session of the diet on August 25, 1932. In it he recounted the problems of Manchuria and the reasons for the establishment of Manchukuo. He emphasized a desire on the part of Japan to help China and stated that Manchukuo could "serve as a good example for the rehabilitation of China proper," where disturbances in domestic administration, "coupled with rampant activities of communist bandits throughout an extensive area... is casting a gloomy shadow on the path of the Nationalist government." The Nation later referred to this as an indication that Japan meant "to establish a virtual protectorate over the whole of Asia" and to guard against the spread of communism in the Yangtze Valley.[22]

SOVIET CHINA

There had been almost no mention of the Chinese communists in the months after the Japanese moved into Manchuria, but in January of 1932 they began to be discussed again. The New Republic announced "renewed reports of activity by radicals who are vaguely described as Communist and some of whom undoubtably deserve this appellation." Current History's news columnist of that month also spoke of the "reappearance of communism" in China. He reported knowledge of a manifesto

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22. Uchida Yasuya, Speech to the House of Peers, Aug. 25, 1932, Current History XXXVIII (Oct., 1932), 126-128; Nation, Feb. 1, 1933, pp. 105-106.

calling the "First National Soviet Congress" to assemble in southeastern Kiangsi. Delegates from all China were expected to attend. It was his impression that communism was not so strong in China as it had been six months earlier.[23]

Actually, the communists were in a period of growth. The most recent campaign against them had netted the Red Army a goodly supply of captured arms and ammunition. Mao himself later said that the campaign had been a failure for the Nationalists even before the Japanese attack.[24] The communists had reaped propaganda benefits among the people from the incident in Manchuria by denouncing Japan within days. The fact was overlooked by American magazines-- as was a formal declaration of war against Japan and a call for Chinese unity against the invader, issued the following spring after Japanese had fought Chinese in Shanghai. The First All-China Soviet Congress, mentioned above, had been held in Juichin, Kiangsi, in November, 1931. Its members had formally established a Chinese Soviet Republic with its center in Juichin. Neither was well enough known to be reported in American magazines until May, 1932, when the Living Age made a reference to "The Central Provisional Government of the Soviet Republic of China." This government was mentioned but twice more that year.[25]

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23. New Republic, Jan. 20, 1932, p. 253; Ralph Norem in Current History XXXV (Jan., 1932), 634.
24. Snow, Red Star Over China, p. 184.
25. Living Age CCCXLII (May, 1932), 198; S. S. Lautenschlager, "Is China Going Communist?" Christian Century, Oct. 5, 1932, p. 1195; George Sokolsky, "The Red Armies of China," Asia XXXII (Dec., 1932), 659.

From early 1932 to early in 1933 the Chinese communists were discussed in the American periodical press in numerous editorials and a few articles, perhaps slightly more often than in each of the preceding years, but with less to unify the references. No event of world-wide interest, such as the Sino-Soviet dispute over Manchuria, the capture of a large city like Changsha, or the Mukden incident and succeeding Japanese warfare, served to affect the tone of news reports. Lesser incidents within China seemed to interest different editors or different correspondents at different times.

Red uprisings and assaults of villages continued, but again only *America*'s news editor thought to comment periodically on these. Some debate yet continued as to whether groups giving trouble were really communists or just old-style bandits. The editor of the *Living Age* remarked that papers all over the world still classed the two together, yet so many spoke of the communists as having seized political power in large areas that it was difficult to see how they could be called outlaws. The *New Republic* solved that difficulty in part when it reported that the soviet districts were as yet divided and unable to organize completely and that some bandit leaders found it useful to pose as communists. George Sokolsky noted later in the year that the communist label was often applied to any criminal in China, be he a bandit or a rebel, a critic of the regime, or a follower of a general with many troops.[26] This confusion was evident late in the spring of 1932 when the city of Changchow, in Fukien province, was captured. The army taking it was variously described as communist or in sympathy with communists, or as directed by a general either loyal to Feng Yü-hsiang or out to save the Kuomintang and China.[27]

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[26] *America*, Mar. 26, 1932, p. 586; *ibid*., Apr. 2, 1932,

Nathaniel Peffer did not believe that the Chinese were really communists. Communism was an anomaly in China, he said in a Current History article; and it was highly unlikely that the country would go communist, even though large parts of it were under a soviet form of government. The movement by that name was a mass movement, and such never got far in China. The Chinese peasant, who had "learned to bend to the wind," was quite willing to take the land and food offered by the leaders; but this was not communism like that in Russia, because the latter had a philosophy, a program, and an organization. Few in China knew what communism was about. They could overthrow, but not build. Moscow would not recognize as communist any state which they might set up. The situation was more similar to the peasant uprisings of the middle ages. Time, however, claimed that most of the

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p. 610; ibid., Apr. 30, 1932, p. 76; ibid., May 14, 1932, p. 125; ibid., July 23, 1932, p. 364; Living Age CCCXLII (May, 1932), pp. 197-198; New Republic, June 22, 1932, p. 137; George E. Soklosky, "Communism Under Four Flags," New Outlook CLXI (Nov., 1932), 27.

[27] America, Apr. 30, 1932, p. 76; ibid., May 7, 1932, p. 100; Time, May 2, 1932, p. 21; New Republic, May 4, 1932, p. 310; Harold Quigley in Current History XXXVI (June, 1932), 373. The general was not red, but Mao claimed the troops were communist. Snow, Red Star Over China, 185. Had the Reds taken this city, they would have had their route to the sea.

leaders in China were real communists who had studied abroad, though it might be that their followers did not understand communist principles; and the Literary Digest provided the information that Leninist schools had been set up in the Soviets.[28] Presumably the followers could learn communism.

In the November issue of the New Outlook, Sokolsky compared communists in five countries, including China. After noting the differences, he concluded that the forces of nationalism were too great ever to permit communists anywhere to become true internationalists. The New Republic agreed that there were differences in kinds of communism, claiming that many westerners were presently emphasizing the differences in the Russian and the Chinese varieties, to the advantage of the latter.[29]

Much more common, at least in American magazines, were favorable comments about the soviet regime in China as compared with that of the Nationalists. A document found the year before in Kiangsi had provided a list of rules for agrarian revolution:

1) overthrow gentry rule, arm peasants
2) confiscate gentry land, give it to peasants
3) divide up temple and other private properties
4) reserve land for soldiers
5) void mortgages, burn title deeds
6) establish a single tax
7) reconstruct farm lands, irrigation systems
8) establish farmers' banks and cooperatives.[30]

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28. Nathaniel Peffer, "The Chinese Idea of Communism," Current History XXXVI (July, 1932), 400-404; Time, Aug. 15, 1932, p. 15; Literary Digest, Nov. 12, 1932, p. 12.
29. Sokolsky, loc. cit., New Outlook CLXI (Nov., 1932), 30-31; New Republic, Aug. 17, 1932, p. 3.
30. Quigley in Current History XXXIV (Sept., 1931), 955 (summary).

Writers spoke admiringly of these aims, as well as of the emancipation of women and the establishment of schools and factories in communist areas.[31] The New Republic found it praiseworthy that the system was comparatively free from graft. Time commented favorably on the draft system, which required only one of a farmer's sons, if he had more than two, to join the Red Army. The soldier's pay was sent home to his father, thus preserving the family system. Sokolsky noted that lapses in communist ideology were permitted in order to win the support of the masses. Private property, for example, was not abolished, but encouraged with land redistribution.[32] There were admitted to be grounds for complaints against the Reds. They did, said the New Republic, confiscate property and, at times, behead good people. However, the Nationalists did the same-- and often killed many more.[33]

The Nationalist soldiers were frequently compared with the Red Army; and the latter, whose successes depended to a large extent of the support of the common people, usually came out ahead. Their indoctrination included rules for thoughtfulness and consideration of the local population, while the Nationalists were accused of unnecessary cruelties toward suspected communists or those believed to have helped the Reds, as well as of a propensity to loot civilians. The American director of flood relief was reported to have said that he was hindered in his activities by three groups: bandits, Kuomintang soldiers, and communists. Of these, the communists had divided what they captured with the people, while the others had simply looted.[34]

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[31] New Republic, May 4, 1932, p. 310; ibid., Aug. 17, 1932, pp. 2-3; Time, Aug. 15, 1932, p. 15; Literary Digest, May 21, 1932, p. 14; George Sokolsky, loc. cit., Asia XXXII (Dec., 1932), 658.

[32] New Republic, Aug. 17, 1932, p. 3; Time, Aug. 15, 1932, p. 15; Sokolsky, loc. cit., Asia XXXII (Dec., 1932), 658. See also Hamilton Butler, "American Delusions about China," American Mercury XXVIII (Jan., 1933), 110.

[33] New Republic, May 4, 1932, p. 310.

Also remarked on was great difference in *esprit de corps*. It was often said that the Kuomintang troops did not wish to fight the communists. During 1932, a number of Nationalist divisions or battalions "were defeated by Communist troops... and prudently deserted to the Communist side." Some joined the Red Army. Others later returned to their homes. It was thus that the communists gathered most of their guns and other equipment. Such desertions had never been uncommon among Chinese armies. Whole armies, with their commanders, had frequently changed sides in the quarrels between warlords. However, such action was rare in western experience, and American writers seldom failed to mention it when it occurred. It was claimed that the communists, whose indoctrination was similar to that given earlier to Kuomintang armies in Canton, did not lose armies by desertion. Captured Red troops were more likely to be shot than persuaded to defect.[35]

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[34] *Ibid.*; Tyler Dennett in *Current History* XXXVI (Sept., 1932), 759; *Time*, Sept. 19, 1932, p. 17; S. S. Lautenschlager, *loc. cit.*, *Christian Century*, Oct. 5, 1932, p. 1196.

[35] *Time*, Aug. 15, 1932, p. 15; Soklesky, *loc. cit.*, *New Outlook* CXLI (Nov., 1932), p. 29; *Living Age* CCCXLII (May, 1932), 198; *America*, July 23, 1932, p. 364;

Writers also noticed that the local peasantry lent assistance to the communist troops, and made attempts to describe the guerrilla tactics which the Chinese Reds were then developing-- and for which they later were to become famous. The *New Republic* said that the failures of the first three communist-suppression campaigns had been the result of the inability of the Nationalist armies, trained to fight in the field, to cope with the communist hit-and-run tactics. It was noted that the communists avoided pitched battles, that their soldiers might well work the fields by day, then hide at a roadside at night, ambushing supply trains, capturing small detachments, or spreading propaganda amongst the Kuomintang forces. Even teenagers, both boys and girls, were used in the Red armies, as messengers if not as fighters.[36]

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ibid., Aug. 13, 1932, p. 436; *ibid*., Aug. 20, 1932, p. 461; *New Republic*, July 27, 1927, p. 272; *ibid*., Aug. 17, 1932, p. 2; S. S. Lautenschlager, *loc. cit*.; *Literary Digest*, Nov. 12, 1932, p. 12; Sokolsky, *loc. cit*., *Asia* XXXII (Dec., 1932), 658. Individual defection to the Kuomintang were not uncommon, however.

[36] *New Republic*, July 27, 1932, p. 272; *Literary Digest*, Nov. 12, 1932, p. 12; *ibid*., May 21, 1932, p. 14. Among those receiving most attention for his espousal of the cause of the soviets was Harold Isaacs, editor of the *China Forum*, Shanghai. This magazine, described by one writer as "an incendiary and vituperative six-page weekly devoted to 'red' propaganda" and by an editor as a "Shanghai weekly with communist affiliations," came quickly to the notice of the Nanking officials, who demanded its suppression. As an American, Isaacs enjoyed the privileges of extraterritoriality; and the consul in Shanghai had to refer to Washington. Isaacs was subsequently warned to change his editorial policy. Not only the government, but the whole Shanghai community, was upset by his paper. Tyler Dennett in *Current History* XXXVI (Sept., 1932), 758-759; *Living Age* CCCXLIII (Aug., 1932), 479; *ibid*. (Oct., 1932), 105. Isaacs later wrote *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, first published in 1938, and often described as "Trotskyist." In 1934 appeals for support for this magazine, the "only radical

Estimates of the size and strength of the Chinese communist areas often seemed to be educated guesswork. Once a figure was stated as a fact by someone who might know, it would appear again and again in editorials and articles. Thus communist armed might, numbered at 100,000 just before the attack on Changsha, was considered that until the China Forum, Shanghai, set the figure at 150,000 in a special edition in May of 1932. Most writers used that figure in the next few months, though Sokolsky preferred to count only 90,000.[37] A reader could never be sure just who was included in any given number, either. The Red Army did not compose the entire communist fighting strength. Different magazines mentioned other fighting groups. The Literary Digest in May, 1932, cited a Moscow monthly that forty to sixty percent of the Red Army was made up of young persons, including girls. Youth was also organized into a Union of Young Communists and into the Young Guards. Six months later that periodical, this time getting its information from Pravda, mentioned the Young Pioneers, who were children under fifteen, and the Red Partisans and Red Guards, volunteer groups of peasants and workers, who might also take part in battles.[38] Nor was there definite

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labor journal in Shanghai," appeared in two American periodicals. T. A. Bisson, letters in New Republic, Mar. 14, 1934, p. 133; Nation, Mar. 21, 1934, p. 332.

[37] Maxwell S. Stewart, "Communism in China," Nation, Aug. 27, 1930, p. 217; New Republic, June 22, 1932, p. 136; Time, Aug. 15, 1932, p. 15; Literary Digest, Aug. 27, 1932, p. 13; Tyler Dennett in Current History XXXVI (Sept., 1932), 759; Sokolsky, loc. cit., Asia XXXII (Dec., 1932), 658.

[38] Literary Digest, May 21, 1932, p. 14; ibid., Nov. 12, 1932, p. 12.

data available about the composition of the army. One writer said that there were four Red armies with 60,000 troops, plus a number of smaller armies. Sokolsky claimed that there were twelve armies under the command of Chu Teh and Ho Lung, the general who had led uprisings in the Yangtze Valley in 1927. Another source stated that the Reds had an eighteen-division army.[39]

Also a topic of discussion were the arms of the communists. How well supplied were the Reds? How modern was their equipment, and where did they get it? The China Forum mentioned above was also quoted as saying that less than 100,000, or just over half, of the communist soldiers had rifles. Many were armed with spears and pitchforks. The army possessed between forty and fifty machine guns. Other sources called the army well trained and well equipped or indicated that they also possessed anti-aircraft weapons. This equipment was said to come with defecting Nationalist troops or to have been bought from unpaid Kuomintang soldiers who needed the money. Sokolsky claimed that some equipment was manufactured at an arsenal in Kiangsi and some was smuggled in from Indochina. The greatest need of the communists, he said, was an outlet to the sea.[40]

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39. S. S. Lautenschlager, loc. cit., Christian Century, Oct. 5, 1932, p. 1195; Sokolsky, loc. cit., Asia XXXII (Dec., 1932), 658.

40. Ibid.; Argonaut, Aug. 5, 1932, p. 3; New Republic, June 22, 1932, p. 136; Time, Aug. 15, 1932, p. 15; Literary Digest, Nov. 12, 1932, p. 12. The May, 1932, China Forum was a special edition, denouncing the Nationalist government and providing a favorable picture of the soviets. It was reprinted as Five Years of Kuomintang Reaction (Shanghai, 1932).

As for lands held and people controlled by the soviets, estimates again were vague. The center of activity was always put in Kiangsi province; and it was generally accepted that there were also strong soviet areas in Fukien, Hupei, Hunan, Honan, Anhwei, Kwangtung, and Chekiang provinces, with smaller enclaves elsewhere. Sokolsky also listed two areas in Manchuria, where anti-Bolshevism had been greatest-- one near Siberia, one near Korea. Documents seized in a raid in Shanghai in April of 1931 claimed that fifty million happy people now lived under the soviet regime; and the figure, if not the adjective, was often quoted. The New Republic indicated how vague were some ideas on the subject by estimating a red-governed population of thirty to ninety million at one point. Another source put the figure at seventy-five million.[41]

William Prohme had estimated that soviet territory equalled that of France. The New Republic on May 5, 1932, guessed this to include between 100 and 300 thousand square miles.[42] Other writers spoke in terms of hsien or Chinese districts (or counties), which could have meant little to most readers. Snow, for example, told in early 1931 that the Reds controlled fifty-five of eighty-three counties in

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[41] Sokolsky, loc. cit., Asia XXXII (Dec., 1932), 658; Time, Apr. 27, 1931, p. 23; Harold Quigley in Current History XXXIV (June, 1931), 479; Prohme, loc. cit., p. 334; New Republic, May 4, 1932, p. 310; ibid., June 22, 1932, p. 136; Tyler Dennett in Current History XXXVI (Sept., 1932), 759.

[42] Prohme, loc. cit., p. 334; New Republic, May 4, 1932, p. 310. France covers over 212,000 sq. mi.; China, over three million.

Kiangsi, then later on the same page said that the Kiangsi Communist Party claimed to hold ninety-four districts. Other figures appearing in 1932 indicate similar confusion. The communists were variously said to hold 177 districts in eight provinces, 200 districts, or 251 of 336 districts in their provinces.[43] Actually, of course, the area held varied from day to day, with soviets put out of commission when a village was taken by Kuomintang troops and new ones being established in areas taken or retaken by communists elsewhere.[44] An occasional map showed better than words how the situation looked.[45]

Whereas most writers were content merely to characterize the communist organization as small soviets, one contributor to the Christian Century, a professor at a Shantung college, explained more fully. He traced the course of the communists from the time when they were condemned by the Third International for failing to resist with force the "betrayal of the farmers and workers" in 1927, describing the destruction of property and the killings of the "enemies of the people" as the first soviets were set up in southern Kiangsi. He then discussed their spread before and after the attack on Changsha. In August, 1930, he said, a second all-China conference, with

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[43] Snow, loc. cit., p. 523; Time, Aug. 15, 1932, p. 15; Literary Digest, Aug. 27, 1932, p. 32; Argonaut, Aug. 5, 1932, p. 3.

[44] Sokolsky, loc. cit., Asia XXXII (Dec., 1932), 658.

[45] Maps appear in Current History XXXIII (Jan., 1931), 522; Time, Apr. 27, 1931, p. 24; and Asia XXXII (Dec., 1932), 622. (See next page, but note that area marked "Jehol" is actually part of Manchuria. Jehol is area to west of this.)


U. S. S. R.
MANCHURIA
BARGA DISTRICT
Manchuli
Hailar
Harbin
Vladivostok
Changchun
Kirin
CHIENTAO DIST.
Hunchun
OUTER MONGOLIA
JEHOL
Mukden
KOREA
SEA OF JAPAN
JAPAN
MONGOLIA
INNER
Peiping
Tientsin
CHIHLI
SHANSI
SHANTUNG
YELLOW SEA
KANSU
HONAN
KIANGSU
Shanghai
TSINGHAI (KOKONOR)
SHENSI
HUPEH
ANHWEI
Hankow
CHEKIANG
TIBET
River
SZECHWAN
Changsha
KIANGSI
SIKANG
Yangtze
Kian
Tungku
HUNAN
Futien
Suichin
FUKIEN
Lungyen
Amoy
FORMOSA
KWEICHOW
KWANGTUNG
Lukfung
Haifung
ASSAM
YUNNAN
KWANGSI
Canton
Hongkong
SEA
CHINA
BURMA
FRENCH INDO-CHINA
SIAM
One Hundred Per Cent Soviet
Strong Communist Influence
Suichin Capital of Provisional Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic
Tungku Capital of the Soviet Government of Kiangsi Province
Lungyen Soviet Center in Fukien

From *Asia* XXXII (Dec., 1932), 622.

Chinese Communists are strongest in the South, where civil wars and greedy tax collectors have produced conditions favorable to revolt. But Communist enclaves also exist in the Barga and Chientao districts of Manchuria forty-five delegates, had met and had decided that a soviet government for China was possible. A conference had been called to set up this government, but all members of the preparatory conference had been seized and shot in Shanghai. On November 7, 1931, however, the new government, the "Provisional Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic," had been established in Juichin.[46]

Sokolsky also mentioned this new government, describing it as the supreme authority of the communists in China. He added some information on government structure, telling of lesser soviet organs at Tungku, Kiangsi, and at Lungyen, Fukien, as well as of local and regional governments.[47]

Few writers in 1932 predicted that China would ever become communist, though there were suggestions that a separate communist state might evolve in the southern part of the country. The New Republic expected this to become a reality if Chiang failed to accomplish his goal by his fourth campaign, underway that summer. But the peculiarity of the Chinese situation had to be considered also. It was seen as not unlikely that the Chinese Reds, as generations of leaders before them, might become corrupt and miss their goals. Peffer did not believe that they could build a strong state once the old one was torn down. Sokolsky, though he claimed that the "communist experiment" would be carried out in some part of China, doubted it could change the country greatly. Instead, he foresaw China's changing communism, making it, as it had made what Christianity it had accepted, Chinese.[48]

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[46] S. S. Lautenschlager, "Is China Going Communist?" Christian Century, Oct. 5, 1932, p. 1195. No other reference to this August meeting has been found. Mao said that the decision to form a national soviet was made on Feb. 7, 1930. (Snow, Red Star Over China, p. 175). The meeting in Shanghai in May, 1930, also urged this move.

[47] Sokolsky, loc. cit., Asia XXXII (Dec., 1932), 659.

RESISTANCE OR PACIFICATION?

Meanwhile, external matters were absorbing the attention of the Nationalists. In December, 1932, with Japan threatening on the east, the Chinese government mended its western fences and resumed relations with the U.S.S.R. In January, 1933, the Japanese moved into Jehol, the province bordering Manchuria. Again Nanking was forced to abandon an anti-communist campaign to face the foreign invader; but again, the resistance to the invader was slight. Hostilities were finally ended by the Tangku Truce, which virtually accepted the fact of Japanese conquest of Manchuria and Jehol.

Chiang's policy of putting off conflicts with Japan while attempting to pacify China internally came at this time under heavy attack by the communists. They repeated their offer of cooperation that January, now offering to join forces with any Chinese army against the Japanese invader, provided that the civil war be halted, the people be given "democratic rights," and volunteer regiments be raised to fight for the independence and the unity of China. The *New Republic* remarked that the communists "almost certainly" expected their offer to be refused, and commented, "The Chinese Reds have the same advantage over Chiang Kai-shek that Lenin had over Kerensky: their policy is single and straightforward, whereas their opponent, in his efforts to retain power, must trim and tack, deceive his own people, and depend on the support of foreign nations."[49]

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[48] *New Republic*, May 4, 1932, p. 310; *ibid*., July 27, 1932, p. 272; Peffer, *loc*. *cit*., *Current History* XXXVI (July, 1932), 404; Sokolsky, *loc*. *cit*., *New Outlook* CXLI (Nov., 1932), 29; Sokolsky, *loc*. *cit*., *Asia* XXXII (Dec., 1932), 659.

While enjoying a respite from Nationalist harassment, the Chinese communists expanded their influence westward. In February, 1933, it was reported that a Chinese Red Army had invaded Szechwan and that two other armies had entered Shensi. Peasant revolts were also occurring in Shansi. The Christian Century wondered if this were an attempt to link the Red holdings to Mongolia and noted that, though treaty port talk still blamed Moscow for the Red successes, this theory was unlikely in view of the fact that Stalin opposed the Trotsky theory of world revolution. The New Republic saw the westward expansion as the only logical direction for the communists to move. Nationalist troops were too much of a force to be reckoned with on the coastal plains, and foreign gunboats were present to protect the port cities.[50]

During most of 1933, however, American magazines were not saying much about China and its communist problems. Japan absorbed the news interest in the Far East at this time, having first defied, then withdrawn from, the League of Nations. The Living Age printed one interesting article, taken from a

49. New Republic, Jan. 25, 1933, p. 280.
50. Ibid., Feb. 5, 1933, p. 1; Christian Century, Feb. 22, 1933, p. 248.

Moscow paper, in April. This was a description, by P'eng P'ai, of his work among the Chinese peasantry before the establishment of the first soviet in Kwangtung province. It gave to those interested an inside story of the slow methods of agitation sometimes utilized among the Chinese and provided a sharp contrast with tales of the slaughter produced by communist agitation in later years. It emphasized the strength gained from union, even among farming groups, but also indicated a real concern for the peasantry, rather than just a desire for power, to have been a moving force with P'eng.[51]

The World Tomorrow also printed an article which seemed somewhat removed (or does in retrospect) from the main tenor of news events. This was a letter from T. Z. Koo, of the Chinese YMCA, describing the conditions which had aided the growth of communism in his country. He included the rural economic problems and restlessness in the cities; the overtaxation by the warlords, many of whom were still in power, though nominally as governors under the Kuomintang; the old communal ideas of China which made people receptive to the new doctrine; and the internal situation, with generals fighting each other instead of the Japanese. Koo also listed the conditions unfavorable to communism in China, including the social code, the untrained leadership of the Chinese

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[51] Peng-Pai /sic/, "Memoirs of a Chinese Communist" (from International Literature, Moscow), Living Age CCCXLIV (April, 1933), 117-129. P'eng was said to have "met with an untimely end at the hand of the Kuomintang butchers" the previous September.

Communist Party, its un-nationalist connection with the Third International, and its own internal dissensions. According to him, the Chinese Communist Party had been breaking up internally since 1927, many of its leaders had turned from the party, and its secret headquarters had been destroyed. He expected it soon to deteriorate into roving bandits.[52]

More common, however, in the few references to the Chinese communists which appeared during this period, were comments on the course of the campaigns against them or about Chiang's fighting the Reds when he might have been preventing Japan from moving in. The communist manifesto to this effect has already been noted. (It was repeated at least twice that year.) As the overthrow of Chiang Kai-shek was a part of the bargain, Chiang ignored the offer, except to order his soldiers not even to speak of fighting Japan until the Reds had been defeated. Madam Sun added her voice to those condemning her brother-in-law in a plea printed in the Nation in May, 1933. In this she praised the Russian revolution and the revolutionary action of the Chinese soviets and urged the workers of the country to unite for the "liberation, unity, and integrity of China." Protest also came from T. V. Soong, who again resigned his post as Finance Minister to remonstrate against the fantastic percentage of the national budget which was allotted to the military and to object to the government's "rapprochement" with Japan. Another protest came that November. A new government was set up in Fukien province, which declared itself independent of Nanking and accused the Nationalists of selling Manchuria to the Japanese.[53]

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[52] T. Z. Koo, "Communism in China," World Tomorrow XVI (July, 1933), 453-454. Though not so weak as Koo thought, the Chinese Communist Party had had its internal problems since 1927, with some leaders, like Ch'en Tu-hsiu, having been expelled; others, like Li Li-san, removed from their positions of power; and others having left the party of their own accord. Also, some had been executed by the Kuomintang; and a power struggle was constantly underway, with Mao rising to greater importance. Party headquarters had not been broken up, however, but had been moved from Shanghai to Juichin the previous autumn.

The Fukien rebellion seemed to pose an enormous threat to the Nationalists. It received better coverage in the American press than had other Chinese revolts of the past years. Its leaders were known leftists, including the Foreign Minister, Eugene Chen, who had held a similar post under the Kuomintang's Canton and Hankow regimes.[54] Military support was provided by the Nineteenth Route Army, originally from Canton; and Fukien was so located as to make possible a union of forces with the Soviet Republic in Kiangsi.

The Nineteenth Route Army had been in the news often in in the past few months. It had first gained a favorable reputation by holding off the Japanese attack on Shanghai early in 1932. More recently it had been held up on its move south by a general who had settled his own army near Foochow and refused to let the Canton group pass. "Hordes" of hungry communists had attacked from the mountains at that time, attracted by the Fukien harvests. Some had been driven back; some had retained a part of Fukien.[55]

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[53] Soong Ching-ling, "Workers of China, Unite," *Nation*, May 24, 1933, pp. 582-584; *ibid*., June 7, 1933, p. 626; Dennett in *Current History* XXXVIII (Apr., 1933), 10; *ibid*. (May, 1933), 254; *ibid*. (Aug., 1933), 640; Wilbur Burton, "Japan Dominates the Far East I- The New Balance of Power," *ibid*. XXIX (Oct., 1933), 36-37; Dennett in *ibid*., p. 128; Edgar Snow, "Weak China's Strong Man," *ibid*. (Jan., 1934), 405; *America*, Nov. 18, 1933, p. 168; *New Republic*, Sept. 27, 1933, p. 171; *ibid*., Nov. 22, 1933, p. 31; *ibid*., Dec. 13, 1933, p. 115; *Christian Century*, Dec. 6, 1933, p. 1526; *Literary Digest*, Dec. 2, 1933, p. 14; *Living Age* CCCXLV (Jan., 1934), 384.

[54] Chen, because of his command of the English language and his well-phrased speeches and diplomatic notes, was probably better known to the West than his positions in China warranted. He was quotable and quoted, but he had difficulty communicating with the Chinese. (He was a native of Trinidad.)

Communists claimed that the army had thus become conscious of the revolution and so had revolted, though others said that the uprising was in protest against being sent to fight communist fellow-countrymen instead of Japanese. Whatever the reason for their revolt, the rebels had proposed a radical program, including redistribution of land and property; the nationalization of farms, forests, and rivers; and a guaranteed right to strike.[56]

The Fukien rebels also offered to join with the Kiangsi soviet; but, though writers feared this might happen, or reported that it had, the Communist Party refused the offer. (The Red Army had been willing and had contracted a military alliance.) Although this would have given them a much-needed route to the sea, party heads claimed that the conditions of

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55. Ralph Townsend, "China Submits to Chaos," Current History XXXVIII (June, 1933), 304; Time, Aug. 21, 1933, p. 17; New Republic, Sept. 27, 1933, p. 171, Tyler Dennett in Current History XXXIX (Oct., 1933), 128.
56. New Republic, Dec. 13, 1933, p. 115; N. Terentiev, "China's New Sore Spot" (from Moscauer Rundschau, Moscow), Living Age CCCXLV (Feb., 1934), 489, 491; Newsweek, Jan. 13, 1934, p. 14.

the offer were not to their liking. A Moscow report later was quoted as saying that the Fukien leaders had shown mere demagogy and theirs had not been a truly revolutionary movement like the soviets.[57] Mao Tse-tung in retrospect regreted this move and called it one of the party's two big mistakes of the period.[58] The Canton government also refused to support the Fukien leaders; the expected influx of leftists did not materialize; Mme. Sun denounced the movement as not being a popular one; and without the support of the soviets, the cause was lost. Nanking forces soon brought the rebels to surrender, using airplanes purchased abroad for use against Japan. This last incident caused Eugene Chen bitterly to remark that Chiang would rather bomb his countrymen than the Japanese.[59]

FIFTH CAMPAIGN

The Fukien rebellion had interrupted, but not disturbed for long, the Nanking government's fifth campaign against the communists. Begun in October, 1933, this was planned to succeed where earlier attempts had failed. American readers of the periodical press must have looked on it with confusion, or with varied expectations depending on their particular sources of information. There seemed to be a great divergence of views as to how strong the communists now were. T. Z. Koo, as mentioned earlier, felt that the soviet leaders were too divided to be effective. One correspondent, Wilbur Burton of the Chicago Sun, was quoted in Current History in August, 1933, as saying that there were almost no prospects of a communist triumph in China in the foreseeable future. Most of the leadership had either recanted or had been killed; the soviet areas in the Yangtze Valley were not spreading; and thanks to gunboats near the big cities, the communists lacked a proletarian base. Two months later an article by Burton appeared in that same magazine. In it he noted that the Reds, though a recognized menace, seen as such even by noted "left" Kuomintang members Wang Ching-wei and Sun Fo, were less strong this year than last. They had been curbed, if not repressed, and might well be crushed by a few more seasons of uninterrupted bombing attacks.[60]

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[57] *Time*, Nov. 27, 1933, p. 18; *Christian Century*, Dec. 6, 1933, p. 1526; *New Republic*, Jan. 17, 1934, p. 264; Crispian Corcoran, "A New Rebellion in China," *Nation*, Jan. 24, 1934, p. 99; *Newsweek*, Jan. 13, 1934, p. 13; Terentiev, *loc. cit.*, p. 491.

[58] Snow, *Red Star Over China*, p. 186.

[59] Tyler Dennett in *Current History* XXXIX (Feb., 1934), 636-637; *ibid.* (Mar., 1934), p. 768; H. R. Gola, "Fukien in Rebellion" (from *Neues Weiner Tagblatt*, Vienna), *Living Age* CCCXLVI (Mar., 1934), 27-30; Corcoran, *loc. cit.*, p. 100.

The New Republic's editor did not see the situation this way. He pointed out that the soviet areas were now more prosperous and in better condition than many areas under warlords and that the Reds were expanding, if not in the Yangtze Valley, then into Szechwan, all of which might be expected to fall under soviet control soon. In December the Literary Digest concluded, from reviewing Chinese papers, that after the Nationalist expeditions the communists were stronger than

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60. Koo, loc. cit.; Dennett, in Current History XXXVIII (Aug., 1933), 640; Burton, loc. cit., ibid. XXXIX (Oct., 1933), 36.

ever before. The government in Kiangsi was reported as effective, though "maintained by terrorism involving much slaughter."[61]

But despite the failure of the earlier campaigns to wipe out the communist menace, there had been some degree of success in them. Writers who doubted if military force could ever accomplish the desired goals saw no other way.[62] The Nationalists had learned from the first four campaigns; and the fifth was to make use of different methods, some of which had been found effective on a smaller scale. Chiang's army was reorganized in the German style, and strategy was planned by German military advisors. Relying on the fact that the Chinese appeared better able to fight defensively, a system was devised to make this offensive campaign seem mostly defensive. Forts and blockhouses were built surrounding the communist areas and cutting off their main lines of communications. The building of new roads ensured the maintenance of Nationalist supply lines, while the blockade thus imposed seriously impaired economic life in the soviet areas. Bombing attacks on Red factories, arsenals, and supply centers also considerably upset existence in the communist sections.

By the time this communist-suppression campaign was launched, such campaigns were an old tale to reporters. It received very little attention in the press. The New Republic

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61. New Republic, Sept. 27, 1933, p. 171; ibid., Nov. 22, 1933, p. 31; Literary Digest, Dec. 16, 1933, p. 15.
62. New Republic, Feb. 5, 1933, p. 1; ibid., Jan. 25, 1933, p. 280.

noted in November that it was the biggest expedition yet--including, it was reported, a secret agreement with Japan to ensure freedom from attack in that direction. The Fukien rebellion moved Time to comment on all of Chiang's problems, the largest of which was said to be in Kiangsi, where the "No. 1 Communist General Chu Teh and No. 2 Communist General Mao Cheh-tung" had prices of 80,000 silver dollars on their heads. Chiang was said to be personally leading 300,000 Nationalist soldiers in the field against them. The Literary Digest put in a word about these soldiers, citing a Chinese source to the effect that they were reluctant to fight the Reds seriously, but were not, as had often been rumored, underpaid or underfed. Edgar Snow, in a critical article about Chiang, in which he described the Chinese leader as "a mediocrity," but an adroit one, doubted that the campaign was even planned to crush the communists. He felt that the show of force was more likely designed to "discourage the ever-rebellious Southern Generals."[63]

Nanking's propaganda campaign, designed to arouse support among the Chinese for the expedition, was regarded cynically by some writers. The Living Age quoted a Chinese, a Nationalist, who felt that the publicity campaign was lost on a population which desired only peace and security. The suppression chore, he said, might well be beyond the abilities of the government. It would be better to work with the

63. New Republic, Nov. 22, 1933, p. 31; Time, Dec. 11, 1933, p. 20; Literary Digest, Dec. 16, 1933, p. 15; Edgar Snow, "Weak China's Strong Man," Current History XXXIX (Jan., 1934), 402, 405.

communists rather than to fight them. An American newsman writing for the Nation suggested that better support came from paying one's troops.[64]

Differences between this campaign and the others were not immediately remarked on in American magazines, though by December it was known that a blockade was in effect, and it was reported that salt in Kiangsi was worth its weight in silver or four dollars, gold, per pound.[65] In October, 1934, with the campaign at its peak, there appeared two articles in American magazines, describing the warfare in China. One, in the American Mercury, a magazine not usually given to reports on Asia, was by Agnes Smedley, whose last two books, both recently published, had been about China.[66] Claiming to tell "the truth about the Chinese Reds," she traced their entire history, from the union with Sun's

[64] Living Age (quoting L. F. Tsok, in China Critic) CCCXLV (Jan., 1934), 384; Crispian Corcoran, "Confusion in China," Nation, May 9, 1934, p. 534.

[65] New Republic, Dec. 13, 1933, p. 115; Tyler Dennett in Current History XXXIX (Jan., 1934), 512.

[66] Miss Smedley's books, Chinese Destinies and China's Red Army Marches, were both reviewed in periodicals in late 1933 and early 1934. The first was described as tales of horror and as the first book on China not to ignore the class struggle. Of the second, Malcolm Cowley remarked that it was Chinese affairs from a communist point of view, told from sources smuggled through the blockade. He aptly described its main theme as the struggle between Brave Reds and Cowardly Whites. Isidor Schneider, review of Chinese Destinies, by Agnes Smedley, New Republic, Dec., 13, 1933, p. 138; "J. G.," review of Chinese Destinies, by Agnes Smedley, Living Age CXLI (Jan., 1934), 461; Malcolm Cowley, review of China's Red Army Marches, by Agnes Smedley and The Chinese Soviets, by Victor Yakhontoff, New Republic, Sept. 19, 1934, p. 163; and reviews of China's Red Army Marches by Agnes Smedley and The Chinese Soviets, by Victor Yakhontoff, New Outlook CLXIV (Sept., 1934), 57-58. The Yakhontoff book, appearing at about the same time, was less emotional, but as pro-Red as those of Miss Smedley.

Kuomintang to the present, speaking in strongly anti-Nanking terms. The recent movement of communists in Szechwan, she said, was due to a laying waste of lands farther east by the Nationalists. The Reds were just seeking new lands to farm. The Szechwan militarists, though receiving financial support from the British in the province, had lost heavily. The present Nationalist campaign was directed by the German General von Seeckt, supported by loans from abroad, and armed with American planes bought supposedly for use against Japan. The Reds, on the other hand, were getting large numbers of volunteer soldiers from all over China-- so many that the Red Army had increased from 200 to 360 thousand between late 1931 and late 1933, with an added increase of 200 thousand extra reservists.[67]

Stuart Lillico, an American correspondent with experience in Japan before coming to China, was more concerned with the present situation than with the history of the Reds-- and more with the techniques of fighting than with damning either side. In a Current History article, he mentioned the importance of the fact that the present anti-Red army was national, rather than provincial, and so able to carry on a campaign unconcerned with provincial boundaries. In the past three years, he said, German advisors to Chiang Kai-shek had been able to instill some ideas of discipline into the soldiers, as well as having given technical instruction. This was not the "comic opera warfare" still common in a large part of China.

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67. Agnes Smedley, "The Truth About the Chinese Reds," American Mercury XXXIII (Oct., 1934), 200-210.

It had become modern to the point of using modern weapons, notably airplanes. These last were of American manufacture and piloted by men trained by American instructors. They were playing a major part in the war and appealed greatly to the dramatic sense in the Chinese.

The main accomplishment of the bombing, said Lillico, was not to destroy much, as the communists had few large fortifications to be hit. Rather, it was a morale-shattering device, designed to keep the communists "on the run," constantly being forced to move and thus unable to erect fortifications. It also kept them hungry, as food supplies were destroyed. It was rumored that Red supplies were getting scarce.

The morale of the Nationalists, however, had improved. They had been trained in marksmanship and in the proper way to treat the local population. These particular Nationalist troops were forbidden to live off the land without paying well for their supplies. No longer did Nationalist armies surrender to the enemy; the only one that did so in this campaign had been surrounded in the early days of the fighting.

With new strategy, armies now did not get surrounded. Instead of making long drives into enemy territory, the Nationalists advanced slowly, perfecting their fortifications as well as their supply lines as they went. This last was of double benefit, as large parts of Kiangsi had been without roads in the past, having only trails with stepping-stone pavements. Now trucks could be used to bring supplies, and the local farmers could better get their crops to market.

The building of blockhouses and "pillbox" forts also prevented an area's being retaken.

Lillico had a good word for the fighting ability and the discipline of the Reds (also reputedly using a German advisor), but was sure the Nationalist strength and equipment would soon win the upper hand for the government. He questioned, however, the improvement this would bring. Winning the war was not enough. There had to be a strong rehabilitation program, including a new recruit system for the army, and a program of farm relief and rural education.[68]

The matter of rural rehabilitation had long been discussed. Borodin had suggested the exploitation of rural discontent as a means of reaching the peasantry, and the communists had capitalized on this since 1927. It was apparent to many viewers of the Chinese scene that Chiang Kai-shek would have to retain peasant gains in the recaptured areas as well as institute similar programs in other regions if he wished to get and keep the political support of the Chinese people. Nearly every pro-communist piece of writing emphasized the abuses suffered by tenant farmers and the support gained by the communist program of land redistribution.

Discussions in 1933 and 1934 indicated that there were two ways of understanding this situation, too. Some writers claimed that no one was doing anything, that the Kuomintang had a rural rehabilitation commission, but that it had not accomplished a thing. The China Yearbook for 1933 was quoted by the Living Age as saying that the Chinese peasant's lot was getting worse all the time. On the other hand, farm programs were being attempted. One contributor to Asia insisted that the Nationalists truly did have a program, but that it was a long-range one and thus sometimes seemed more like paper reform. The communists, he said, worked hard to tear down whatever the Kuomintang tried to do in the rural areas, fearing that any Nationalist improvement would make too good propaganda for the Nanking government. They preferred revolution to reform.[69]

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[68] Stuart Lillico, "Warfare in China," _Current History_ XLI (Oct., 1934), 45-51. A German communist did assist the Reds during this last campaign, but little is known of him. Ch'en, _Mao and the Chinese Revolution_, p. 178 and Snow, _Red Star Over China_, pp. 417-419. See John E. Rue, _Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927-1935_ (Stanford, 1966), p. 257 n. for reference to a 1964 article supposedly by this advisor.

By late October, 1934, the Nationalists were to get their chance to rehabilitate Kiangsi. The Chinese Communist Party, finding the fifth campaign all too effective, decided to withdraw. In October they began the move their leaders had been planning for months. With the Red Army fighting its way out of the Nationalist encirclement, a large group of Chinese communists began to move westward on what was to become their famous Long March to Shensi.

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69. Ralph Townsend, "China Submits to Chaos," Current History XXXVIII (June, 1933), 301; New Republic, Sept. 27, 1933, p. 171; Literary Digest, Dec. 30, 1933, p. 15; Living Age CCCXLVI (Apr., 1934), 100; Charles Hodges, "Kuomintang China Goes Bourgeois," Asia XXXIV (May, 1934), 262-265; Charles Hodges, "How Red is China?" ibid. (June, 1934), 345-347.

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In summary, the period of the communist-suppression campaigns was a period in which American knowledge of the Chinese communists was augmented considerably. Instead of vague references to "communist-bandits," there appeared in a variety of magazines lengthy descriptions of a new way of life in China. Less than a dozen such articles were printed in the four-year period, and none was first-hand; but each added a little to an understanding of the situation. Given special attention were the new soviet government in the Kiangsi area and the size and organization of the Red Army. Red leaders' names became more familiar, but personal information about them was either erroneous or non-existent.

As the new government at Nanking failed to fulfill its early promises, those writers who had expected much became disillusioned. Sympathies of many turned toward the Reds, who might possibly offer something better. As Russia became a respectable member of the family of nations and less a bogey, there was a softening of attitude toward China's communists, also. Too, Japan's behavior in this period helped the communist cause. That nation became the "bad man" of the Far East; and the groups within China which, vocally at least, offered resistance, gained respect abroad. Chiang's seeming failures in the anti-communist campaign also lost him respect among American writers. The last expedition was getting but little attention as it finally closed in on Juichin.

CHAPTER VI, 1934-1936

In the last months of 1934 and throughout 1935, information on communism in China was of two general varieties. Part was about attempts at reclaimation or reformation by the Kuomintang in Kiangsi and elsewhere. The rest, largely military or strategic in nature, concerned the communists themselves or, more specifically, the Red Army and where it was moving. The following year, though with the Red Army "lost" (newsmen seemed not to know where its main units were located), there came to the American periodical press the first good information about its make-up and methods.

THE LONG MARCH BEGINS

The westward move of the communists from Juichin was not announced by the Chinese government, but reporters were accustomed to fitting together bits of news passed by the Chinese censors and to producing far different information. So it was with the Red Army's Long March. This journey, begun at Juichin on October 16, 1934, took the communists over thousands of miles, through Hunan and Kweichow and into Szechwan, then northward into Kansu and into northern Shensi, where a new Red capital was established at Pao-an. As the eventual goal was not planned from the start, but decided en route, a map of the communist wanderings shows many changes of direction, doubling-backs, splits, and new starts. Especially is this true if the map includes the routes of the different armies, as Hsiao Ke's force from the Hunan-Kiangsi border moved separately from the main army to join Ho Lung's Second Front Army in northwestern Hunan. The central forces had at first planned to join Ho, but had been turned away by strong government armies in Hunan. Ho's army began its own Long March in mid-1935 and travelled a route much to the west of that of the main army, combining with the Fourth Front Army (from the Szechwan-Shensi border) in Sikang (bordering Tibet) and then travelling northeast to Shensi in late 1936.

Another force, the Twenty-fifth Army, travelled in a more direct route from the Anhwei-Henan borders to eastern Kansu and then to northern Shensi, reaching there well in advance of the earliest detachments of the central or First Front Army. This latter group, under Mao Tse-tung, arrived at its journey's end in October of 1935, after slightly more than a year on the way; but the Long March was not over for all groups until late 1936. In December of that year, the communists took over and moved their capital to Yenan. Here they remained until the late 1940's.[1]

It was December, 1934, before an American magazine indicated that the Kiangsi Reds were definitely on the move, though the recently-begun weekly Newsweek reported in late November that even friends of Nanking were distrustful of what seemed to be too simple victories by the government forces and were waiting for new developments. Earlier reports had told of communist gains in Szechwan. This was the Fourth Front Army, which had moved in from the Shensi border. A Chinese writer was quoted as worrying that it might be difficult to drive

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1. The map on the following page is the first with much detail to appear in an American periodical. The route for the central forces is approximately correct, but the Second Front Army's march is not shown completely.


JAPAN SEA
YELLOW SEA
JAPANESE DOMINATION
AUTONOMOUS RED MONGOLIA
CHINESE TURKISTAN SEMI-AUTONOMOUS UNDER SOVIET INFLUENCE
THROUGH THE GREAT GRASSLANDS
ACROSS THE SNOWY MOUNTAINS
CROSSING THE TATU RIVER
CROSSING THE RIVER OF GOLDEN SAND
RED CAPITAL (1937)
Sian
Peiping
Shanghai
Hong Kong
Yellow River
Yangtze River
Tatu River
4TH FRONT ARMY
HO LUNG 2ND FRONT ARMY
RED CAPITAL CHINESE SOVIET GOVERNMENT (1934)
THE "LONG MARCH" BEGINS AT NIGHT OCTOBER 16, 1934
ROUTE OF THE MAIN FORCES OF THE RED ARMY ON ITS LONG MARCH
AUXILIARY FORCES FLANK MOVEMENTS
100 200 300
STATUTE MILES
1—SINKIANG (Chinese Turkistan)
2—OUTER MONGOLIA
3—TIBET
4—BURMA
5—FRENCH INDO-CHINA
6—SIAM
7—MANCHOUKUO
8—KOREA
9—JAPAN
10—PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
11—U.S.S.R.
12—FORMOSA
13—NINGHSIA
14—SUIYUAN
15—KANSU
16—CHINGHAI (Koko Nor)
17—SIKANG
18—YUNNAN
19—KWANGSI
20—KWEICHOW
21—SZECHWAN
22—SHENSI
23—SHANSI
24—CHAHAR
25—JEHOL
26—HOPEH
27—HONAN
28—KIANGSU
29—ANHWEI
30—HUPEH
31—CHEKIANG
32—KIANGSI
33—FUKIEN
34—KWANGTUNG
35—SHANTUNG
36—HUNAN

From Asia XXXVII (Nov., 1937), 732

the communists from the new area after it had been "contaminated with this Communist curse" as it had been thus far to drive them from Kiangsi.[2]

An article by an American newsman in China in the December 5 issue of the Nation described the move of the Reds into Szechwan. The first advance, it said, had been in late 1932, when a few towns near the Shensi border had been taken. Soviets had been set up, and a stable administration had been established. In August of 1934, the Red Army, now grown to a membership of 60,000, had begun to move again. Since then, foreigners and wealthy Chinese had left the area. The provincial capital of Chengtu was reported fallen. Another Red army, that of Ho Lung and Hsiao Ke, was attacking Szechwan from the south and seemed to be advancing toward the Yangtze. This would cut the province off from the rest of China. Nothing to prevent the Red takeover was seen: the provincial governor would not be aided by nearby warlords, his troops were unpaid and discontented and not likely to fight well, and the peasantry had so long been overtaxed that many had given up their land and moved to the hills, perhaps to become bandits.

This article, which had been written on October 30, 1934, went on to say that the area was a rich one and of strategic value. Being close to Tibet, it was under the eye of the British, who might offer aid, as the French were planning to

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2. Newsweek, Nov. 24, 1934, p. 12; Nation, Oct. 10, 1934, p. 394; America, Nov. 24, 1934, p. 268; Paul K. Whang (from China Weekly Review), Living Age CCCXLVII (Dec., 1934), 287. Newsweek was first issued in February of 1933, but had paid little attention to Chinese affairs.

do in the southern province of Yunnan, to prevent a Red government's establishment there. Already an offer to aid development of the province had been made. Nanking certainly could use the threat of soviets as a bargaining point to get money, though those soviets now appeared to be strong and getting stronger.[3]

The Nation at this time showed particular interest in the movements of the Chinese communists. No doubt this reflected the addition in August to its list of associate editors of Maxwell S. Stewart, the former professor at Yenching University who had written of the organization of the Chinese communists just before the taking of Changsha four years earlier.[4]

An editorial in the issue of the Nation just cited reported that the Nationalist Army, using the tactics of the German general von Seeckt and with the help of United States-built planes, had achieved what it called a "complete triumph" and had captured Juichin. It was to be expected that Kiangsi would now be returned to its old state, if the peasants,

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3. Crispian Corcoran, "The Red Army Triumphs in Szechwan," Nation, Dec. 5, 1934, pp. 638-639. "Crispian Corcoran" was a pseudonym for I. Epstein, who later wrote The Unfinished Revolution in China (1947), which was very critical of the Kuomintang. (Letter from Carey McWilliams of the Nation to writer, Nov. 11, 1966). Ho Lung and Hsiao Ke did not attack Szechwan at that time, but were in southwest Hunan and in Kweichow. See Hsiao Ke's account in Nym Wales, Red Dust (Stanford, 1952), p. 139. See also Wilbur Burton, "Tug-of-War in Central Asia: II The British in Tibet and Szechwan," Asia XXXV (Oct., 1935), 612-613. "Corcoran" failed to note that the Reds were moving because the warlords had attacked them. Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, p. 170.
4. Stewart had worked in Moscow on the staff of the Moscow News in late 1930.

having once been given their own land and a taste of self-government, could be kept in check. The crucial question for the present was whether the soviet armies had really been destroyed or whether Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung had escaped with their troops virtually intact and might now be on their way to join the Reds in Szechwan.

Evidence, it continued, seemed to suggest that the latter possibility might be true. No engagements had been described as large enough to have involved the main body of the Red troops, and clashes had been reported in Hunan, Kwangsi, and Kweichow-- all in a line seeming to lead from Kiangsi to Szechwan. All American missionaries had been ordered from these areas and from Szechwan; and Chiang was presently in the northwestern provinces, trying to get warlord aid for an attack on "the growing communist 'menace' in Szechwan." Once in this province, the Reds would be difficult to dislodge, as the area was isolated and hard to reach, even by plane, with air bases few in that section.

It would be no exaggeration, concluded the editor, to say that the march of a large army through miles of hostile territory, dependent only on peasant goodwill, would be "one of the most remarkable feats of modern military history." This feat would probably be unsung in the press; but "thousands of Americans will follow their struggle against overwhelming odds with keen sympathy and interest, and with confidence that the reactionary regime of Chiang Kai-shek will ultimately be overthrown."[5]

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[5] Nation, Dec. 5, 1934, p. 635.

Though "unsung" in the periodical press until a few years later, the westward trek of the communists was not unnoticed, but was traced as well as possible, considering the meagreness of the information available. Within a month and a half, by late January, 1935, eight of the twenty-three magazines under consideration made mention of communist wanderings (though Time's statement that "communists or bandits were sweeping all before them last week in Northern Hunan Province..." may have been referring to Ho Lung's forces rather than to those of the central Red Army, which were by then in Kweichow and had been in only the southern part of Hunan).[6]

Nor were all writers sympathetic with the Reds. Some spoke of the "valiant struggle" of the Chinese government to eradicate communism or of the "hordes" of Reds moving west. Many were worried about the fate of missionaries in the areas along communist routes.[7] The beheading of two young American missionaries in Anhwei in December showed that this worry was not unwarranted.[8]

[6] Ibid., Dec. 26, 1934, p. 724; ibid., Jan. 23, 1935, p. 86; America, Dec. 8, 1934, p. 216; ibid., Jan. 19, 1935, p. 364; Grover Clark in Current History XLI (Jan., 1935), 511; Asia XXXV (Jan., 1935), 3; Time, Jan. 7, 1935, p. 23; Literary Digest, Jan. 12, 1935, p. 14; Christian Century, Jan. 16, 1935, p. 68; New Republic, Jan. 23, 1935, p. 288; T. A. Bisson, "China Behind the Headlines," ibid., Jan. 30, 1935, pp. 328-329.

[7] Literary Digest, Jan. 12, 1935, p. 14; America, Dec. 8, 1934, p. 216; Time, Jan. 7, 1935, p. 14; Christian Century, Jan. 16, 1935, p. 68; Asia XXXV (Feb., 1935), 67. See also Newsweek, Apr. 27, 1935, pp. 13-14, on missionaries.

[8] Mr. and Mrs. J. C. Stam were captured, pared through the streets, and executed in public. Their infant daughter was unharmed. Seven magazines reported

Editors made it clear that they had only bits of evidence on which to base their conclusions. In late December, 1934, the Nation noted, "Fragmentary reports from Hongkong indicate that the main body of the Chinese Red Army has broken through the blockade imposed by the joint forces of Nanking and Canton and has penetrated the province of Kweichow where... Ho Lung has been operating for some months." The following month's Current History remarked that official reports continued to tell of the wiping out of many communists, the capture of others, and "wholesale desertion," but that the Red forces seemed to be moving steadily westward, foiling all efforts to stop them. A New Republic editorial, describing the trek as "one of the most difficult and dramatic marches in the history of warfare," explained, "The story, once more, has to be pieced together from lies and rumors and little items of fact overlooked by the censors." That same week's Nation reported that by "tracing the location of Chiang Kai-shek's alleged victories over the 'communist-bandits,' it is evident that the main body of the Chinese Red Army has

the incident, the New Republic suggesting that the communists who had done this were most likely cut off from the main body of Reds and somewhat undisciplined. All reports except one noted that communists were blamed. Agnes Smedley later implied that the accusation was unfair and without proof. There were reports that the murders had been done in retaliation for the United States' selling airplanes to Nanking. New Republic, Jan. 23, 1935, p. 288; Time, Dec. 24, 1934, p. 20; Nation, Dec. 26, 1934, p. 724; Asia XXXV (Feb., 1935), 67; Missionary Review LVIII (Mar., 1935), 98, 103-106; Newsweek, Apr. 27, 1935, p. 13; Agnes Smedley, "The Corrupt Press in China," Nation, July 3, 1935, p. 8. Grover Clark in Current History XLI (Feb., 1935), 639, did not mention communists.

virtually completed its dramatic march from the province of Kiangsi to that of Szechwan."[9]

In fact, the marchers were much farther from their goal than this editor believed. Though they entered Szechwan at about this time, they were turned back by large forces of government and provincial troops before reaching the Yangtze. In April, 1935, the Nation's editor was puzzled by the appearance of the armies of Mao and Chu once again at the gates of Kweiyang, the capital of Kweichow. He assumed that the difficulties of crossing the Yangtze, which was patrolled by foreign gunboats and plied by Japanese vessels rented by Chiang, was one reason for the Reds' wanderings. He did not, however, think that the communists would remain in Kweichow and establish a permanent base there.[10]

As soon as the marchers were seen to have begun to move westward, editors and contributors alike assumed that the ultimate goal of the Red Army was Szechwan. With a strong communist army already holding large parts of that province and with the provincial government gravely threatened, it seemed only logical that the main force would also settle in that rich and relatively protected area. It was expected that they could easily establish a stable government there--perhaps, said the New Republic, one "which might end by liberating all of southwestern China from its landlords and warlords."[11] A few writers in early 1935 noted increasing activity among the Reds in Shensi, saw that they seemed to be moving toward Kansu, and suggested a planned breakthrough into Sinkiang and thus to Outer Mongolia, making a line of communication with the U.S.S.R. Wilbur Burton noted in another Asia article that Sinkiang "appears rather closely allied with Russia politically, although so far free from any Communist developments" and remarked that only Kansu lay between this province and Szechwan. The opening of communication through there would counteract any possible problems caused the Reds by being "bottled up" in Szechwan by Kuomintang armies to the east. However, some residents of China, reported the Living Age, saw suggestions of a Szechwan-Russian connection as far-fetched. The mountains between were impassible, the Reds had no planes to fly over them, and Sinkiang was inhabited by Moslems, who were certainly not Red. Moreover, Russia was paying less and less attention to China. Having developed a stronger army of its own, that country felt less need for outside allies. Materially, Russian interests in China were now considerably fewer than those of United States mission boards.[12]

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[9] Nation, Dec. 26, 1934, p. 724; ibid., Jan. 23, 1935, p. 86; Current History XLI (Jan., 1935), 511; New Republic, Jan. 23, 1935, p. 288.

[10] Nation, Apr. 17, 1935, p. 431.

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11. New Republic, Jan. 23, 1935, p. 288; Nation, Jan. 23, 1935, p. 86; T. A. Bisson, loc. cit., New Republic, Jan. 30, 1935, p. 328. Writers seem to have overestimated communist strength in Szechwan at this time.
12. Literary Digest, Mar. 16, 1935, p. 9; Wilbur Burton, "The Communist Stand in China," Asia XXXV (May, 1935), 269; Living Age CCCXLVIII (Apr., 1935), 101. For Russian interests in China in the 1930's, see Wilbur Burton, "Red Failure in Nationalist China," Current History XLI (Feb., 1935), 553; or Martin Summers, "How to Grow a Mooney Case," New Outlook CLVI (Nov., 1932), 36-39.

ANTI-COMMUNISM

Meanwhile, the anti-communist campaign in China was continuing. Attempts were made in Kiangsi to make a model province of the recaptured areas. In 1934 Chiang proposed what he called his "New Life Movement," to provide a spiritual or ideological basis for the Kuomintang reforms. Stressing the ancient Confucian virtues of righteousness, propriety, integrity, and a sense of shame, its most obvious manifestations were a list of rules and regulations exhorting the Chinese people to practice hygiene, physical fitness, and cleanliness-- including suggestions on the proper methods of eating, of dressing, and of behaving in public. As the communists had their Young Pioneers, so the nationalists had their groups of youths whose delight it was to admonish adults who were following old-time habits and not living up to the precepts of the new movement.[13]

Begun in the Kiangsi area as a part of the movement to rehabilitate the sections newly liberated from communist control, the New Life Movement eventually spread throughout most of China and existed, in a somewhat different form, through World War II. The American periodical press did not appear to attach much import to it, however. Time mentioned in September of 1934 that Chiang Kai-shek was taking a little time off from his communist-chasing to develop a new reform movement; and the following month this weekly gave Mme.

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[13] See Samuel Chu, "The New Life Movement," in John Lane (ed.), Researches in the Social Sciences on China, Columbia University East Asian Institute Studies No. 3 (New York, 1957).

Chiang's translation of her husband's explanation, commenting that for the past months Chiang had "fought the fire of Communism in China by wetting down the ground with his New Life Movement." Mme. Chiang tried to explain the program in American terms in the June, 1935, issue of Forum.[14]

Although not greeted enthusiastically by American writers, who saw it too much as an attempt to make over society by rules rather than by a real reform, the New Life Movement was looked on as a step in somewhat the right direction and not greatly condemned. Another Kuomintang anti-communist move was viewed less happily. This was the secret police group known as the "Blue Shirts," being compared with units then in operation in Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy. The Nation printed a condemnation of this organization by Harold Isaacs, the young editor who had previously been denounced by the Kuomintang and by much of the foreign community in Shanghai for his virulent anti-Nanking publications.

Isaacs called the Blue Shirts a pseudo-fascist organization, a secret society which was supposedly anti-communist, but which was also turned on all other opponents of the Nanking government. He had, he said, published in the July 14, 1934, edition of the China Forum a list of intended victims of this group, most of whom were not communist. By holding the population in terror, these Kuomintang hatchetmen could

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14. Chu claims the Chinese press also paid the movement little attention. Ibid., p. 10; Time, Sept. 24, 1934, p. 30; ibid., Oct. 8, 1934, p. 22; Mme. Chiang Kai-shek (indexed under Kai-shek, Mme. Chiang) "New Life Movement," Forum XCII (June, 1935), 354-360.

control much of Chinese life, through individuals from newspaper editors to men responsible for a university curriculum. Isaacs also doubted if the New Life Movement was really designed for reform. To him it seemed more a political gimmick for controlling the Chinese further.[15]

The recaptured areas in Kiangsi were not opened to correspondents for some months after they had been retaken. Meanwhile, acting on the theory that the struggle had been more economic than ideological, that there had been "more rice Communists than genuine converts to the Red doctrine," Nanking worked toward rehabilitation. As Mme. Chiang wrote after viewing the situation on Fukien, "Now comes a long steady pull. Where a nation's people are contented, seeds of so destructive a type of communism as we have seen in China do not readily take root." Reports filtered out regarding the influence of the New Life Movement, of the beginnings of cooperative markets for grain and the common ownership of draft animals for the poorer peasants. Officials were said to be undergoing training in both physical fitness and self-discipline. Kiangsi cities were reported to be becoming "drastically modernized almost overnight." Chiang was quoted to have said that the people were "responding enthusiastically to the government's program of recovery and reconstruction."[16]

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15. Harold Isaacs, "'Blue Shirts' in China," Nation, Oct. 17, 1934, pp. 433-435. See also Wilbur Burton, "Chiang's Blood Brothers," Asia XXXVI (May, 1936), 308-310.
16. Literary Digest, Jan. 12, 1935, p. 14; Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, "Fighting Communists in China," Forum XCIII (Feb., 1935), 78; A Correspondent in China, "Kiangsi Province" (from Frankfurter Zeitung), Living Age CCCXLVII (Feb.,

In June of 1935, Randall Gould, one of a team of newsmen in China who were permitted to travel in Kiangsi that spring, wrote in Asia of his impressions. He spoke approvingly of the new highways and of the welfare centers being established. The Nanking soldiers he found well disciplined, but possibly a bit harsh toward the people. The New Life Movement was beginning to be taken seriously. He included a picture of the "Communist Bandit Reformatory" where former "Reds," including boys between twelve and sixteen, were receiving vocational and physical training. Agricultural cooperatives were doing well and indicated some imagination on the part of the planners. There was considerable evidence of destruction in the province, but Gould noted that much of this was the work of "whites" and could not be blamed on the Reds. His general conclusion was that the area could be reconstructed along non-communist lines, that the people there wanted just peace. However, having once learned that they need not suffer under government oppression, they presented a challenge. The government would have to make good its programs.[17]

Complaints about the strictness-- or the vagaries-- of Chinese censorship had appeared now and again in editorials for years. In July, 1935, two articles in American magazines spelled out the problem more clearly. One, by Agnes Smedley,

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1935), 504; Asia XXXV (Apr., 1935), 195; Grover Clark in Current History XLI (Feb., 1935), 639.

[17] Randall Gould, "Cleaning Up After Communism," Asia XXXV (June, 1935), 337-341. Many young boys worked with the Red Army. See Snow, Red Star Over China, passim., especially pp. 289-290 and 362-370.

appeared in the Nation. In angry terms, Miss Smedley protested the "servile and corrupt" press in China. The Blue Shirts kept all in fear, she said; and neither the Chinese papers nor the foreign press dared to tell the truth.[18]

She also mentioned the establishment, the year before, of a censorship bureau, which Edgar Snow described further in Current History. It was, he claimed, another example of how Kuomintang suppression of civil liberties was getting harsher. The New Life Movement and the Blue Shirts were other examples of what he deemed Fascism in China. The censorship bureau demanded that all news be submitted to it and could "kill" any item which was disadvantageous to the Kuomintang. It also condemned certain books, at first Chinese translations of Marxist, communist, and socialist works, but later including some books in English, also. He mentioned those of Rodney Gilbert, André Malraux, Agnes Smedley, and Victor Yakhontoff in particular. Further examples of censorship included suppression of films, punishment of artists of "revolutionary" paintings, intimidation of college professors, and the banning of student unions.[19]

Not all writers were so condemnatory of the Nationalists. Wilbur Burton, correspondent for the Baltimore Sun, a number of whose contributions were printed in American periodicals in 1935 and 1936, wrote with more detachment.[20] Two articles appearing in the spring of 1935, one in Current History and one in Asia, gave his views of communism in China. In each he outlined the history of the Chinese Communist Party up until the present time. Also in each he stressed the fact that the Chinese were not practicing true Marxism, that their agrarian program "-- the sickle without the hammer-- was by communist logic foredoomed to failure." He described their activities among the peasants also as not pure communism, but as the replacing of one set of landowners with another. "Presumably..." he said, "the Communists regarded the rural adventures as transitory, to be followed by urban uprisings in support of the Red Army." That this was impossible he blamed on the ruthless houndings of urban communists carried out by the Kuomintang; and the successes of the Kuomintang at this activity were credited to the influence of foreigners, especially to the presence of foreign gunboats near the large cities. Burton admitted that too little was known about the Chinese soviets because no visitors had gone there and because even Chinese communist accounts were few. Little communication existed, he claimed, between the soviet regions and the communist underground in Shanghai. All literature, therefore, had to be based on second-hand information.

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[18] Agnes Smedley, "The Corrupt Press in China," Nation, July 3, 1935, pp. 8-10.

[19] Edgar Snow, "The Way of the Chinese Censor," Current History XLII (July, 1935), 381-386. Some of China's revolutionary art was pictured in Asia that same month with an article by Snow's wife. One painting, entitled "A Peasant Joins the Red Army on the March," might easily have been deemed Red propaganda. Nym Wales, "China's New Art," Asia XXXV (July, 1935), 404-407.

It was Burton's belief that the Reds were defeated in

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[20] Burton also wrote for the China Press and for the China Weekly Review, an American-Shanghai paper which was generally pro-Nanking.

China. Though they might not be completely exterminated for some time, they were failing as an important factor in the political situation. Now that they were driven from Kiangsi by the Nanking armies, they would remain in the west, away from any concentration of proletarians and would therefore be able to bother the Nationalists only as guerrillas.[21]

A few writers, including Burton, speculated on the strategic importance of the communists' western drive. The Nation's editor again stated that Chiang's headquarters were being moved west largely because he knew that once the communists settled in Szechwan, it would be impossible to dislodge them. The Living Age quoted a Chinese writer who saw another good reason for the Nationalists to enter that province: it had been only nominally under Nanking up until now; the warlords had misruled; and Chiang Kai-shek would be the hope of the Szechwanese. "Under his direction, Szechwan can be saved from the sad fate of Kiangsi, and the people can be delivered from their present plight." An earlier editorial in that same periodical had called the flight of the communists from Kiangsi only "a Pyrrhic victory for Chiang Kai-shek." With the removal of the communist buffer state, a renewal of civil war between Canton and Nanking might be expected. Also, Szechwan was too valuable an area for the communists to give it up easily.[22]

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[21] Wilbur Burton, "Red Failure in Nationalist China," Current History XLI (Feb., 1935), 549-554; Wilbur Burton, "The Communist Stand in China," Asia XXXV (May, 1935), 266-269. Burton stressed the importance of war planes, here and in Wilbur Burton, "Mandate From Heaven," ibid. (Aug., 1935), 458-465. The May Asia article included a photo of Li Li-san, with the comment that Li had been ousted as a leftist. This was the first picture of a Chinese communist leader found in an American magazine.

Burton, too, saw the removal of the Reds as possibly also the removal of a unifying force among Chinese generals. However, he speculated further. In February, 1935, he asked why the Reds had been allowed to move almost unharmed into the western provinces. Was it because Chiang never intended actually to control these provinces anyway? Did he simply want to remove the threat from the Yangtze regions? Three months later the writer had other ideas. It might be, he said, that by letting the Reds move through Kwangsi and Kweichow and the upper reaches of Kwangtung, Chiang had planned to force the southwestern armies to defend themselves and thus be weakened and unable to resist Nanking later.[23]

Viewing the situation from Moscow, the New York Times' correspondent Walter Duranty later made similar suggestions: "It is not entirely fantastic to suppose that the move of the Chinese Communists westward has been less of a surprise to Chiang Kai-shek-- or to Moscow either-- than his military operations would indicate.... Nanking is well aware that its control over the far western provinces is little more than nominal." Duranty added that he would hesitate to say the Reds were headed for Sinkiang but that it might be possible. It would not be the first time large bodies of men had crossed

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[22] Nation, July 3, 1935, p. 2; Living Age CCCXLVIII (quoting Paul K. Whang) (June, 1935), 287-288; ibid. (Mar., 1935), 7-8.

[23] Burton, loc. cit., Current History XLI (Feb., 1935), 554; Burton, loc. cit., Asia XXXV (May, 1935), 269.

"this allegedly impassible terrain." He suggested that the distances already covered would indicate that the communist move was not entirely haphazard or directed by pressures from hostile military forces. Sinkiang was rich and fertile and under Russian influence. It was far removed from Nanking and could cause that government little distress. Such an outcome of the Red march might in the long run prove a benefit to both China and Russia and a reason for future diplomatic friendliness.[24]

There was merit in most of these suggestions, though none was completely correct. The removal of the Kiangsi soviet did make pressures from Canton more strongly felt. The presence of the Reds in their territories did weaken the southwestern warlords, making it necessary for them to invite the central government's armies in to fight the communists and eventually strengthening Nanking's control over that area. Chiang Kai-shek did undertake some reforms in the upper Yangtze regions, eventually building up Szechwan as a last stronghold against the Japanese invasion. And the Red Army did leave Szechwan, going over "allegedly impassible terrain," though it turned toward Shensi rather than Sinkiang. The more western province had, however, been suggested as a goal by a leader of the Fourth Front Army, then in Szechwan, who later tried to go there.

THE LONG MARCH AT AN END

By the time Duranty's article was printed, the Red Army

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24. Walter Duranty, "Russia Faces East as Well as West," Asia XXXVI (Feb., 1936), 84-85.

had been at its headquarters in Shensi for three and a half months, and the commander who had tried to reach Sinkiang had been tried and punished for his wrong thinking. The last leg of its journey had been much less well chronicled than the earlier portion. In the first six months of 1935, references to the communists on the march were relatively frequent, either to report a city captured or recaptured, to comment on the large numbers of communists the Nationalists claimed to have killed, or to wonder how loyal to Nanking the various warlords along the way would remain. On July 3, 1935, the Nation's editor announced receipt of a report that the main body of the Chinese Red Army under Chu and Mao had joined the forces of the Szechwan Red Army seventy miles south of Chengtu, adding, "If this report is confirmed, it marks the completion of one of the most dramatic military maneuvers in history." The following month the Living Age claimed that future historians would compare the communist march with that of Xenophon's Ten Thousand. He listed the accomplishments of the Red Army: battles won, equipment captured, opposing armies brought over to the cause, and an active propaganda machine's gaining and keeping the goodwill of the civilian population en route.[25]

For the remainder of that year, the Chinese communists

[25] Nation, July 3, 1935, p. 2; Living Age CCCXLVIII (Aug., 1935), 476. The armies met at a spot well to the north of Chengtu on or before June 2, 1935. Though the Red armies were not conceived in territorial terms, writers at the time found it more convenient to refer to "Szechwan Red Army" rather than "Red Army in Szechwan," and the practice has been followed when quoting or paraphrasing them here.

faded from the news picture, except that they announced again their willingness to fight Japan.[26] No mention of a move further north was found. Apparently even the editor of the Nation, who followed Red Army moves faithfully during the early months of the year, was sure that his earlier hunches had been correct and that the Reds were settling in Szechwan.

The question of fighting Japan had never really died down, though it had been superseded by the harrassment of the communists. One of the main reasons for opposition to Chiang by the Canton and Kiangsi general was stated to be a desire to resist Japan.[27] In February, 1935, rumors of a Sino-Japanese anti-communist pact stirred up comment. The Nation suspected that Chiang would sign if he could make his doing so appear to be against his will.[28] In August that periodical reported that interest was growing in the recent offer by the communists to cooperate with any group against Japan. Canton and the Nineteenth Route Army and Wang Ching-wei were all opposed to a policy of non-resistance. They might unite, remarked the editor, adding hopefully that the "end of Chiang's long reign is probably in sight."[29]

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26. The decision to go to fight Japan was made at a conference held in Jan., 1935, in Tsunyi, Kweichow. This gave a nationalistic goal to the march. Opinions later differed as to whether the main body of the Reds should remain in northwest Szechwan and spread into Sinkiang, but the eventual decision was to move on-- probably because of Kuomintang pressure. The offer to form a united front to fight Japan was made that August.
27. Living Age CCCXLVIII (Mar., 1935), 8.
28. Nation, Feb. 13, 1935, pp. 173-175; see also Christian Century, Feb. 6, 1935, p. 163.
29. Nation, Aug. 28, 1935, p. 226.

Throughout the following months, there were other Japanese statements and moves to be considered. Newsweek reported a tale found in Japanese papers: the governor of Sinkiang was supposed to be planning to cut loose from China and join the U.S.S.R. Various other magazines quoted one Japanese officer as having told a correspondent that Japan would not tolerate the establishment of a communist regime in any part of China and would take steps independently to destroy such a regime if it were begun. Also, the Japanese Army announced a "special force" to cooperate with the Chinese in preventing a threatened Chinese communist advance into Inner Mongolia from Shensi and Kansu.[30]

In January, 1936, the Nation's editor again passed on information about the Reds and again questioned the veracity of reports. He noted that Japanese movements, said to be to stop communism in North China, broke the "conspiracy of silence in the American press regarding the progress of the Chinese Soviet Armies since their dramatic westward movement of last winter." The Japanese were claiming a northward drive of the Red Army. This claim, said the editor was "probably... exaggerated," adding, "Actually, a comparatively small proportion of the communist troops appears to be involved in the drive through Kansu and Shensi." He still believed, on the evidence of recent information published in Russia, that the

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30. Newsweek, Oct. 5, 1935, pp. 14-15; Literary Digest, Sept. 21, 1935, p. 14; Nation, Sept. 25, 1935, p. 338; Current History XLI (Dec., 1935), 222-223; Grover Clark in ibid. XLIII (Oct., 1935), 112; Asia XXXVI (Jan., 1936), 3; New Republic, Dec. 4, 1935, p. 85. The Japanese was Major-General Isogai; the correspondent, Hallett Abend.

main body of the communist troops was in northeastern Szechwan, but noted that Japan had reason to fear the communists' united front propaganda.[31]

A few other items in periodicals mentioned the communists in Shensi, especially when the governor of Shansi felt threatened; but these were given no more notice than were the operations of Ho Lung's army, then in Kweichow. The important communists were believed to be still in Szechwan.[32]

Information on the Reds in Szechwan was provided American readers by an American who, early in 1936, was doing field research in Chinese political economy in that province. Norman Hanwell, whose first article on the communists appeared in Asia in May of 1936, studied particularly rural and village structures; and, though he apparently never interviewed any important communists, he was able to gather considerable material. He himself warned that it could not possibly be up-to-date by the time it was published, "for the least stationary force in China is the Chinese Red Army." His information on the Red forces was based on a Chinese

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31. Nation, Jan. 22, 1936, pp. 89-90. Newsweek, noting Japanese moves in November, had remarked that "the nearest Reds are in Szechwan, nearly 1,000 air miles southwest." (Nov. 30, 1935, p. 16.) The only other news report of communist activity in this area to have appeared recently had been a Time report of the explosion of a munitions dump in Kansu, which the government had blamed on communist sabotage. Time, Nov. 11, 1935, p. 22. Over half of the forces in Szechwan the previous summer were still there that winter.
32. Time, Feb. 24, 1936, p. 26; Literary Digest, Mar. 14, 1936, p. 16; T. O. Thackery, "What's Left of China," Current History XLIV (May, 1936), 59. Governor Yen Hsi-sian's unrest led him to accept aid from government troops.

publication, which he checked through his own research.[33]

Hanwell described the movement of the Reds into Szechwan in 1933 and the subsequent growth of influence there. He was particularly interested in the structure of the army and provided a chart of the army committees, listing the various chiefs of staff and other officers. It was impossible, he said, to know the actual enrollment of the Red armies, as companies varied in size; but he estimated the Szechwan armies to have numbered 26,000 in May of 1934, with the Red Guards and Vanguards adding 15,000 more. Now, with the armies of Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung added, he could not guess the numbers.[34]

The tactics and training of the Red army were described by Hanwell in some detail. He noted that the Szechwan forces were less of a hit-and-run type than those of Ho Lung and that they often entrenched themselves for battle, using special forces, not the fighters, to do the digging. All Red soldiers received special training in marksmanship, in marching and mountain-climbing, as well as in reading and in the doctrines of communism. Some special units, faster than others, were used to take a new position (often at a time of day psychologically upsetting to the enemy) and then were replaced by other groups and thus released to strike elsewhere.

Communist soldiers were reported to be well-disciplined.

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[33] Kwo Wen Chou Pao, by Hsun Shih.

[34] Ch'en estimates 50,000 Szechwan-based troops in 1934, with the Chu-Mao army adding 45,000 more. Mao and the Chinese Revolution, p. 193.

Hanwell estimated that sixty percent of them were from the farming classes, ten percent from the working class, and the rest from the professional military. Because of their closeness to the people as well as because of their discipline and propaganda, the soldiers got on well with civilians wherever they were. On the march, they did not destroy crops. They took only what they needed from people along the way, and usually paid for it. Killings had become fewer; now mostly only corrupt officials were executed in towns taken by the Reds.[35]

The Literary Digest of May 23, 1936, quoted much of Hanwell's information, but added a description of a communist raid on Shansi, which had been turned back by heavy bombing by the central government. Mao was reported to have lost large numbers of his soldiers in this attack and presently "to be trekking southward toward his mountain stronghold in famine-ridden Szechwan." According to this article, the Reds had "dug in" in Szechwan in the past year as well as having "mushroomed up in Hupeh, Honan, Shensi, and Shansi." They seemed to be expanding, despite government reports to the contrary.[36]

Another expression of doubt about the reliability of Chinese government reports came from a London paper by way of the Living Age. According to George E. Taylor, the nationalist government claimed that the soviets were dying,

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35. Norman D. Hanwell, "The Chinese Red Army," Asia XXXVI (May, 1936), 317-322.
36. Literary Digest, May 23, 1936, p. 15; ibid., Aug. 1, 1936, p. 15.

that "we have only to wait for the Red Armies to starve in the mountains of Szechwan." Taylor feared that Nanking might be attempting to "bury" a very-much-alive force, which would later sprout new heads. He saw communism in China as something more than mere agrarian revolt in that it had a purpose. It could take hold elsewhere as it had in Kiangsi, and it appealed to the people because of the Reds' habits of encouraging cooperation, controlling the military by the civilian government, and including non-communists in soviet organization. Though without the army or the organization for country-wide sovietization at present, the communists might, in spite of the censors, political intimidation, and secret arrests by the Kuomintang, be able to develop a new base in Szechwan.[37]

The first attempt to provide much personal information about the Chinese communist leaders appeared in an Asia article in July of 1936. Before this, little except the names and official positions of these men had been given, aside from erroneous statements that they were all foreign-educated or all deserters from provincial armies, a report (also incorrect) that Mao was desperately ill and had to be carried through Kweichow on a stretcher, the use of "brooding-faced Red General" to refer to Mao, or information that Chu Teh's wives fought with the Red Army.[38] In what he called a "Red Gallery of Cathay," Wilbur Burton repeated what was known about five communists: Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Li Li-san, Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, and Ho Lung. The first had been ousted by the party and was at that time imprisoned by the Kuomintang, and the second was in Moscow being "educated" because of his "mistakes" in his thinking and conduct at the time Changsha was captured. It was rumored that he was under surveillance in Russia and not permitted to return to China or to participate in party activities.

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[37] George E. Taylor, "...Though China Fall: II The Prospects of Communism in China" (from the New Statesman and Nation, London), Living Age CCCL (July, 1936), 389-392.

[38] Reginald Sweetland, "The Strength of Communism in China II: Banditry in a New Guise," Current History XXXIII (Jan., 1931), 529; Time, Apr. 29, 1935, p. 20; Literary

Nevertheless, Burton, whose articles indicated a belief that communism could succeed only through urban movements, felt that those two men were still important. Ch'en had before his arrest formed a Trotskyist group in China, and Burton suggested that this held the key to whatever future communism might have in China. As for Li Li-san, he had been the closest approximation of a truly popular leader that the Chinese Communist Party had produced. Though of gentry birth and foreign education, he had worked as an ordinary laborer, had become accepted by the proletariat, and was successful as an organizer of strikes and demonstrations. It was Burton's contention that none of the other leaders had come close to inspiring hero worship among his followers, but he also suggested that Li might not again be able to do so. The Chinese

Digest, May 23, 1936, p. 15, Newsweek, Nov. 24, 1934, p. 12. Agnes Smedley had described Chu and his wives in her book on the Red Army. The Communist International of Feb., 1936 (N.Y. ed.) provided largely erroneous biographies of Mao and Chu (pp. 193-208).

tended to forget the vanquished.[39]

The third person in the "gallery" was Mao Tse-tung, sometimes known as "China's Stalin," for whom the Kuomintang had offered a $100,000 reward. The son of a well-to-do farmer, Mao, said Burton, had studied in Changsha, organized study groups, gone to France with Li Li-san, and taken part in the first general meeting of the Chinese Communist Party. He had worked with the publicity department of the Kuomintang and with the peasants before 1927, organized the agricultural revolution in Hunan that year (against Borodin's wishes), and then gone underground, to reappear as a public figure at Juichin in 1931. Burton thought Mao was "apparently a sincere fanatic, more interested in the peasantry than in the proletariat," and so devoted to party activities that he had had little private life. A man who concentrated when he talked, but spoke little, "he is determined, ruthless, careful of details, and reads all available newspapers and magazines with thoroughness, including the advertisements." At the time he allegedly suffered from tuberculosis.[40]

Chu Teh was referred to as the "Oft-Dead Warrior" because his "death" had been officially announced at least five times in the press. Most recently a touching description of his coffin being carried at the head of a retreating Red Army

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39. Wilbur Burton, "A Red Gallery of Cathay," Asia XXXVI (July, 1936), 460-463.
40. Ibid., p. 463. Mao did not have tuberculosis and had never left China. Though a devoted party man, he had found time to contract two modern marriages. His first wife had been killed by the Kuomintang; his second had made the Long March.

had circulated. Chu was said to be a native of Yunnan and a graduate of the military academy there, who had first led troops in revolt at the time Yuan Shih-k'ai attempted to become emperor. He had studied in Berlin, where he had first become interested in communism. Later he had commanded Kuomintang troops, but had revolted at the time of the Nanchang uprising, then had led his forces south to join Mao. Chu was heavily built, but not stout; a hard worker; a stern disciplinarian; an effective organizer; and, it was rumored, a ladies' man. He spoke four languages besides Chinese. Burton suspected that Chu Teh was a better warrior than a "Marxian," though admitting there was no reason to doubt his sincerity.[41]

A former bandit leader, the "Red Robin Hood," Ho Lung, had left his bandit career to join the army, but had remained a friend of the people while he amassed a fortune and gathered a harem. Rumor said that after joining the communists, Ho had pensioned off the wives and given the rest of his money to the party; but he still operated more-or-less independently, cooperating with the other leaders, but ranging wide in other regions at the head of his own army.[42]

Also in Asia, but a few months later, in October, 1936,

41. Ibid., pp. 463-464. Chu was not a linguist and came from Szechwan, though he had been graduated from a Yunnan military academy.
42. Ibid., p. 464. Burton overestimated Ho's independence as well as his wealth. Among the Reds he was legendary for his hatred of the rich. Though his army marched a different route from that of the Central Red Army, Ho joined the other leaders in Shensi and worked with them from there. Snow, Red Star Over China, pp. 58-62; Wales, Red Dust, p. 222.

was another article by Norman Hanwell, describing what happened in an area when the Red armies moved in. Hanwell had by the time he wrote this travelled from Szechwan to Shensi, often "on the trail of the Reds." He had gathered information from Chinese travellers and had compiled information on Red operations in various areas.

Before a city was occupied, Hanwell learned, the communists sent delegates ahead to talk with elders and magistrates. In some places there were later trials of magistrates if corruption was suspected. Only those who had oppressed the people were executed. Contrary to old Chinese practices, heads of such victims were not displayed on poles in the towns. The Reds prepared a list of goods and presented it to each town, asking "contributions" only from those who could afford it. Some of the goods collected went to the army; some was divided among the local poor. Only what was needed was taken, and there was no wanton destruction.

In all cases, land deeds and records of indebtedness were destroyed. This won the good will of the poor, some of whom often joined the Red Army on the spot.

Many times, said Hanwell, advance agents of the Reds aroused the local people before the Red Army arrived, and immediate steps could be taken to organize a village soviet. Investigation groups were set up to determine the land situation and the size of each household. Then land was redistributed on the basis of this investigation. All of the lands of a non-cultivating landlord was confiscated, as well as the best lands of a "rich farmer." The "middle farmers" were left alone, and confiscated land was divided among the rest according to the size of each household. Special consideration was given to land for the members of the Red Army, and some land was reserved to be given to "specialists" from the non-communist areas who might be invited in. Thus teachers and technicians were given a good reason for joining the soviets. The tools of the oppressing landlords were seized, and their collectivization urged. Crops of divided land went to the cultivators; none to the "rotten gentry." If land was reclaimed-- and the Reds urged this-- part of it belonged to the soviet.

The communist tax system was a complete reversal of the former system and was highly propagandized. The tax rate was higher for the richer farmers. There were tax exemptions for dependents of Red Army members, and more and higher exemptions for areas subject to "white" attack. To urge crop improvement, other exemptions were offered if harvests resulted from improved seed or new and recommended methods of cultivation. Special taxes existed for luxury items to be sold to "whites," on opium in particular.[43]

The opium problem was an old one in China. Early efforts had been made by the Kuomintang to prohibit its growth and sale, but to no avail. The new regulations had not been enforced, and the white or creamy flower was cultivated widely. In some areas taxes were based on the value of the land for growing opium poppies, and peasants were virtually forced to cultivate them, as no other crop brought sufficient income to meet these taxes. The Kuomintang had eventually taken a halfway approach. The opium trade was still technically forbidden, and customs officers seized large shipments; but the trade was also heavily taxed, so that the government appeared to have an opium monopoly. There had long been rumors that the use and production of the drug were prohibited in Red areas. Hanwell explained how this was done. In every new area the use of opium was restricted. The young were expected to break the habit quickly. Older persons were given more time in which to give it up, with the aged not expected ever to do so. However, poppy cultivation was not forbidden. The drug was produced for sale in the "white" areas, and Red soldiers made a practice, wherever possible, of trading opium to government soldiers for food and weapons. Thus a double purpose was accomplished; the Reds got needed material, and the Nanking army was weakened.[44]

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[43] Norman D. Hanwell, "When Chinese Reds Move In," Asia XXXVI (Oct., 1936), 631-634.

Although these longer articles about China's communists were appearing in the periodical press in mid-1936, few news items or editorials referred to the Reds. A communist view of Chiang was provided by another letter by his son in Russia, condemning the Chinese leader for his non-revolutionary stand;

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[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 633-634; Hanwell, *loc. cit.*, *Asia* XXXVI (May, 1936), 320. See also Wilbur Burton, "China's New-Old Road to Ruin," *ibid.* XXXIV (Nov., 1934), 678-681. For two views of the opium situation as seen by foreigners in Shanghai, see Percy Finch, *Shanghai and Beyond* (New York, 1953), pp. 277-295, and Ilona Ralf Sues, *Sharks' Fins and Millet* (Boston, 1944), pp. 64-95.

but the government blockade effectively cut off information as well as a large flow of goods.[45]

In September, 1936, Newsweek did say that "well-armed Reds" had "recently marched into northwestern Chinese provinces." That same month, another article by Hanwell, this one in the Nation, reported the locations of the various Red Armies. Chu Teh and Hsu Hsiang-ch'ien were in Kansu, Mao's forces were in northern Shensi and part of Shansi, while Ho Lung and Hsiao Ke were presently in western Szechwan. Hanwell blamed censorship and misreporting for the general lack of awareness of the situation, then reviewed the agrarian conditions as he had seen them and explained the changes brought about by the communists as reasons for their acceptance by the people and their growth. He also told of the communist policy of opposition to Japan and described it as an important factor in their prestige. A revival of national feeling among the Chinese, especially among the youth of the country, meant increased opposition to Chiang Kai-shek and his policy of non-resistance. The communists had long urged resistance to Japan, but their location in the hinterlands had previously made their denunciations of the Japanese seem hallow. Now the situation had changed. The present soviets in the Northwest were like an obstacle to Japan's dreams of expansion in the area of Mongolia. The Chinese Communist Party's offers of cooperation in a united front against Japan had become a practical proposal.[46]

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[45] Literary Digest, Feb. 22, 1936, p. 43; ibid., Apr. 4, 1936, p. 20; ibid., Aug. 1, 1936, p. 14 (to get information about the Chinese communists at this time, the Literary Digest quoted books printed years earlier); Time, Feb. 24, 1936, p. 26; Nation, Feb. 26, 1936, p. 235.

Signs of this growing nationalism were being reported increasingly. Occasional news items in recent months had told of anti-Japanese demonstrations. Some demonstrators were jailed by the Kuomintang and accused of having communist sympathies. The Taylor article mentioned earlier had seen discontent caused by Japan as an advantage for the communists. The tendency was, it said, for communism and patriotism to be seen as identical, especially as Chiang gave in to the Japanese. In a companion article, Li Tsung-jen, a Kwangsi general, had called on all Chinese to unite for national emancipation. A *Current History* article said that Japanese activities gave the Chinese soviets a new lease on life, while that magazine's editor noted that anti-Japanese sentiment was rising in China and that nationalistic sentiment tended to align itself with the Reds, as Japan's only determined opponents. In late 1936 an "incident" in Shanghai led the Japanese to demand more privileges in China, and nationalism grew stronger.[47]

46. *Newsweek*, Sept. 12, 1936, p. 12; Norman D. Hanwell, "Red China on the March," *Nation*, Sept. 26, 1936, pp. 359-360. Ho Lung and Hsiao Ke had recently left Szechwan for the Kansu-Shensi area. *Newsweek* included a picture of "Red chiefs of Yunnan," found after Ho and Hsiao had left that province. It included Hsiao and his wife. See also *Life*, Dec. 28, 1936, p. 51.
47. *Newsweek*, Dec. 21, 1935, p. 18; *ibid*., June 20, 1936, pp. 19-20; *Time*, Feb. 24, 1936, p. 26; Taylor, *loc*. *cit*., *Living Age* CCCL (July, 1936), p. 392; Li Tsung-jen, "...Though China Fall; I- I Call China to War" (from

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Despite Chinese Nationalist censorship, which prevented good news coverage, some information about the communists' Long March reached the American people through the periodical press. Over a third of the magazines had remarked, by January of 1935, that the Red Army seemed to be heading westward. Coverage was generally not sufficient to indicate definite points of view; and of those four magazines which mentioned the march more than twice, only the *Nation* showed much concern for the communists themselves. Others worried about missionaries, simply chronicled reports as to where fighting was said to be taking place, or quoted sources with varying views. Editors and contributors were more inclined to wonder what the move would do to or for the Nationalist regime rather than how it would affect the communists, who were not considered powerful enough to be important as anything but one of the factors threatening the Chiang government.

Writers assumed that the Reds were going to Szechwan to settle, and the northward portion of their journey, from Szechwan to Shensi, passed unnoticed in the press. Increased

Canton Truth), *ibid*., pp. 384-389 (Li was President of China at the time of the Communist takeover. He left the country to live in New York, returning with much fanfare to Red China in 1965); Grover Clark in *Current History* XLIII (Feb., 1936), 554-555; h. r. ekins, "chinese puzzle" [*sic*], *ibid*. XLIV (Aug., 1936), 66; *ibid*., p. 27; *ibid*. XLV (Nov., 1936), 26; *Nation*, Oct. 3, 1936, p. 380. The *Christian Century* printed an article by a Christian pacifist who now felt war was the only answer, and Hu Shih stated that he would support a war against Japan when it came. Y. T. Wu, "China Must Resist," *Christian Century*, Nov. 6, 1935, pp. 1409-1410; Hu Shih, "If We Are Faced With War," *Asia* XXXVI (July, 1936), 379.

numbers of communists in Shensi were not mentioned until early 1936, and even then they were not believed to be the main Red Army. Meanwhile, by the middle of the year, additional information on the backgrounds of the Red leaders and on the practices of the Red Army arrived from China. Though printed in only a few magazines and though far from error-free, the new articles added much to knowledge about the communists.

Other communist-related information included comments on the Kuomintang's anti-communist moves: the New Life Movement, a secret police force, and censorship. The first was considered innocuous, but the other two were greatly disliked by correspondents, who considered them oppressive. Thus dissatisfaction with the Chiang regime grew-- as favorable reports of Red practices became known, as Japanese pressures increased, and as anti-Japanese propaganda came from the communists. Along with many Chinese, American magazine writers wondered if Chiang were choosing properly when he designated the Reds as the greatest problem facing China.

CHAPTER VII, 1936-1937

By late 1936, the Chinese Reds had been out of the news for about a year, though they had been discussed and described in a number of magazine articles. Anti-Japanese feeling was growing in China as Japan appeared more and more determined to make its will felt in that country. The communists' vocal nationalism was compared with the compromising attitudes of Nanking, to the credit of the former. The American periodical press had been giving frequent mention to anti-Japanese demonstrations and found the "Sian incident" in December, 1936, an even more dramatic demonstration. The settlement of this affair, with the establishment of a new Kuomintang-communist accord and the coming of war with Japan, served as an introduction and background for increased information on the Reds, including the first first-hand views of them by a westerner.

SIAN

Among those Chinese with the most reason for anti-Japanese feelings were the members of the Tungpei (Northeastern) Army, the Manchurian troops of Chang Hsueh-liang, now stationed in the northwestern parts of China with orders to complete the work begun in Kiangsi and to wipe out the "communist bandits." With the southern and western sections of the country, including Szechwan, now virtually freed from communist control and those areas firmly under the Nanking government, Chiang Kai-shek proposed a sixth campaign of suppression, in which the Tungpei Army was to be a major factor.

However, the Manchurians did not share Chiang's enthusiasm for fighting communists. Naturally resentful of the presence of Japanese troops in their homeland, they were especially susceptible to communist propaganda that Chinese should not fight Chinese while there were foreign invaders on Chinese soil. The Reds made use of this susceptibility. Persuasive tactics were applied to the Tungpei soldiers. Groups of them sent out to fight were captured, surrounded, and indoctrinated before release. Not only the rank and file, but the officers came to believe that, since they wanted to fight the Japanese and the communists wanted to fight the Japanese, the two groups should stop fighting each other and do so. Chang Hsueh-liang, too, was convinced that the Reds were not China's real enemies. He even met with communist spokesmen, invited one of their strategists to advise him, and attempted to persuade the Nanking government to think as he did. A truce of sorts was arranged, and China's Northwest was strangely peaceful for an area supposedly at war. Though nominally obedient to the government of Chiang Kai-shek, the Tungpei Army did not war on the Reds. A village "taken" during this period was probably exchanged for another the Reds wanted.

It was news of this situation which, in June of 1936, led Edgar Snow to try to penetrate the lines and do what no foreign correspondent had done before-- to talk with the communists themselves and to get their own stories. He remained in Communist territory for four months, until October. Information about his trip did not, however, reach

American periodicals until December.[1]

Meanwhile, Chang's pleas to the government continued. Early in December, 1936, Chiang Kai-shek flew to Sian, in Shensi province, to talk personally with Chang Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-ch'eng and other officers there. Yang commanded the Hsipei (Northwestern) army and was also in favor of abandoning civil war and turning against the Japanese. The talk came to naught. Chiang could not persuade the younger officers that China was not yet strong enough to fight the Japanese and that the communists were insincere and should be eliminated. The army officers could not convince their generalissimo otherwise. On the night of December 12, Chiang's quarters at a compound outside the city were attacked. Members of his bodyguard were killed. He escaped briefly, but was found next day on a hill nearby and was taken "prisoner" while the Young Marshal again tried to talk his brand of sense into his general's head. Chiang still would not listen.

Accounts of the Sian coup or "kidnapping" are far from simple. Even the participants have told somewhat different stories at different times.[2] Contemporary reports in the

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1. New Republic, Dec. 23, 1936, pp. 231-232.
2. See "Sian: a Coup d'Etat," by Mme. Chiang and "A Fortnight in Sian: Extracts from a Diary," by Chiang himself in Chiang, General Chiang Kai-shek (New York, 1937) or Chiang's story as told to a New York Times reporter in Hallett Abend, My Life in China, 1926-1941 (New York, 1943), pp. 232-235. For other accounts gathered from participants soon after the coup, see James Bertram, First Act in China (New York, 1938), pp. 111-152, and Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, pp. 431-464. For a recent scholarly analysis of the event, see Lyman P. Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History (Stanford, 1967), pp. 71-91.

periodical press were even more confused. Although forced to vie for news space with the abdication of Edward VIII of England, an event which had romantic and religious as well as political interest,[3] Chiang's "kidnapping" by his own generals was seen as newsworthy by American magazines. Within two weeks, ten of the twelve weeklies investigated had reported the incident. The February, 1937, issues of four of the ten monthlies also made comment. This indicates more interest than had been shown in a Chinese happening since the shootings of May 30, 1925, and is probably indicative of an increased interest in Asia, as the Sian coup did not involve a western nation.[4]

In some ways, the earlier reports of Chiang's seizure, before too many rumors began to circulate, were, though lacking in details, more accurate than others coming later. With the exception of the Literary Digest, whose first mention of the coup, one of the earliest appearing in the periodical press, described with imaginative detail Chiang's capture as he and his aides relaxed in hot baths, the first reports told the meagre facts, adding perhaps some speculation.[5] All who gave reasons for the coup mentioned Chang Hsueh-liang's desire for a war with Japan.[6]

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[3] For example, the issue of New Republic first to mention Sian remarked that the British situation was outstanding in popular attention that week. Time of Dec. 21, 1936, devoted 4 1/3 pages to the abdication and only 2/3 page to China. The following week its biggest coverage of the Sian coup included 2 1/3 pages, while Great Britain was given 1 1/3 pages. The Argonaut found the English romance much more interesting, though its editor, in the one article on China's politics to appear in years, noted that they were "so important to the Pacific Coast and bear such significance to Pacific affairs...." (Dec. 25, 1936, p. 3.)

[4] It did, of course, involve Japan's threat to international peace. In comparing the lists of magazines mentioning the May 30th Movement with those reporting the Sian coup, one finds that, excepting magazines gone out of print or begun since 1925, they are identical.

After the generalissimo's capture, the Sian rebels broadcast to the nation an eight-point policy for national salvation, points to which Chiang had been asked to agree. These included a reorganization of the government to include all parties to share the joint responsibility of national salvation; an immediate end to civil war and the adoption of armed resistance against Japan; the release of patriotic leaders jailed in Shanghai; pardon for all political prisoners; a guarantee of the rights of assembly; a safeguard for rights of political liberty and patriotic organization; realization of the will of Sun Yat-sen; and the immediate convening of a

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5. Literary Digest, Dec. 19, 1936, p. 9. By late 1936, the Literary Digest was no longer the important magazine it had once been. In an effort to compete with the newer news weeklies, it had given up earlier practice of quoting from many sources, adding only short comments, and had turned to predigesting the news and presenting it in a colorful style. Too often its presentations were grossly incorrect. The following week it elaborated on the hot springs story and explained to its readers that Chang Hsueh-liang was dissatisfied with his "fief" in the Northwest, wanting to control an area that was richer and less infected with communists, as these influenced the peasants not to pay taxes and drove the wealthier taxpayers out. He was said to have demanded a "juicier" province and back pay for all his troops, with a request of war against Japan added "for the outside world." In 1937 this magazine joined with the Review of Reviews and was restyled the Digest; but in Feb., 1938, it ceased publication.
6. Ibid.; Nation, Dec. 19, 1936, p. 721; Time, Dec. 21, 1936, p. 14; New Republic, Dec. 23, 1936, p. 231; Argonaut, Dec. 25, 1936, p. 3; America, Dec. 26, 1936, p. 280; Newsweek, Dec. 19, 1936, p. 11.

conference for national salvation. American magazines showed some awareness of these points, but usually condensed them, mentioning an end to civil war or a readmission of the Chinese communists to the government and a proposal of war against Japan, sometimes assumed to include the recovery of Manchuria.[7] All eight did not appear until February, when the *Nation* printed an article written by Agnes Smedley on December 15. Miss Smedley had been in Sian at the time of the coup and had written of its background as well as of what could be observed of the kidnapping from the city. Though not privy to the counsel of the generals, she had connections with the leftists of the area and learned much from Chinese friends.[8]

Despite the broadcasts, rumors about the motivations of the generals involved were numerous. Chang Hsueh-liang, as the most colorful and the best known, figured largely. Although there had been from the first stories that Chang had been fighting the Chinese communists until he learned that they too hated the Japanese and that he had first fraternized with, then joined, them,[9] this was not always believed. Some

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7. *Literary Digest*, Dec. 19, 1936, p. 9; *Time*, Dec. 21, 1936, p. 14; *ibid.*, Dec. 28, 1936, pp. 12-13; *America*, Dec. 26, 1936, p. 280; Norman D. Hanwell, "The Course is Set in China," *Asia* XXXVII (Feb., 1937), 73; *ibid.*, p. 71; *Current History* XLV (Feb., 1937), 21.
8. Agnes Smedley, "How Chiang Was Captured," *Nation*, Feb. 13, 1937, p. 180. Miss Smedley served as an English broadcaster for the rebels. The broadcasts were suppressed by Nanking. Snow, *Red Star Over China*, p. 445.
9. *Literary Digest*, Dec. 19, 1936, p. 9; *New Republic*, Dec. 23, 1936, p. 231; *Nation*, Dec. 26, 1936, p. 748; *Newsweek*, Dec. 19, 1936, p. 11.

editors thought this credible because Chang's father had been killed by the Japanese; but others remarked that the Young Marshal was unlikely to become a communist, being the rich son of a communist-hating father.[10] Rumors spread about ransom, though Time and Commonweal declared that the only "ransom" asked was a declaration of war against Japan.[11] Chang's recent past was recalled, and he was characterized as an "incompetent," a "weakling," a gambler, and as a taker of drugs. The New Republic indicated belief that the whole affair was the "irresponsible action of an opium addict."[12] In a Nation article, Maxwell Stewart remembered how the Young Marshal had, in his earliest years of power in Manchuria, invited a rival general for dinner, entertained him handsomely, then had him shot where he sat. This hardly seemed to bode well for Chiang as Chang's "guest" at Sian.[13]

Other writers suggested that Chang was seeking to further his own ambitions: either he was angry because he wanted a new area to rule, he believed that he was to be removed from his post, or he hoped to replace Chiang as generalissimo. Perhaps he was in league with one or more of

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[10] Nation, Dec. 19, 1936, p. 721; Time, Dec. 21, 1936, p. 14; America, Dec. 26, 1936, p. 280.

[11] New Republic, Dec. 30, 1936, p. 255; America, Jan. 2, 1937, p. 304; Time, Dec. 21, 1936, p. 14; Commonweal, Dec. 26, 1936, pp. 245-246.

[12] Christian Century, Dec. 23, 1936, p. 1707; Literary Digest, Dec. 19, 1936, p. 9; New Republic, Jan. 6, 1937, p. 284; Life, Dec. 28, 1936, pp. 52-53. Chang had been cured of his drug habit in 1933.

[13] Maxwell Stewart, "Who's Who in China," Nation, Dec. 26, 1936, p. 755. See also Literary Digest, Dec. 26, 1936, p. 10.

Chiang's Kuomintang opponents.[14] One editor had heard that the entire affair was a Kuomintang maneuver, designed to make Nanking appear to have been forced to move against Japan and to permit that government to save face when it broke former agreements with the Japanese.[15] No Americans seemed seriously to think that the communists might have arranged the affair.[16]

For those who looked for foreign involvement in everything Chinese, there were other proposed explanations for the incident. The Japanese press was reported to have stated that the "kidnapping" was really inspired by Chinese communists, on orders from Moscow. (Japan also reported very early that Chiang had been killed in the coup.) Russia, on the other hand, suggested that the Japanese might have had a hand in the affair. The New Republic was sure neither was correct.[17]

The course of events did not for a while clarify matters. After much discussion at Nanking, with some military men certain that the only response to Chang and his fellow officers would be a bombing of Sian, William H. Donald, an Australian who was advisor to the Chiangs and who had served in a similar position to Chang Hsueh-liang, flew to Sian. Mme. Chiang and her brother, T. V. Soong, flew there later. On Christmas Day, 1936, all left Sian to return to Nanking, bringing along the Young Marshal as well as the generalissimo. Chiang and Chang each blamed himself for the incident-- the latter for his rashness and the former for having had so little control over his subordinates that such a situation could develop. The Young Marshal was tried and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for his misdeeds, then pardoned, but not given back his command. No doubt many westerners agreed with the Christian Century's comment that the whole episode "refuses to yield to rational explanation" or with the Herblock cartoon which portrayed a puzzled American reading a newspaper, with headlines proclaiming, "The story of Chiang, Chang, and the Chinese Dragon," and the entire text in psuedo-Chinese characters, except for the conclusion: "And so everything turned out all right in the end." Remarked the cartoonist, "Well, we're glad to know that."[18]

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[14] Ibid.; America, Jan. 9, 1937, p. 328; Current History XLV (Feb., 1937), 21; Nation, Dec. 19, 1936, p. 721; ibid., Dec. 26, 1936, p. 748; Living Age CCCLI (Feb., 1937), 477. Chang's command was in danger. See Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends, pp. 72, 74.

[15] New Republic, Jan. 20, 1937, p. 339.

[16] By October, 1937, however, Life was stating that the Chinese communists had "helped engineer the coup." Oct. 11, 1937, p. 100.

[17] Newsweek, Dec. 26, 1936, p. 9; Christian Century, Dec. 30, 1936, p. 1740; Nation, Dec. 26, 1936, p. 748; New Republic, Dec. 23, 1936, p. 231; ibid., Jan. 6, 1937, p. 284; Time, Dec. 28, 1936, p. 12.

And yet, some pattern did evolve. Despite the confusion caused by all these suggestions and speculations, the one consistent thread running through everything was the concept of an anti-Japanese united front. Though the weeklies wavered somewhat and presented different views in different issues, with only the Nation consistently seeing the coup as a demand for war against Japan, all had suggested the idea at least once in December and January, and only the Literary Digest made a statement of definite denial. All the monthlies mentioning Sian expected such a pact to result.

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[18] Christian Century, Dec. 30, 1936, p. 1740; NEA Service cartoon in Current History XLV (Mar., 1937), 28. Chang remained in custody of the Kuomintang, in a sort of house arrest, throughout World War II. He went to Taiwan with the Nationalists.

TOWARD A UNITED FRONT

The Chinese communists had suggested some sort of unity against Japan as long before as the time of the Japanese attack on Shanghai in 1932; and the proposal, in varying forms, had been repeated many times since.[19] American periodicals had often mentioned the anti-Japanese character of the communist line. In May, 1935, Wilbur Burton outlined its earlier years in Asia. After remarking that the communists "so far as any records show" completely ignored the Mukden incident, he spoke of an April, 1932, appeal from Juichin to "the masses of China" to "join us in a struggle against Japanese imperialism." A year later a typewritten statement, allegedly mailed in Shanghai over the names of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh had laid down definite conditions of cooperation between the Soviet Republic and Nanking "or any military detachment for the struggle against the Japanese invasion." No official

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19. At first the CCP called for unity through overthrow of all Kuomintang leaders and their allies. From 1932-1936 their type of "united front" was modified a number of times until they could offer concessions to get Chiang to join them against Japan. The periodicals did not note these changes. For more information see Charles B. McLane, Soviet Policy and the Chinese Communists, 1931-1946 (New York, 1958), pp. 51-100, 266-276; and Van Slyke, Enemies and Friends, pp. 31-74.

notice of this offer had been made.[20]

American periodicals had commented on communist offers soon after they had been issued. Some notice also was taken of an expedition sent northward at the time of the fifth encirclement, probably as a diversionary tactic. Known as the "Anti-Japanese Vanguard," the group was seen by some as an attempt to reach and fight the Japanese.[21]

The following year, while still in Szechwan, the communists on the march had again offered to unite with other groups against Japan. The Nation's editors soon made this fact known, but failed to note that a Comintern congress, meeting at about the same time, called for world-wide united fronts against fascism. It was more than a year later that an American periodical (the Living Age) connected Moscow's line with China.[22] Meanwhile, the Japanese began to warn the Nanking government of the large Red Army which was forming in the Northwest.[23]

The rising tide of anti-Japanese sentiment throughout

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20. Burton, loc. cit., Asia XXV (May, 1935), 266-268. The communists had denounced Japan in 1931.
21. New Republic, Jan. 23, 1935, p. 288; Ch'en, Mao and the Chinese Revolution, p. 182; Frederick V. Field, "China's United Front," Current History XLVI (June, 1937), 40-41. A picture of the captured leaders of this expedition appeared in Asia XXXVII (Oct., 1937), 682.
22. Nation, Aug. 28, 1935, p. 226; Living Age CCCLI (Nov., 1936), 195. Robert North feels that the united front idea may have originated with the Chinese, however. Moscow and Chinese Communists, pp. 176-177.
23. Nation, Jan. 22, 1936, p. 89. Reports about the size of the Red Army at this time, as well as of the area under communist control, were usually exaggerated. Often Japanese sources were cited.

1936 was often tied in with the communists. Some demonstrators were jailed for allegedly having communist connections. Current History remarked in August that Japan in its stand as the "bulwark" against communism, might prove to be "that religion's best friend," as any Chinese nationalist sentiment tended "to align itself with the Reds as Japan's only determined opponents." Three months later this magazine noted that the growth of Red strength in Kansu, northern Shensi, and western Shansi contributed to the idea of a united front against Japan. The communists now seemed strategically as well as numerically in a position to challenge Japan's spread to the westward. Moreover, rising nationalist feeling sent many students and intellectuals to join the communists.[24]

The Sian coup stirred up interest anew. As stated above, all periodicals discussing the coup speculated on the likelihood of an anti-Japanese war. Most mentioned the communists and a united front, expecting Chiang's release to be made contingent on his accepting the demands of his officers for such a union. The return of the former captive and his captor to the capital city did not at once prove this to be true; and for the following two months, editors mused further about what might be happening. Chiang Kai-shek was quoted as insisting he had made no promises while prisoner. The New Republic decided that "the incident has not materially affected the overwhelming issue in the Far East: Japan's slow but implacable march across the Asiatic littoral." The Christian Century saw but one revelation: it had been shown that Chiang, ruthless though he was, was the only man who could hold China together. The Nation, however, assumed that Chang's pardon after his nominal sentence indicated that an anti-Japanese agreement had been reached. It also reported that Nanking had abandoned its anti-communist campaign, but had left the Tungpei and Hsipei armies in the Northwest.[25]

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[24] Current History XLV (Nov., 1936), 27; ibid. XLIV (Aug., 1936), 27. See also Nym Wales, "Students in Rebellion," Asia XXXVI (July, 1936), 446-448.

Though Newsweek remarked that the communists had rallied to Chang's support, Time was the only magazine to report "A further and persistent rumor ... that the Dictator, while technically the prisoner of kidnappers, had held long and earnest parleys ... with the celebrated Chinese Communist Cho Wen-lai /sic/ 'Chairman of the Military Affairs Commission of the Chinese Communist Armies.'"[26] Chiang probably had met though not willingly, with Chou En-lai. Chou had been the communist who had made contact with Chang Hsueh-liang before the truce with the Tungpei troops; and he was one of those who, as representative of the Chinese communists, had gone to Sian after the "kidnapping" to help persuade the generalissimo to lead all of China against the invader (and to convince the generals not to kill their stubborn prisoner). Chou, though not one of the communists written of by American newsmen

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25. Time, Jan. 4, 1937, p. 19; New Republic, Jan. 6, 1937, p. 284; Christian Century, Jan. 6, 1937, pp. 5-6; Nation, Jan. 9, 1937, p. 30.
26. Newsweek, Dec. 19, 1936, p. 12; Time, Jan. 11, 1937, p. 24.

earlier (he did not command armies), had long been active in party affairs. He had known Chiang Kai-shek when serving under him as political officer at Whampoa. In 1927 he directed the uprising of workers which took Shanghai and had barely escaped Chiang's purge a month later.[27]

Time believed that the incident at Sian had been a "feeling out of each other" by the Chinese communists and by Chiang: "The central reality behind all was merely that China has approached a point at which her leaders are considering open war with Japan, and they know that no Chinese leader can make even a partial success of such a war without Communist support...."[28]

The Christian Century also reviewed the incident in terms of what it had done for the position of the communists within the country, noting that they were strong in their areas and had spirited armies. It was suspected that Chiang's abduction had provided the opportunity for negotiation on a united front, which was presently orthodox policy for members of the Third International. If so, the editor stated, Japan's policy would have done the opposite of what it intended: "Instead of eliminating communism from China, it will have given communism its first security inside the Chinese government!"[29]

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[27] Chiang does not mention Chou's visit in his published (and expurgated) diary of the kidnapping. This was issued soon after the incident, first in Shanghai and then in the United States. It was reviewed by Philip Burnham in Commonweal, Oct. 15, 1937, pp. 581-582, and by Pearl S. Buck in Asia XXXVII (Sept., 1937), 656. Neither reviewer felt it added much to what was then known.

[28] Time, Jan. 11, 1937, p. 24.

Negotiations between the communists and the Nanking government did take place, beginning soon after the return of Chiang Kai-shek to Nanking and continuing throughout the first part of 1937. Because of censorship, information on these negotiations was sparse; and rumors at times served as news. There were hints of communist leaders arriving in Sian, even of the communists taking the city and holding foreigners as hostages.[30] The New Republic saw signs of a truce in that the Nanking government "continued to send ultimata to the Chinese communists and then to postpone the action threatened." It was reported by the Christian Century that some agreement had been reached, that northern portions of Shensi and Suiyuan had been turned over to the Red armies, and that the more conservative, anti-communist elements in Nanking had been removed from the government. This was related to the Sian kidnapping; and "Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, instead of being the irresponsible opium addict of Sianfu, begins to emerge as something of a national hero...."[31]

That matters were not resolving into a happy ending for all, however, soon became apparent in news of further revolts in Sian. The Tungpei troops were reported to have mutinied, some having joined the Reds, others threatening to do so if

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[29] Christian Century, Jan. 13, 1937, p. 36.

[30] Time, Jan. 25, 1937, p. 21. A British newsman in Sian when the reports came out saw them as wholly fictitious. James Bertram, First Act in China, pp. 208-221.

[31] New Republic, Feb. 3, 1937, p. 395; Christian Century, Feb. 10, 1937, p. 173.

Japan were not resisted soon. Again, details were not clear. Time's editor looked at the incident as an example of growing communist strength, while the Nation felt the underlying cause of the difficulties to be obstructionism of pro-Japanese groups in the Kuomintang.[32]

In February, 1937, Kuomintang leaders met in plenary session to discuss the communist question; and the American press showed interest. The Nation reported that they had voted tentatively to abandon the anti-communist campaigns. Details, added the Christian Century, were still to be worked out. Probably the communists would agree to give up their party organization for the present and to call a halt to their habit of redistributing land. Both this magazine and Time, which spoke of "delicate negotiation" continuing with communists near Sian, repeated that union with democrats against fascists was now a Comintern policy.[33]

Further signs of amity between the communists and the central government were seen at the "Day of the Spring Wind Festival" ceremonies. The Reds sent their finance minister, Lin Po-ch'ü, as the representative from these areas. According to Time, "Red Lin produced a scroll which he said was from the brush of Red Mao-- as likely a story as though it should be claimed that Comrade Browder had written a

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32. Time, Feb. 15, 1937, p. 27; Nation, Feb. 13, 1937, p. 170. The Tungpei men were divided. Some felt that the Reds were selling them out in the negotiations. Bertram, First Act in China, pp. 257-279.

33. Nation, Feb. 27, 1937, p. 226; Christian Century, Mar. 3, 1937, p. 269; Time, Mar. 1, 1937, p. 21.

speech in Chaucerian English or Attic Greek...." The Chinese censors had not printed the speech, however-- possibly, mused Time, in order not to admit any Red accomplishment, even though it be in homage to a past emperor.[34]

In May the New Republic, which had been expecting a united front ever since before negotiations began, reported progress thus far. The government, it said, had been trying to keep events a secret, but "what they amount to is at least a truce, and perhaps an alliance, with the Chinese Communists, and a more complete national resistance to Japan than has existed in this generation." Nanking still refused to admit a sharp change in its policies in regard to the communist Chinese, but the military drive against them had stopped, and "there is good reason to believe that in the northwestern area Communist and Nanking troops are working together against the Japanese menace."[35]

A well-informed (and pro-communist) member of Current History's advisory board, Frederick V. Field, reviewed the history of the united front in China for that magazine in June, 1937. His version began the movement directly after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria (though he felt that the plan had not been formulated completely until later), and claimed that the Long March had begun partly because "the Reds saw a golden opportunity of further dramatizing their

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34. Ibid., Apr. 19, 1937, p. 24. The speech was described as "lofty" in style and "stuffy" in scholarship. Mao, whose education was in classical writings, is considered a poet of some merit.

35. New Republic, May 5, 1937, p. 373.

united front movement by shifting their main strength to the north." He also noted that a Chinese Communist manifesto had been issued soon after speeches concerning a united front had been given in connection with the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in 1935. The Sian revolt he saw not as a direct move for a united front, but as associated with the communist goal. Chiang, he said, probably agreed to nothing formally, but certainly was impressed with the strength of his opposition.

Field credited the intervention of communist leaders, who brought pressure to bear on the Tungpei officers against the move they were threatening, with effecting Chiang's safe return to Nanking. The communists, he said, saw the Sian coup as an "obvious stimulation" to their own "first tenet... the cessation of civil warfare." They had, in February, sent to the plenary session of the Kuomintang's Central Executive Committee a telegram explaining changes in their policy. In it they offered to stop fighting the Nationalists, to give up their soviet government, to stop expropriating property and to place their armies under Nanking if the central government would stop fighting them, would direct its energies to fighting Japan, and would agree to certain freedoms for the people.

There was, said Field, no comprehensive report of the meeting. It was known that the Central Executive Committee had rejected the eight demands which Chiang had presented as from the Sian rebels because of the illegal means used to gain their presentation. But there was also a hint that similar demands had been submitted by someone else and that these had been accepted. Return proposals had been made to the Reds, and negotiations were still going on; but it looked as though a united front were being founded-- something which should improve the welfare of all of China.[36]

In July Asia announced that the Nanking government was sending supplies to the communists, including motor vehicles and even airplanes;[37] and it soon became apparent that these could be put to good use. On July 7, 1937, Japanese and Chinese fired on each other not far from Peiping, near Lukouchiao, or the Marco Polo Bridge. Though this, like earlier incidents, was made a subject of negotiation, attempts at maintaining the uneasy truce failed. After nearly six years of unequal settlements, China and Japan were at war.

Japan continued to denounce the Chinese communists. They were, claimed Japanese papers, getting munitions from Moscow even yet. In August, the Christian Century quoted a Japanese official statement: "Japanese policy is directed solely toward the realization of stability in eastern Asia through conciliation and cooperation between Japan, Manchukuo and China, and by stopping the communist invasion of the

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36. Frederick V. Field, "China's United Front," Current History XLVI (June, 1937), 39-44. Field was then secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations. He overestimated the early importance of the united front move. First attempts were aimed at possible defectors from Nanking, not at Nanking itself. The Comintern speeches came after the Chinese communist manifesto in August, 1937, not before. Though refusing in 1950 to say whether he was communist, Field did register with the U. S. Government as agent for the People's Republic of China in the early 1950's.

37. Asia XXXVII (July, 1937), 467.

Orient." Soon after the Lukouchiao affair, Maxwell Stewart speculated in the Nation on the role of the communists in bringing about the Japanese move. The Japanese, he explained, had been disturbed greatly by the prospect of an alliance between Nanking and the Chinese communists. Such an alliance was expected to have been concluded by the end of July, 1937. All signs pointed toward unity, with the anti-communist campaign called off, and the Reds having abandoned their soviets for a democratic system and accepted the authority of Nanking. The central government, too, had pledged itself to resisting Japanese aggression. With opposition to communism a long-time policy of the Japanese, a principle having been used to cover aggression, it was possible that the latest incident had been planned to halt the alliance. This idea was "supported by the fact that Japan has included the suppression of communism in its four demands for a settlement of the immediate controversy."[38]

Actually, the incident had been unplanned; and it certainly did not stop the alliance, which was formally announced in September. Though said to be "only skin deep," depending only on hatred of Japan and based on the prestige of Chiang Kai-shek (of which the first was said to be the stronger), its "cement" was enough to hold it together, though tenuously at times, for nearly a decade.[39]

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38. Time, July 19, 1937, p. 20; Christian Century, Aug. 11, 1937, pp. 990-991; Maxwell S. Stewart, "Behind China's Conflict," Nation, July 24, 1937, p. 100. See also Commonweal, July 23, 1937, pp. 313-314.
39. Living Age CCCLIII (Nov., 1937), 195.

NEWS FROM THE CHINESE SOVIETS

The announcement of Chiang's seizure at Sian came to the American periodical press at the same time as the first information from a visitor to the Chinese soviets. The December 23, 1936, issue of the New Republic made the first reference in an American periodical of Edgar Snow's trip to the Northwest. Though some of his material had appeared in Chinese papers and in the London Daily Herald, from which the New Republic got its information, he had not yet published anything in American magazines about his experiences. The first American periodical to print an article on the soviets by Snow was the July, 1937, issue of Asia. In the following months his writing found a varied audience in different magazines, but early in the year his findings were printed only as comments by those who read the London papers.

The New Republic's first commentary concerned the size and strength of the Chinese soviets. It reported that communist territory was now larger than it had ever been and that Snow had found a loyal population under unified Red commanders and well-disciplined troops, "unique in China in that they are hard to frighten and impossible to buy." Mao was quoted as having claimed that China could offer resistance against Japan and, with some outside aid, might well be victorious.[40]

The following week this same magazine cited Snow again, describing the Red army as numbering at least 100,000 youthful troops. Their health was good; and they were well (if roughly) clad and fed and fairly well armed with captured materiel. They were daily subjected to political lectures, but no Russians were with the army; the only foreigner advising them was a German. Mao again was quoted; and this quote was well chosen to fit the situation of the day in China: he was willing to cooperate with the Kuomintang against Japan, to submerge the soviet identity in a popular front, and to submit to the laws of the central government, if it were truly representative and anti-imperialist.[41]

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[40] New Republic, Dec. 23, 1936, pp. 231-232.

In its January, 1937, issue, before Snow's information was widespread, Asia published the last of its articles on communist practices by Norman Hanwell.[42] The article discussed the cultural and economic changes which the Reds introduced into their areas, indicating that with fighting still going on, such changes were of necessity limited, but still outlining the usual (or perhaps the ideal) approach.

In his writing Hanwell included a description of the communist emphasis on education, both through schools ("Lenin Primary Schools") and through other means, as clubs and reading rooms-- and an organized propaganda corps. He also outlined communist attempts at improving working conditions, with strict rules for hours and wages and with encouragement of unions.

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41. Ibid., Dec. 30, 1936, p. 255-256.
42. A further article by Hanwell appeared in Asia the following month. It discussed the Sian kidnapping and anti-Japanese feeling in China.

It was clear that the Reds did not practice "pure" communism in their economic organization. Hanwell compared the system which had been set up to Russia's New Economic Policy, with a Soviet Workers' and Farmers' Bank to hold confiscated gold and silver, with communist-printed paper money for circulation (its value dropped as fast as did that of Nationalist paper money when "enemy" troops arrived), and with both state and private industry encouraged.

Farming was also in a compromise state. The communists tried to encourage more and better farming, but thus far had not succeeded well. Attempts at imposing collective farming had brought resistance from the peasants, and the idea appeared to have been given up. The Reds, concluded Hanwell, had some support from the local population; but they would have to show positive results to maintain it.[43]

The following issue of Asia made reference to Edgar Snow's visit behind Red lines, repeated much of the information which the New Republic had published earlier, and added that Snow had brought back with him numerous photographs of life with the Chinese communists. Two of them were included.[44] Most of Snow's pictures were made available to the American public at about that time in the pages of the recently begun and widely circulated picture weekly, Life. In its issues of January 25 and February 1 were shown ten pages of pictures of the Chinese Reds, mostly taken by Snow. For the first time readers could see what China's communists looked like and how they lived. Included were photographs of various leaders: P'eng Teh-huai, Chou En-lai, Lin Piao, Chu Teh, and their wives, as well as pictures of individuals or groups whom Snow found interesting. Some were old; some were young. All were either smiling happily or deeply engrossed in their tasks: learning to read, singing, hearing lectures, or dancing. There were pictures of the Red Army, of captured equipment, and of Red industry.[45]

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[43] Norman D. Hanwell, "Within Chinese Red Areas," Asia XXXVII (Jan., 1937), 58-61. Evidently the Reds had learned to step lightly since their days in Fukien, where the peasants had complained bitterly about over-organization and were reported to have welcomed the old regime back again. Living Age CCCXLVIII (July, 1935), 385.

[44] Asia XXXVII (Feb., 1937), 74-75.

Obviously (to one who has read more of Snow's writings, though not to readers of Life at that time), Snow had not written the captions for his pictures, though he had supplied much of the information. Some comments were too uncomplimentary to have come from his pen; and one caption, under a picture of young people doing a "dance of the machines," remarked that these youths had probably never seen a modern machine, "except a machine gun," and that this dance was "on direct inspiration from Moscow." Snow's books, as well as some of the articles to appear that summer, indicated that the Reds made considerable use of machinery in their areas

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45. Life, Jan. 25, 1937, pp. 9-15; ibid., Feb. 1, 1937, pp. 42-45. Life's first issue was dated Nov. 23, 1936, with 466,000 copies printed. By mid-1937, the print order was for over a million copies-- larger than the circulation of any of the other magazines considered except Colliers and the Saturday Evening Post. James Playsted Wood, Magazines in the United States. Second edition. (New York, 1951), 209.

and that Comintern influence was very slight.[46]

One of these issues of Life also included a map of China and its neighbors, on which was traced the general route of what it called the "heroic trek" from Juichin to the Northwest. It was a poor map, in that the journey looked quite short in its perspective, though the caption did say that the distance covered was 7,000 miles. A month later Time gave a better map, but spoke only of a "2,000-mile migration."[47] The maps and pictures undoubtably drew more attention to the topic than had earlier articles.

As the only man who had had any extensive contact with the Chinese soviets thus far (a few correspondents did make contact with the Reds in Sian in the spring of 1937, as the united front was being worked out), Snow had the journalistic field to himself for a while; and that summer and fall saw the publication of a number of his articles in American periodicals. Asia published a four-part autobiography of Mao Tse-tung, as told to Snow, between July and October and a two-part account of the Long March in October and November. The New Republic printed four shorter articles in August and September, one giving the communists' view of

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46. Ibid., Jan. 25, 1937, p. 13. See Edgar Snow, "Soviet China - III: Chinese Communist Industry," New Republic, Aug. 18, 1937, pp. 42-44; Snow, "Soviet China -- IV: Moscow and the Chinese Communists," ibid., Sept. 8, 1937, pp. 124-125; Snow, Red Star Over China, pp. 265-276, 404-422.

47. Life, Jan. 25, 1937, p. 11; Time, Feb. 15, 1937, pp. 26-27. Life's mileage was most correct. The term "Heroic Trek" had appeared in a communist publication the year before. Communist International (New York), Feb., 1936, pp. 124-144.

their place in China, one recounting the Long March, one describing industry behind Red lines, and the fourth discussing Comintern-Chinese communist relationships.

All ten articles were, in essence, chapters from Snow's forthcoming book, though there were differences. The *New Republic*'s short article on the Long March was a major condensation of the two long *Asia* articles. Otherwise, there were footnotes omitted, English terms instead of Chinese, fewer digressions, and some rearranging of paragraphs. Also, *Asia*'s coverage included photographs, some similar to those which had appeared in *Life*, but in later issues depicting peasant gatherings and united front negotiations and posted slogans.[48]

The pieces appearing in *Asia* were largely historical in nature. Those about Mao Tse-tung provided readers with their first genuine information about the Red leader, explaining about his education (that he had not studied abroad as had often been claimed, but at a teachers' college in Changsha)

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48. The articles and their corresponding pages in the book are as follows: Mao Tse-tung, "Boyhood of a Chinese Red," *Asia* XXXVII (July, 1937), 481-484 (pp. 121-135 of *Red Star Over China*); Mao Tse-tung, "Schooling of a Chinese Red," *ibid*. (Aug., 1937), 570-576 (pp. 135-156); Mao Tse-tung, "How the Red Army Began," *ibid*. (Sept., 1937), 619-622 (pp. 157-173); Mao Tse-tung, "The Red Army in Action," *ibid*. (Oct., 1937), 683-686 (pp. 173-188); Edgar Snow, "The Long March I," *ibid*., pp. 689-692 (pp. 189-205); Snow, "The Long March II," *ibid*. (Nov., 1937), 741-747 (pp. 205-219); Snow, "Soviet China-- I: What the Chinese Communists Want," *New Republic*, Aug. 4, 1937, pp. 351-354 (pp. 84-90); Snow, "Soviet China-- II: The Long March," *ibid*., Aug. 11, 1937, pp. 9-11; Snow, "Soviet China-- III: Chinese Communist Industry," *ibid*., Aug. 18, 1937, pp. 42-44 (pp. 265-276); and Snow, "Soviet China-- IV: Moscow and the Chinese Communists," *ibid*., Sept. 8, 1937, pp. 124-125 (pp. 410-416).

as well as of his childhood, and telling how he came to accept communism. The account told less about his personal life in later years, becoming, as Snow remarked, more a history of the growth of the Red Army than of Mao Tse-tung. The last two articles were an epic-like tale of the march from Kiangsi to Shensi, emphasizing less the politics of the period than the difficulties and the heroics of the march.

The New Republic articles were similarly well suited to the character of the magazine in which they appeared. Less concerned with the past, they outlined conditions as Snow had seen them, including of course some background, but providing more political commentary. The communists' position on Japan was discussed. In the Long March emphasis had been placed on the "secondary goal": going where they could fight the Japanese. (The unstressed, primary goal had been to effect a "strategic retreat.") In another article, Snow quoted Mao as hoping for national unity against the Japanese, even as being willing to cooperate with other anti-Japanese nations, though they might be imperialists.

Throughout the articles were favorable descriptions of life in the Red areas. Friendship had been won along the way to Shensi by good treatment of the peasants. Once at the journey's end, the Reds had continued to win friends and influence peasants in their favor. They were still carrying on the agricultural revolution, which Mao accused the Nationalists of having abandoned. They were also industrializing, though on a small scale, and were maintaining working conditions which were much better than any Snow had seen in coastal areas. (Much of the information was similar to that produced by Hanwell, but more authoratative, as Snow had seen the theories in operation.)

As for relations with the Comintern, Snow made it clear that Russia had ceased to help the Red Chinese after 1927. There had been little communication with the Comintern. The development of soviets had been a purely Chinese move. The Red Army might properly be said to have had less foreign aid than any other army in modern Chinese history.

Informative though these ten articles were, they probably had less impact on that American public than an additional report by Snow which appeared in the Saturday Evening Post in November, 1937. The readers of both Asia and the New Republic had had earlier information on the Chinese Reds, though it had been much less detailed. The readers of the Saturday Evening Post, however, who numbered over forty-four times as many as those of the other two magazines combined (not allowing for duplication of subscriptions), had been given but one piece of fiction about Chinese politics for over a decade.

Written after the Kuomintang-communist accord had been reached, this article set out to explain the situation to the every-day American. It contained more personal commentary and less straight reporting than had the earlier articles mentioned and than did Snow's book.[49] The report began by explaining the importance of the agreement between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party-- two Chinese factions which, if left alone, might well have killed each other off, but which Japan's actions had driven together. Communist agitation for a united front had brought about the Sian incident, which had, in turn, brought negotiations and an end to hostilities. The negotiations had been kept secret, but the Japanese had heard in them a death knell and consequently had attacked.

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[49] First published in Great Britain, Red Star Over China was reviewed in a London paper and the review reprinted in the Living Age's December issue. Review by Bosworth Goldman (from the Observer, London), Living Age CCCLIII (Dec., 1937), 365-366. American publication and American reviews were to come in 1938.

For the first time in American periodicals, Snow told of the circumstances of his visit to the communist areas and described his reception (by Chou En-lai, of whom he gave a short biography) and his treatment there-- telling how he had spent four months behind Red lines, being well-received and permitted to take notes and pictures at will. He made it clear that he had been favorably impressed.

The main concern of the Reds, Snow said, was "anti-Japanism," and "there was far less Communism observable than some people see in the New Deal." While he was there, the "Reds were already giving up much of the radical program which had marked their past career," and they had abandoned, or at least postponed indefinitely, other changes.[50] It was Snow's stated opinion that

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[50] Edgar Snow, "I Went to Red China," Saturday Evening Post, Nov. 6, 1937, pp. 10-11, 98-100. In his book Snow was more careful about differentiating between long-term and short-term goals of the Reds. "Marxism, and the basic tenets of social revolution, it was quite clear, they would never give up. Every new step taken, every change made, was examined, debated, decided, and integrated in terms of Marxism-- and the proletarian Revolution, which the Communists did not abandon as their ultimate purpose." Snow, Red Star Over China, p. 476. See also pp. 478-495.

> The Chinese Reds are today, for all practical purposes, simply another camp of Chinese Nationalists, but with different backgrounds and beliefs, more youth and ardor and determination, with infinitely less corruption, with a more disciplined and better organized party machine, and with less cynical views on Soviet Russia, than the Nationalists of Nanking.

He doubted if the Chinese had ever achieved a state which Marx would recognize as his. Thus far they had put their efforts into strengthening the Red Army and its base and in extending the revolution, never abolishing private property, but striving mainly to overthrow landlords and gentry and to bring an end to foreign imperialism.

The immediate goals of the communists and the Kuomintang, he said, were not very different. Their main quarrel was over leadership, which the communists believed should rest with the workers and the peasants. Japan's aggressions had hurt the Kuomintang's chances for achieving reform in China through the bourgeoisie. Meanwhile, the communists, forced into the rural areas, had had to turn to an agrarian revolution. The system they established, a sort of rural equalitarianism, was an odd mixture of state-owned enterprizes, private businesses, and state-owned cooperatives, a system which somehow "muddled along." Their greatest strength came from the peasants to whom they had given expropriated land.

However, the communists had now promised to give up their policy of expropriation, as well as their soviet systems, and to establish a capitalist-democratic government with equal opportunity for all classes. The Red Army was to be put under Chiang Kai-shek. Little of the original communist movement remained except the leadership and personnel in the army, in the communist organization, and in the propaganda machine.

The Red Army, reported Snow, succeeded because its recruits came from the new land-owning classes and thus had an economic stake in Red victories. He went on to describe this army, stressing its youth, its emphasis on literacy, and its training in political theory. The communists even had a military academy, now known as the Chinese People's Anti-Japanese University, where it had once been the Red Academy.

The renaming of the academy was typical of the situation in the communist areas, evidently on the theory that a rose by any other name might smell a little sweeter. The Red Dramatic Society was now the Anti-Japanese Dramatic Society. The Young Vanguards were the Anti-Japanese Vanguards. There were also Anti-Japanese Children's Brigades. Japan was being built up as a bogeyman, and the only oppressed classes in the communist area were the shirkers, who were dubbed "traitors."

The communists, Snow concluded, did not admit to having given up Marxism. They felt that "Anti-Japanese" was a synonym for "communism." As Mao said, "We cannot even discuss Communism if we are robbed of a country in which to practice it." As for the future, both factions in China hoped to gain from the present union. Chiang expected the Reds to lose their identity in nationalism, while the communists thought they could conclude the war with a firm grip on the leadership of the nation, then return to socialist progress-- along with a socialist Japan.[51]

Whereas Snow's writings did not actually deny the Marxist orientation of the Reds, they did point out how far from true Marxism the communist state was and noted that the united front agreements made it even more so. Other correspondents in China's Northwest in 1937 made similar observations. As early as April, the Literary Digest had cited a New York Times reporter and Snow to the effect that the mystery surrounding the Chinese communists was now gone, that they had been found stronger than believed, but "only a pale pink." "Communism" was learned to be a misnomer. The people had little or no concept of doctrinaire communism or socialism. Relieved of the misleading "Red" label, the Northwest was becoming a nationalist state, where conditions were a little better for the farmers and the common people than those which had existed before. "Even... missionaries" agreed to this last concept.[52] The articles appearing during the fall and summer could be used to support such an outlook.

After the outbreak of war in July, 1937, most interest in the Chinese communists was centered in the Red Army-- or, as it was now known, the Eighth Route Army. Some of Snow's articles praised the Red soldiers. In September the Nation printed a discussion by Maxwell Stewart of China's chances against Japan. China's strength, this writer believed, lay

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51. Snow, loc. cit., Saturday Evening Post, Nov. 6, 1937, pp. 100-103.
52. Literary Digest, Apr. 3, 1937, pp. 12-13. The Times reporter was Anthony Billingham, who had reported a conversation with Chou En-lai.

not in massed warfare, but in the hide-and-seek guerrilla tactics which the communists had developed in ten years of fighting the nationalists. The Chinese government could learn much from the communists about the technique of organizing peasants to help with transportation or communication or diversionary tactics. He described a peasant army which was then operating in Manchuria. Chiang, he said, did not yet seem to have encouraged guerrilla-peasant resistance, but should do so.[53]

Other writers also advocated the adoption of guerrilla tactics. Victor Yakhontoff wrote in the New Republic that the Eighth Route Army's veterans of guerrilla fighting were its most valuable assets and proceeded to quote Mao on the subject. Current History's news editor also felt that peasant organization along the lines "so successfully employed by the Chinese communists" was Nanking's main hope, adding that agricultural reform was a prerequisite to gaining peasant loyalty, however. Time described early victories by such tactics, noting that Chu Teh and Wei Li-huang, a Nanking general who had earned the nickname of "One Hundred Victories Wei" in anti-communist battles, were now cooperating against the Japanese. Most comments, however, came from the Nation's editorials, presumably written or influenced by Stewart.[54]

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53. Maxwell S. Stewart, "What Chance has China?" Nation, Sept. 11, 1937, pp. 262-264.

54. Victor Yakhontoff, "The USSR in the Oriental Crisis," New Republic, Sept. 27, 1937, pp. 204-206; Current History XLVII (Oct., 1937), 16; Time, Nov. 1, 1937, p. 23; Nation, Oct. 23, 1937, p. 418; ibid., Nov. 20, 1937, p. 546; ibid., Dec. 18, 1937, p. 678. See also New Republic, Dec. 29, 1937, p. 214.

Other information on the formerly-Red forces was furnished by _Time_, which praised the ability of Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, and by _Life_ and the _Digest_. This last magazine, the result of a union of the _Literary Digest_ and the _Review of Reviews_, gave pictorial coverage to the armies of the Northwest, showing well-armed patrols, sand piles where strategy was taught, games to teach hatred of the Japanese, Red generals, and troops. Captions praised the soldiers and spoke of their training at the model "Soviet West Point." _Life_, too, printed a few pages of pictures of the Red Army at this time, also depicting soldiers learning strategy through war games, as well as showing them at sports, study, or in dramatic productions. Good practices were indicated by the pictures of the men studying or washing up, while army strength was revealed by shots of the army on the march. The captions were much more complimentary in tone than those eight months earlier had been.55

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In the year between December of 1936 and December of 1937, China's image in the American periodical press changed drastically, as did the situation in China itself. The "kidnapping" of Chiang Kai-shek by his own generals emphasized the danger from Japan, brought to the fore the pleas of the Chinese communists for a united front against that country, leading to open (though undeclared) war between China and Japan. The "kidnapping" incident, arousing more interest in

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55. _Time_, Sept. 20, 1937, p. 14; _Digest_, Sept. 25, 1937, pp. 20-21; _Life_, Oct. 11, 1937, pp. 100-103.

the United States than anything since the May Thirtieth Movement, came at the same time as information about Red areas was arriving in America by way of articles by an American newsman, printed first in London papers. By the end of the year, Edgar Snow's opinions were being published, not only in "liberal" magazines, but in the more conservative, more generally circulated, Saturday Evening Post. As the communists and the Kuomintang joined forces against the Japanese, few writers except those who were pro-Japanese, judged that the Chinese communists were much more than radical socialists who were advocating social reform. Magazines which had spoken distrustfully of the Chinese Reds but a year or less earlier were, by late 1937, finding much about them to admire; and the communist leader, Mao Tse-tung, an unknown quantity at the end of 1936, was being quoted, not only on the communists, but as an authority on guerrilla warfare, which was to be the hope of China. Much more information about the Chinese Reds had become available, pictures and maps had added to a favorable overview, and unity with the Nanking government had made China's communists' "respectable."

CONCLUSION

In the years between 1920 and 1937 an interest in Chinese politics, in particular in the growth and challenge of the Chinese Communist Party, was but a minor concern of American periodicals. Indeed, many magazines barely touched on the subject of China at all; and those which did often found other matters more absorbing than the communists. They told their readers about Chinese customs and habits; discussed the position and privilege of Americans in China; questioned United States policies toward that country, especially whether various military upsets and uprisings there should incur intervention to protect foreign nations; described China's periodic floods, droughts, and famines and what was being done about them; and showed considerable interest in what other nations-- Russia, Britain, and Japan in particular-- were doing in the "Middle Kingdom."

Interest in Chinese politics was generally greatest when a change within China might have an effect on the other nations of the world. Of the communist-related incidents in this eighteen-year period, two, the shootings at Shanghai on May 30, 1925, and the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek in December of 1937, received far more attention than any others. Violent displays of anti-foreign opinion brought on by the first of these caused anxiety for the peoples of other countries who were then within China, as well as for the future of foreign interests in that country. The second was newsworthy because of the drama of the situation, but also because it was seen to be connected with a possible resistance to the Japanese invasion of North China, which had been a matter of international concern since 1931. Communists were accused by many of having instigated the demonstrations bringing on the first of these incidents and were seen as likely to gain by the second, if Chiang were persuaded to stop fighting them and to turn on Japan.

The largest body of communist-connected news came neither during 1925 nor 1936-1937, however. Though no single incident in 1927 was commented on by large numbers of periodicals, the combination of happenings brought about more articles, editorials, and news items than the events of any other year.[1] The northward march of the Kuomintang army attracted numbers of interested persons to China, where they could observe and write. Mindful of the part Russia was playing, Moscow correspondents like Walter Duranty (New York *Times*), William Chamberlin (*Christian Science Monitor*), and Paul Scheffer (*Berliner Tageblatt*) received special assignments to China. Vincent Sheean persuaded *Asia*'s editors to send him there to continue his reports of personal adventures in trouble spots of the world. An international delegation of communists toured China at the time; and one, Jacques Doriot, sent regular reports to a Paris communist paper. Other "leftists" and "liberals" hurried there to watch the course of China's revolution; and some of these, like Anna Louise Strong (who had also been in China a year or so earlier), William Prohme, and

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1. Articles in 1937 provided more real information and may perhaps have taken more columns of print, but they were fewer in number and appeared in a smaller variety of magazines.

Roy Cort, later contributed articles to American periodicals. The course of events elicited articles from regular correspondents, including those listed above, as well as letters and observations from other persons-- teachers, missionaries, businessmen-- who happened to be in China for one reason or another. Because it was impossible at times for writers to separate the communists from the other nationalists, they sometimes treated all alike (as communists), but more often worried in print as to just where to draw the line. Thus communism was most mentioned in that year, though actual knowledge of party machinations was slight. In the years following, when it was easy to separate the two groups, communism received much less comment.

This lack of comment was due as much as anything to a lack of knowledge. Even those writers residing within China found it difficult to learn much about the Chinese communists. The party was relatively small. Its activists in the cities were necessarily secretive; and the centers of its affairs, after 1927, were in the hinterlands, in the mountains and poorer farming districts far from the large cities where westerners and westernized Chinese resided. Also of immediate bearing was the censorship of the Nationalist government. After coming to power, the Nanking government maintained effective control of the news media of the country and extended this control as far as was possible over foreign correspondents living in China. Eventually all news to be cabled out of the country had first to be submitted to a censor for official approval, and material considered unduly critical of the regime was not permitted to be sent.

While control of cables may have affected to some degree the type of news sent back to the United States, and while it undoubtedly made it necessary to send some critical information by other, slower, means of communication, it probably had little effect on Americans' knowledge of the communists. Of far greater import was the internal censorship which prevented Chinese and foreign editors from printing information about the communists-- aside, of course, from government-inspired descriptions of Red atrocities against other Chinese or news of Nationalist victories in the anti-communist campaigns. Moreover, travel to communist-held territories was interdicted. Even writers sufficiently interested to journey to communist areas to gather information would have been prevented from doing so, both by the government and by the communists themselves. Snow's 1936 visit behind Red lines came at an especially opportune moment, when the government troops were somewhat defiant of orders from Nanking and the communists had apparently decided it was time to let the world make their acquaintance.[2]

Even before 1927, before there was a central government strong enough to control the news media or the travel habits of westerners, there were problems of gathering news in China. The cost of sending cabled news was high, much higher than from Europe; and correspondents had to exercise good personal judgement in their choices of what information was worth the price of a long cablegram. (Long feature articles without time value could be sent by surface mail, which was slow. Not until the mid-1930's was a regular air service to the Orient initiated.)[3] Because most of the news originated in Peking or Shanghai, correspondents lived in these cities. The rest of China's land mass was covered only when these correspondents made trips into the interior or had arrangements with someone living in another city. Thus there were not western writers at hand to witness the arrival of Russian advisors in Canton, the March 26 coup of Chiang Kai-shek, or the beginnings of the Northern expedition.

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[2] Information on Nationalist censorship appeared from time to time in references made by periodical editors or by the writers of articles. More complete discussions were Agnes Smedley, "The Corrupt Press in China," Nation, July 3, 1935, pp. 8-10; and Edgar Snow, "The Way of the Chinese Censor," Current History XLII (July, 1935), 381-386. In his introductory chapter and elsewhere throughout Red Star Over China, Snow makes further mention of the difficulties of news-gathering in China. Another individual's brushes with the censorial system may be found throughout much of Hallett Abend, My Life in China (New York, 1943).

Had there been western correspondents observing these events, they might have had more publicity, but this is not certain. Descriptions of various Canton happenings reached Shanghai within a short while. At least one English-language Shanghai paper, the China Weekly Review, received news regularly from a western-educated Chinese living in Canton. But similar reports were coming in from all sections of China. Many warlords employed foreign advisors-- English, American, Australian, German, White Russian-- and there were always

3. In time to carry home pictures of the Lukouchiao incident (July, 1937) and the Panay sinking (December). See ibid. and Life, Aug. 9, 1937, pp. 64-75.

coups of one sort or another taking place or offensives being launched. Though correspondents knew that Russians-- Red Russians-- were aiding Sun Yat-sen, they obviously did not judge this to be of sufficient importance to make an issue of it in a news report.[4]

Similarly, while in retrospect one may wish that correspondents had written more about what they knew of the communists in China after 1928, it is not at all difficult to understand why they did not. The Reds were, after all, a small group struggling in the back country, not far different, except for some connection with a world-wide organization (and the amount was debatable), from the numerous bandits groups which had throughout history kept parts of China in ferment. Information about such a small number of persons, especially insofar as their future importance could not be known, could be only a small part of the total news from China; and the news from China was, relative to the news from Europe, slight.[5]

Though Americans are assumed to have had some type of special, friendly feeling for the Chinese, evidenced by the

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[4] For information about correspondents in China and their reactions to various events, see J. B. Powell, "The American Correspondent in China," Asia XXVII (May, 1927), 380-382; also Powell's autobiography, My Twenty-Five Years in China (New York, 1945); also Hallett Abend's autobiography (op. cit.); Percy Finch, Shanghai and Beyond (New York, 1953); and Randall Gould, China in Sun (New York, 1946).

[5] Also, the Sino-Japanese situation absorbed the most attention. Those autobiographical works mentioned above include relatively little about the communists though one of the authors (Gould) visited Kiangsi in 1935. They stressed Japan's role in China.

Open Door and by the return of Boxer indemnities, their knowledge of and interest in that country do not appear to have been especially great during the 1920's and early 1930's. Many popular magazines went for years without printing an article on China. In the eighteen-year period under discussion, Colliers had no such articles, while the American Mercury had but three, only two of which were of any value to this study.[6] Harper's also had very few pieces on China or the Chinese which were concerned with politics. Other periodicals including only a small number of useful articles were Century and the North American Review with but three articles apiece;[7] the Saturday Evening Post, with five articles and two pieces of fiction about communism in China; Forum, with eight articles; and the Missionary Review with four articles and nine editorials.

Even periodicals with a professed interest in international news often neglected the Chinese-- indeed the Far Eastern-- scene. The peccadillos of a minor European nation's royalty were viewed with more interest than were the campaigns of Chinese generals. Time magazine, one of whose publishers had been born and raised in China, paid more attention to the marriages, love affairs, and personal problems of Carol of Rumania than it did to China.[8] Even so, it did better by

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[6] The other was a declamation against American missionaries.
[7] This last magazine was the only one except Colliers published in 1926-1927 which failed, even in a current events column, to comment on events in China; Century's three articles all came in that period.
[8] Other examples could possibly be found; but the arrangement of Time was such that Rumania's news always came just before whatever the magazine had to offer on China

China than did its emulator, *Newsweek*, which, in the four and one-half years between its founding and the end of 1937, discussed the China situation less than half as often.

Asia, begun by a one-time consul to Manchuria to bring information about the East to Americans, expanded its coverage to include such diverse topics as the Polynesians of Hawaii, the problems of Russia, and the tribes and animals of Africa. This gave a rather wide interpretation to "Asia," and one is forced to conclude that real interest in the East alone was restricted. The magazine headed the list in numbers of articles on China and the communists. Even so, it averaged fewer than four per year useful to this study.

With such a small proportion of publication space given over to China, it is difficult to determine a definite outlook on the China situation for most of the monthlies. Those like *Asia*, *Current History*, and the *Living Age* which were published for public enlightenment included the most articles and attempted to give balanced coverage-- the first two by using articles by open-minded writers and the last by including works from the far left as well as the far right.

The most general magazines hardly gave enough material to indicate a bias. The *American Mercury*'s two articles mentioning the Chinese communists were favorable to the Reds; but it would seem more likely to assume these to be evidences of an extension of that periodical's well-known disapproval

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and Japan, and the inequality of space given to these areas was particularly flagrant.

of "the establishment" than an approval of the Chinese Communist Party. Harper's two offerings were in disagreement. A tale praising a Christian girl revolutionary appeared just a month before an article which discussed Russia's actions in China and explained that though both the Christians and the communists claimed goals of social and racial justice, Christians should remember that Russia was trying to attain its goals through war and militarism and should thus hesitate to lend moral (and other) support. Similarly, the Saturday Evening Post, though with more articles on Chinese politics, would be difficult to categorize on the basis of these offerings alone. They varied from a knowledgeable warning of Comintern interests in the Far East through a lengthy eulogy of Sun Yat-sen to two 1927 articles which equated the nationalists with communism and considered all bad. Ten years later came a different outlook: Snow's suggestion that the communists should be equated with nationalism and considered in many ways superior to the Nationalist government.

Those weeklies whose editorial columns frequently discussed international events and commented on matters covered by their articles were easier to judge. Even there, however, mention of China was not frequent. In the fourteen years of the Christian Century considered, there were but sixty editorials whose views were seen as useful to this study (and many of these did not mention communism, but seemed important because of what they did not say). That averages fewer than one editorial for ten issues, with each issue containing from eight to ten editorials in all. Moreover, nearly a third of the sixty appeared in 1927, lowering the average for all other years.

The Nation and the New Republic gave approximately the same proportion of editorial space to Chinese politics, the latter slightly exceeding the average of the Christian Century, the former not quite reaching it. All three of these magazines maintained a liberal point of view, with the New Republic taking a stand against Chiang at first, then for the new government, then against it. All three presented articles by a variety of writers with views ranging from open-minded to radical leftist.

The contributors, of course, provided one key to the outlook of a magazine. The Atlantic Monthly's essential conservatism was shown by its selection of articles from such writers as an American woman "adopted" by a Chinese gentry family and married to a British civil servant working for the Chinese government, a Japanese correspondent, a missionary's son, and an historian of Imperial China. However, few magazines had monopolies on prolific writers; the missionary's son also wrote a series for Asia, while the Japanese correspondent made numerous contributions to Current History.

It is interesting to note that there was in the greater part of this period no single writer who was considered an authority on China's communists-- though Snow was to be in that position by 1937. Between a third and a half of the signed articles used in this study were singles-- the only one on the topic by a particular author. Less than half were written by persons who had contributed three or more on the general topic, and only seventeen writers had five or more articles on the Chinese political scene printed in American periodicals from 1920-1937.[9] Though these more prolific writers had their ideas before the public for a longer period of time, each seemed to hold forth for a relatively short period before becoming "lost" to periodical readers. Nathaniel Peffer, with articles appearing between 1922 and 1932, held the stage the longest, though George Sokolsky (1925-1934) came close; and Edgar Snow and Maxwell Stewart (1931-1937 and 1930-1937) were catching up when the study ended. So was Agnes Smedley, whose writings on China began at about the same time as those of Snow and Stewart. Others, like Lewis Gannett, Vincent Sheean, Norman Hanwell, and John McCook Roots, wrote a series of articles based on one visit to or one period of observation in China. Only Wilbur Burton (whose works appeared from 1933 to 1936), Snow, Smedley, and Sokolsky resided long in China during the period in which they wrote.

Thus changes in views of periodicals toward the Chinese communists must be seen as due not only to changes taking place in China, but to altered situations in the United States and the world and to an ever-varying list of contributors (and of editors, too).

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[9] Except for Quincy Wright, who wrote numerous articles as well as his column, this omits the news columnists of Current History, some of whom did other writing. Theirs, as well as one or two of the single articles, may have had additional impact because the author's name was familiar to readers, having appeared over articles on other topics.

Though each magazine differed somewhat from the rest in attention given to China and though each contributor had a slightly different view of the situation, the general outlook of American periodicals toward communism in China was as follows. In the early 1920's, there was some apprehension about the spread of communism owing to its proponents' sudden attainment of power in Russia and the stepped-up activity of its agents throughout the world. Realization of this in the United States had resulted in the 1919 "Red Scare." Those who paid attention to Comintern speeches and writings and to the Far East knew of "Bolshevik" aims in that part of the world; but most felt that communism was so alien to the Eastern philosophy that its agents could accomplish little there.

In 1925 Chinese unrest and growing nationalism led a few alarmists to talk of Bolshevist intrigues, but claims to this effect went unproven, and writers pooh-poohed the idea. A year or so later it became evident that Russians were plotting with the Kuomintang, but no one was sure to what degree or to what end. Periodicals wondered about this, but were not very interested until the Kuomintang began to move northward, defeating warlords along the way.

In late 1926 and throughout 1927 views of the Kuomintang-communist alliance varied from fear (of its anti-foreignism) to exultation (that it seemed destined to unite and strengthen China). There was also considerable speculation about the strength of the communist element. When, in late 1927, it appeared that the communists were to be excluded, a few contributors sorrowed; but most periodicals, even those who had given support to the "left" Kuomintang, wrote with pleasure and hope about the new government, though expressing a little concern about its treatment of suspected Reds.

However, within a few years, as it became evident that the new government leaned heavily on the gentry and business classes and could not live up to its "revolutionary" promises, there came a time of disenchantment. Meanwhile the communists regrouped in the hills and began programs destined to win support from the peasants. Liberals began to wonder about championing the new groups. In the years which followed, the Nationalists were more and more forced to give up planned reforms in order to face the threat from within. At the same time they were unable to face a threat from without: Japanese encroachment.

As the Kuomintang stopped-- or moved less fast than observers would have wished-- hints came to western ears of the reforms being carried out in the soviet regions. Although unable to check on these rumors by investigation, writers tended to discredit the Nanking government's tales of hardships faced in the Red areas and to wonder if the Chinese communists might provide an answer for China's ills. (Both reforms and oppressions took place in the soviets, but the oppressions at hand seemed worse.) Bolshevism was less of a worry by the 1930's, when Russia was again admitted to the list of countries recognized by the United States.

In 1936, after the Reds had been driven from the southern regions and had made their long and heroic trek to the

Northwest (periodical writers had assumed for months that they had stopped to settle in Szechwan), a political economist doing research in areas through which the communists had passed provided American readers with detailed information about the social, economic, and agricultural reforms practiced by the Reds. Some months later, while the world was still amazed by the "kidnapping" which led later to a declared peace between Chinese communists and the Nanking government, the earliest first-hand information about the Red Chinese was published. Again, reforms were stressed and cruelties denied. With the increased good will of the following months, other reporters visited, photographed, and wrote of the Chinese communists. The suspicions of later years seemed well founded: the communists were good-hearted reformers and "nice guys." Meanwhile, goodwill seemed to extend to the Nationalists. As the attacking Japanese became the "bad guys," all Chinese benefitted in American eyes.

Throughout the greater portion of the writings about the Chinese communists runs a thread of speculation-- often of disbelief and doubt. How Red were these people, anyway? Were they really communists? To decide this for himself, each writer tended first to define his terms, to set up a careful definition of communism as he understood it-- based not exactly on ignorance, but on his own conception of classic Marxist ideas, usually without any of the "refinements" applied by later communist thinkers. Having once thus defined communism, the writer would note that the Chinese Reds did not fit the mold and would therefore have to assume they were not communists.[10] Thus Paul Reinsch could declare in 1920 and others restate in later years that China need not fear communism because its economy was largely agricultural and its customs opposed to such concepts as class warfare. Thus the government at Canton was called non-communist because it not only permitted, but urged, expanded trade. Thus the essential Marxism of the soviets was doubted because land was divided among the people instead of being held in common.

Here, then, were to be found, especially in the descriptions of Hanwell and Snow, the roots of the concepts which led to the "agrarian reformer" label of the decade following. The term itself did not gain currency in the American periodical press in or before 1937, but the idea was beginning to develop. Both Hanwell and Snow described the reforms made in the countryside and both showed clearly why these "Reds" could not be considered pure Marxists. It was but a step to labelling them "agrarian reformers" when "even missionaries" found life for the peasants under their rule to be better than elsewhere in the country.

10. It has been claimed that U.S. diplomats were handicapped by an inadequate knowledge of communism when they discussed the Chinese Reds in the 1940's (See especially Tang Tsou, America's Failure in China, 1941-1950, Chicago, 1963, pp. 176-236.) Perhaps so, but this research shows that they were in good company. It should also be noted that Stalin and Trotsky disagreed as to whether the Chinese were communist, and that Stalin was calling them "margerine communists" and "radish communists" until late in the 1940's. See Herbert Feis, The China Tangle (New York, 1965), pp. 140-141 for comments by Stalin.

It has been suggested that the missionary attitude shaped American opinions of China. Has this been proved in the light of this study? Here again one would have to demand a definition of terms and then might find the definition too narrow or too broad. If the statement can be construed to mean that the missionaries themselves, in particular those devoted mainly to a spreading of the gospel, greatly influenced American thought, the answer would be, "Not so-- at least not through the periodical press." Most writers for the press were scornful of the average missionary in China, though occasionally admitting to having met one or two who seemed out of the ordinary. Even the Christian Century's editors and contributors differentiated between types of missionaries, seeing those with less narrow interests as being superior to the others.

However, if by "missionary attitude," one means the point of view of those who had been raised in an atmosphere of devotion to the "social gospel," who paid as much or more attention to the social aspects than to the religious, the answer would have to be "Yes." In this category can be placed most of the contributors to the Christian Century, as well as writers for Asia, the Nation, and the New Republic-- and the founders of Time. Among them were many with the "missionary spirit"-- teachers, social workers, labor leaders, and "leftist" writers-- individuals who might scorn the average missionary, but who would also join him in working for the betterment of society in China. They shared a common belief that the lot of the Chinese could be improved and a common faith in the ability of the Chinese to do this for themselves, if given the opportunity-- and a little assistance.

Using the broader definition of "missionary attitude" or "missionary spirit," one could, indeed, encompass the majority of those writing about Chinese politics in the period under discussion. The most conservative elements, the supporters of the status quo or those who desired more foreign intervention in China, were seldom heard from in the periodical press. There were, of course, individuals like J. O. P. Bland, who were convinced that Chinese could never be unselfish; like Rodney Gilbert, who were sure that efficiency was "un-Chinese"; or like the editor of the Argonaut, who felt that "coolies" could not even fight. But the larger percentage of such persons did not write articles or editorials, and the three mentioned stand out in that they look at Chinese matters differently from other writers of the time. The businessmen in the treaty ports seldom wrote for publication, and their views were thus less well circulated, leaving the periodical field open to the balanced, more academic approach or to the "liberals."

Because of their "missionary spirit," most writers supported the idea of a strengthened Chinese government as a way in which the Chinese could help themselves. This attitude also led many to look to the communists because the communists seemed to be aiding the masses of the people, whereas the Nationalists helped only a few. And it was no doubt the desire to have the people well treated which led some of the missionaries themselves not to oppose the Reds, but to work with them in bringing education and sanitation to the peasants.

Did the American periodical press serve the American people well in this period, or was it guilty of misleading them about China? Any answer to this would have to be qualified. In general, the periodicals were good servants and teachers. There is little evidence that Bertrand Russell's complaint of being served "such news as they may think good for us, not without a certain economy of the truth" was applicable to America's magazines, even if the British telegraphic agencies might have deserved his reprimand. Magazine editors at times complained that the daily press was filled too much with "spectacular" news items, and they usually attempted to counteract the trend. Reliable information, they often remarked, was difficult to get-- but, as noted earlier, it was difficult for correspondents to get, also.[11]

It might possibly be argued that, as American policies toward China during the early (and even later) 1940's were based on a rather unrealistic assessment of China's world position and as it has herein been suggested that most

[11] Even Comintern members did not know what the Chinese communists were doing in many instances. A _Communist International_ provided erroneous information about CCP leaders in 1936; and Stalin seems not to have known when the Kiangsi soviets were first formed. See Schwartz, _Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao_, p. 136.

magazine articles about China during the 1920's and early 1930's were full of the "missionary spirit," a cause and effect might be assumed. Perhaps the policy-shapers had been greatly influenced by their reading in the previous decade? There could, of course, be a connection; but a clear-cut case of cause and effect would be difficult to substantiate. In the first place, even those magazines which were most concerned with the well-being of China did not say that all was well there. The Nationalist government, the government with which the United States dealt in the war years, had been thoroughly castigated by the liberal magazines in the years before 1937, though there was a falling-off in criticism after the Japanese attack. One could hardly have absorbed what enthusiasm for China the magazines showed without also taking in considerable doubt about the Kuomintang government.

Moreover, as there was a change in outlook observable in the last months of 1937, after the Lukouchiao incident, it might be expected that the periodical press in the 1938-1941 period grew more favorable toward the Chinese as they stood up to increased Japanese pressures. That period can not be overlooked in considering attitudes of the 1940's.

And then the magazines were not the only sources of information, probably not even the most influential. To understand completely the information which was shaping American opinion during any given period, more attention must be given the daily press. Periodical editors said it was given to sensational-type stories, but this accusation should be investigated before being accepted completely. Also of increasing importance in the 1920's and 1930's was the radio. Newscasts undoubtably made an impact, too.

To measure the impacts of the various news media is a virtual impossibility. An attempt was made during this study to see if members of Congress made references to the magazines under consideration in speeches about China's political situation. It was discovered that China was talked about very seldom in the 1926-1927 period, before which China's communists were too much an unknown element to expect discussion, and that the topics brought up were most likely concerned with matters like consulates or indemnities. (Cases from the Boxer Rebellion of 1900 were still being considered a quarter-century later.) Between December of 1926 and February of 1927, in a period when the periodicals were worrying in print about the political "color" of the northward-moving Kuomintang, Congress did discuss China from time to time, largely because there was a question of recognition and of possible treaty revision to be considered.

It appeared that the United States Congress was unconcerned with the possibility of a communist threat in China. One speaker made passing reference to Bolshevism, but stated that it was no problem because only a few of China's leaders were influenced and because what he mistakenly called the "traditionally religious" Chinese would never assimilate "the blasphemies of Bolshevism."[12] One other reference to communism was found in a quoted editorial from a newspaper, which denied that China's anti-foreignism was really Bolshevism, even though it was encouraged by Russia.[13] In both instances, mention of communism was but a sentence in a lengthy discussion of tariffs, extraterritoriality, American business in China, and the chance of a revision of treaties. The 'twenties and 'thirties were not years when the hint of a threat of communism in a foreign country aroused a strong reaction in Congress.

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[12] Congressional Record, 69th Congress, Second Session, pp. 877-978. The speaker was Representative Black of

The Congressional Record, then, added nothing to information on the impact of periodicals on government officials; but it did serve to corroborate what the periodicals themselves had shown: China was not especially high on the list of subjects of interest to Americans, and interest was greatest when changes in China might demand changes in American policies.

Therefore, while American magazines did not provide their readers with a clear and detailed picture of the Chinese Communist Party and its activities during that party's earliest years, they did give as complete a view as could be expected, considering the paucity of material available, even in China itself. When more information was brought to light, a variety of the magazines rushed it into print. No single periodical consistently kept before its readers even a relatively good picture of China. But it may well be that as a

New York. See also ibid., pp. 1862-1863, 2324-2326; 2383-2386; 4386-4389; and 4672-4673.

[13] Ibid., p. 1862.

group the periodicals, scanty though their offerings may have been, provided more information about Chinese politics than the great majority of Americans would have wished. This was not a period when Americans were highly concerned with-- or felt threatened by-- problems in the "Middle Kingdom."

APPENDIX I -- PERIODICAL CIRCULATION

The figures below give the reported circulation of the periodicals under consideration. This will provide some key to the influence of each, though it must be remembered that numbers reached is only relative. One may assume that the readers of such periodicals as the _Nation_, the _New Republic_, and to some degree _Forum_ would in themselves be more influential than most readers of _Colliers_ and the _Saturday Evening Post_. Subscribers to the _World Tomorrow_, however, may be supposed to have been largely those whose ideas it confirmed anyway. All figures are from N.-W. Ayer and Sons, _Directory of Newspapers and Periodicals_. A dash indicates that the periodical was listed, but that its circulation had not been reported.

Periodical	1922	1928	1934	1936
American Mercury		77,277	33,316	30,178
America	20,000	---	---	---
Argonaut	15,540	8,000	12,462	25,495
Asia	68,370	60,078	38,416	38,900
Atlantic Monthly	114,253	132,348	99,439	110,064
Century	42,518	23,946		
Christian Century	---	35,000	---	28,643
Colliers	1,024,714	1,327,875	2,172,963	2,415,896
Commonweal		---	19,638	---
Current History	29,323	67,120	46,150	42,361
Current Opinion	57,185			
Forum	15,000	67,039	40,186	33,210
Harpers	80,352	111,527	100,105	101,807
Independent	110,000	12,163		
Life**				
Literary Digest	900,000	1,570,000	978,178	920,164
Living Age	---	16,472	5,000	5,000
Missionary Review	9,316	8,000		---
Nation	30,584	30,188	36,092	35,024
New Republic	35,000	25,000	25,000	25,000
Newsweek				114,074
North American Review	17,709	---	---	---
Outlook	93,758	66,570	---	---
Review of Reviews	223,870	160,669	130,016	124,464
Saturday Evening Post	2,100,098	2,295,388	2.776,502	2,811,410
Time		136,460	428,950	544,332
World Tomorrow	6,668		15,000	

**_Life_ was not begun early enough to be recorded in these years. However, its first recorded circulation figure, in 1938, was already 1,005,895.

APPENDIX II -- CHRONOLOGY

1920 March- Peking announced receipt of Karakhan note
Spring- Voitinsky and Yang sent to China by Comintern
Communist Youth Corps founded in France by Chou, Li, et. al.
Sept. 1-8- Baku Conference
Sept.- Conference in Shanghai discussing formation of CCP
1921 July- First Congress of Chinese Communist Party, Shanghai
Oct.- Hunan branch of CCP
Nov.-Feb., 1922- Washington Conference
1922 Jan.-Mar.- Hong Kong strike
Jan.-Feb.- Congress of Toilers of the East, Moscow and Petrograd
June- CCP manifesto urging united front with Kuomintang
May-July- Second Congress of CCP
Aug.- Individual members on CCP began joining KMT
Autumn- Joffe to Peking
1923 Jan.- Sun-Joffe meeting, Shanghai (Jan. 20: Declaration)
June- Third Congress of CCP, Canton
Summer- Chiang Kai-shek in Moscow
Sept.- Karakhan to Peking
Oct.- Borodin in Canton
1924 Jan.- First Congress of KMT
May- Whampoa Academy founded
Sino-Soviet treaty
Oct.- Merchant Corps defeated, Canton
1925 Jan.- Fourth Congress of CCP, Canton or Shanghai
May 30- Shanghai shootings
Mao began organizing Hunan peasants
June- General strike at Canton
Shameen shootings
1926 Jan.- KMT elections for CEC- defeat for rightists
Second Congress of KMT
Mar. 20- Chiang's coup in Canton
June 9- Northern expedition launched
Oct. 11- Fall of Wuhan cities
1927 Jan.- KMT government officially at Hankow
Feb.- Abortive rising in Shanghai
Mar.- Nanking, Shanghai fell to KMT
Apr.- Raid on Russian legation, embassy officials withdrawn
Apr. 12- Shanghai union leaders, communists disarmed and executed
Apr. 27- Fifth Congress of CCP, Hankow
May- Hunan and Hupei uprisings
Quelled May and June
June 1- Stalin telegram to CCP
July- KMT Left reaction; Russian advisors left
Aug.- Nanchang uprisings
Sept.- Autumn Crop uprisings
Swatow taken by CCP leaders
Oct.- First Chinese soviet organized by P'eng P'ai (To Feb., 1928)
Dec. 11- Canton commune; Russian consulates closed

1928 Jan.- Chu Teh led uprisings, Southern Hunan
May- Organization of CCP Fourth Army
June- Peking taken by Nationalists
July-Sept.- Sixth Congress of CCP, Moscow
July- P'eng Teh-huai led uprising, Hunan
Oct.- Organic Law of National Government
1929 Apr.-June- Soviet consulates in Manchuria raided, closed
June- CCP Second Plenum meeting, Shanghai
July- Soviet consular officials arrested
Relations with Russia broken
Aug.- Soviet formed in Kiangsi
Dec. 22- Khabarovsk protocol, ending Sino-Soviet hostilities
1930 Feb.- Kiangsi Provincial Soviet organized
May- Convention of Delegates from Soviet Areas, Shanghai
July 27-Aug. 3- Changsha in communist hands
Dec.- First Anti-communist Campaign
Futien incident
1931 May- Second Anti-communist Campaign
Provisional Constitution of Nationalist Government
July- Third Anti-communist campaign
Sept. 18- Mukden incident
Sept. 20- CCP denunciation of Japan
Nov.- First All-China Soviet Congress, Juichin
Chinese Soviet Republic established
1932 Jan.- Shanghai attacked by Japan
CCP offer of unity with any group against Japan
CCP declaration of war against Japan
Mar.- Manchukuo established
June- Fourth Anti-communist Campaign
Aug.-Sept.- CCP Secretariat moved from Shanghai to Juichin
1933 Jan.- Japanese entry into Jehol
Another CCP offer of unity against Japan
May 3- Tangku Truce, ending hostilities
Nov.-Jan., 1934- Fukien Revolt
Dec.- Resumption of Sino-Soviet diplomatic relations
1934 Jan.- Second All-China Soviet Congress, Juichin
Fifth Anti-communist Campaign
Oct.- Long March began
1935 Jan.- Tsunyi Conference, Kweichow
July-Aug.- Mao Erh-kai Conference, Northwest Szechwan
Anti-Japanese united front Offer- to KMT
July- Seventh Comintern Congress
Oct.- First Long March units in Shensi
Dec.- Resolve for Anti-Japanese united front
1936 Aug.- CCP proposal to KMT CEC of united front against Japan
Sept.- CCP resolution for Unified Democratic Republic
Dec. 12-25- Chiang "kidnapped" at Sian
Dec.- Red Army occupied Yenan
1937 July 7- Lukouchiao incident, Peking
Sept.- Formal announcement of KMT-CCP united front

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2. PERIODICALS AND MAGAZINES

America, 1920-1937. New York. Catholic weekly of intellectual substance. Very few articles on Chinese politics or on China generally. News column which, between 1927 and change of format in April, 1933, made frequent reference to Chinese situation, in particular to communist depredations against missions. Strongly anti-communist.

American Mercury, 1924-1937. New York. Monthly magazine of opinion and comment, with literary value. Most influential in the 1920's, when it represented the period's skepticism and iconoclasm, less so in 1930's. Only three articles on Chinese situation in fourteen years--one on missionaries, two on communists and Kuomintang.

Argonaut, 1920-1937. San Francisco. Weekly, mostly of local news, but with some national and world comment. Strongly conservative, anti-communist. Interest in Far East was slight, found mainly in infrequent editorials, and colored by a racial bias.

Asia, 1920-1037. New York. Devoted to articles on area between west coast of North America and Central Africa (North Africa, Russia, and Hawaii being considered). Material included a few short stories, articles on culture and history, reminiscences, as well as political discussions. Attempt made to print all points of view, though most was for "enlightenment." Editorial comment infrequent, though greater in late 1930's. Monthly.

Atlantic Monthly, 1920-1937. Boston. Old (begun in 19th century) monthly characterized by literary style as well as alertness to concerns of its day. Articles on China's politics mostly by people then in China. Varied points of view, though none "radical."

Century, 1920-1930. New York. Old monthly of decreasing importance throughout the 1920's. Merged with Forum in 1930, after short life as a quarterly. Only three articles on China in this period, all relating its situation to the international scene.

Christian Century, 1924-1937. Chicago. Interdenominational weekly, perhaps most influential of Protestant papers. Founded as a denominational weekly, but was too outspoken and liberal to retain such ties. Concern with China of both humanitarian and intellectual variety. Many articles and editorials on proper role of missionaries and on U. S. policies in the Far East. Contributors

varied from those opposed to communism to some "fellow travelers." Editorial mention of communist-related affairs not frequent-- seldom more than three or four a year, except in 1927.

Colliers, 1920-1937. New York. Weekly of large circulation, containing a balance of political and economic comment, as well as short stories and coverage of the sports and amusement worlds. No articles on China and its problems with communism in this period.

Commonweal, 1924-1937. New York. A weekly review of the arts, literature, and public affairs, written for Catholics, but widely read by others. Of a liberal persuasion, it accepted articles by writers of all faiths. Editorials showed anti-communism and Anglophobia of Irish Catholicism. China not often mentioned-- mostly in 1925 and 1927, very seldom thereafter.

Current History, 1920-1937. New York. Monthly begun by New York Times to cover international situation. Included some diplomatic documents and texts of speeches, as well as articles by journalists in China and Chinese in America. From 1924-1935 a monthly news column by professors of Far Eastern politics, history, or international law made frequent reference to the Chinese political situation. News items usually contained a minimum of commentary. Views of articles varied with the writers, who were of many persuasions.

Current Opinion, 1920-1925. New York. Monthly of diminishing importance, bought out by the Literary Digest in 1925. A few articles, editorials, and cartoons of conservative outlook.

Forum, 1920-1937. Philadelphia and New York. Monthly containing discussions about contemporary issues, presented from many points of view. Magazine remaining non-partisan. China coverage slight: only three articles in period mentioned communism there.

Harpers Monthly Magazine, 1920-1937. New York. (Herein called Harpers.) Monthly of fiction and history. Mention of China very infrequent. Only two articles, both in 1927, related to communism or nationalism there.

Independent and Weekly Review, 1920-1928. Boston. (Herein called Independent.) Distributed both weekly and biweekly until merger with the Outlook in 1928. Not much on Chinese politics, though some references in 1925 and a few more in 1927. Articles varied in view, though editorials were mostly written with sympathy and an open mind.

Life, 1936-1937. New York. Pictorial weekly begun in Nov., 1936. Excellent pictorial coverage of news events and matters of interest, with commentary of varying quality.

Literary Digest, 1920-1937. New York. (In 1937, merged with Review of Reviews, became the Digest.) Weekly containing information about world affairs, giving commentary from many sources, until mid-thirties, when format was changed and material was all pre-digested for the reader. Large circulation in the 1920's. China coverage greatest

1925-1928, after which there were from one to eight (1936) communist-connected articles a year. View generally anti-communist, but not virulently so.

Living Age, 1920-1937. Boston and New York. Bi-weekly to 1928, then monthly gathering of articles from newspapers and periodicals the world over. Excellent coverage of different points of view, from communist to treaty-port varieties. Editorials also contained comments from abroad. China coverage not large, but relatively good.

Missionary Review of the World, 1920-1937. New York. (Herein called Missionary Review.) Monthly news of Protestant missions throughout the world. Little interest shown in politics of various nations, even when this threatened missionaries.

Nation, 1920-1937. New York. A weekly "organ of liberalism," with interpretive essays, as well as texts of documents, summaries from the foreign press, and numerous editorials in each issue. Contributors included communist sympathizers and fellow travelers among other liberals. Balance of opinion as long as Oswald Garrison Villard was editor (to 1932). Took sides more later. China coverage relatively good.

New Republic, 1920-1937. New York. Another liberal weekly. Supported a point of view more than did Nation. Pro-KMT to 1930, later more friendly to CCP. Slightly less coverage of China than the Nation, but still more than most magazines.

Newsweek, 1933-1937. New York. (Called News Week to 1937.) Weekly news digest with some signed columns (none on China). China-communist interest slight; few news items, bias not indicated.

North American Review, 1920-1937. New York. Monthly (except for 1924-1925, when issued quarterly) with little interest in China. Three conservative articles in ten years.

Outlook, 1920-1935. New York. (Called New Outlook 1932-1935.) Weekly to 1932, monthly thereafter. Changes in staff reflected in magazine: in 1928 and before, articles on China were written by a variety of people, mildly liberal, liberal, and conservative. Editorials indicated some interest, some openness of mind. After 1928, new editor (Al Smith) had less interest in Asia. The few references to China still impartial.

Review of Reviews, 1920-1937. New York. (Merged with Literary Digest, 1937.) Monthly digest of world affairs. China's political coverage was slight: a few articles in 1925 and 1927, but only three brief references thereafter.

Saturday Evening Post, 1920-1937. Philadelphia. A popular and conservative weekly, which printed but five articles and two stories on China and communism in the period considered. These were largely anti-communist, though Snow's article in 1937 showed a favorable view of the Chinese communists.

Time, 1923-1937. New York, Cleveland, and Chicago. Weekly news digest with more interest in China than similar digests and a favorable attitude toward the Nationalist

government, though not unaware of its faults.

World Tomorrow, 1920-1934. New York. Monthly (except briefly in 1932) journal of Christian socialism. Infrequent mention of China and communists often related to labor or social codes.

Communist International, 1936. New York. Used only to check biographical data as given about CCP leaders.

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